# 1NC

## Off-Case

### 1NC

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the resolution.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---fairness---a limited and predictable topic defines prep and research, while preventing the aff from skirting clash, moving to the fringes, and picking true arguments, which wrecks neg ground; this outweighs because debate’s a game---competition encourages research practices and innovation, which is a prerequisite to participation

#### 2---clash---open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

## Case

### 1NC---Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption---the 1ac does have and advocacy or an endpoint---every argument has alt causes that the introduction of the 1ac can never overcome.

### 1NC---AT: Stiegler

#### They said Stiegler:

#### Every facet of their argument is totalizing and wrong---incremental improvements to capitalism solve.

Beardsworth 10, Head of the School of Politics and International Studies and Professor of International Politics at the University of Leeds (Richard, “Technology and Politics: A Response to Bernard Stiegler,” Cultural Politics (2010) 6 (2): 181–199, dml)

Now, for Stiegler, the question of technics is a Greek question because the relation between the human and the technical is explicitly posed by the Greeks, and any thinking on technology necessarily works within this Greek framework.5 Whatever one makes of this thesis technologically speaking, the question of the modern and contemporary autonomy of the economic from the social whole is nevertheless not Greek. With the end of the Cold War, with increasing trans-border activity of capital, goods, and, to a much lesser extent, labor, capital comes to determine the terms in which the allocation of scarce resources is made. Capital becomes, that is, general, and there is for the foreseeable future no alternative to it.6 All human beings live within the system of capital, whatever the particular node they live on, or conjunction they make with it. This system is highly unstable and dissymmetrical with immense imbalances in equality, natural resource distribution, financial assets, and terms of trade. With no alternative to capital, a revolutionary politics is no longer tenable. The ethical question driving political innovation has, consequently, to be worked out in terms of universally coordinated, but locally determined equilibriums between growth, sustainability, and equity. Given economic interdependence and the necessity of large transfers of technology and wealth from the developed world to the developing world in the context of climate change, effective financial regulation, economic coordination, and staggered development present the right strategies to tame the excesses of neoliberal global capitalism. Whether these strategies are feasible or not is at present an open question given recent government failure to regulate risk-taking and the evident dilemma, for developing countries, between the need for curtailed energy use, on the one hand, and industrialization and exit from poverty, on the other.

Now, whatever our answers to these large questions, the political question today—‘who are we?’—can only be appraised if the political economy of a globalized world becomes the direct object of critical attention. Only by foregrounding this object and its dilemmas will one have any chance of critical purchase on the political challenges ahead. In this context, Stiegler's foregrounding of technology to promote a new critique of political economy is decisive in purpose and tone, important in detail, but misplaced in general intent. Stiegler is right to stress again the pertinence of the economy for critical thought after “the supposed economism of Marxism” (2009: 29). His technologically trained focus on the alienated consumer is important within the cognitive dimension of contemporary capitalism and debt-led growth. But, if he is concerned to show, as a philosopher, the general lines of a re-invented critical political economy, his object and attention need to be much larger than his “Greek” framework affords. Since there is no systemic alternative to capitalism at this moment in history, the question of political economy is one of whether effective regulation of capitalism is possible or not for the world as a whole.

In this regard, I fear that Stiegler's rhetorical logic of excess testifies to a straightforward shift of Marxist terminology (from producer to consumer) rather than a reinvention of Marxism's object (political economy). I say this despite the deep interest in understanding cognitive capitalism and consumerism through Stiegler's categories. To take a few examples from only the last pages of Pour une nouvelle critique de l'économie politique: we are witnessing the “extreme disenchantment of the world” (2009: 88), a “generalized proletariat [of consumption]” (89), the “disappearance of the middle classes” (89), the “destruction” of social association (87), and “lawless and faithless” elites of capitalism (88). This logic of excess ignores the need today to make small distinctions, under the canopy of political regulation, within the world as a whole. The art of politics today is the prudential art of making critical distinctions within an economy of the same. “Critical philosophy” may wish to eschew such distinctions, but it does so at its practical peril when there is no alternative to capitalism, and when, just as importantly, the mid-term horizon is global coordination of a world economy under circumstances of economic imbalance, energy-crisis, and poverty.

The political questions today are therefore: “what kind of regulation of capitalism is ethically and empirically appropriate?”; “at what level is it appropriate?”; and “what instance should and can decide?”. These are vast and difficult questions for philosophy, political science, and economics: they will occupy minds and bodies for a long time to come. It is my belief that, within these questions and their distinctions, an engaged philosophy (which Stiegler rightly advocates) has an important role to play. A generalized technological reading of Marx creates in this context important cultural work; but it does not give itself the terms of a contemporary critique of political economy.

I end this section with one example of what kinds of matter need to be “adopted,” and how. There has been much talk recently of the regulation of financial offshore centers. Such talk, when coming from elite bodies in power, can serve as a smoke-screen to evade the major issue of imbalances within the world economy as a whole (particularly the northwestern problem of public and private debt). Worldwide coordinated investment in the real economy remains in this context an outstanding question. That said, the political regulation of these tax havens forms part of the ongoing struggle against international and national neoliberal practices, since it was financial offshore centers, starting with the Eurodollar markets, which helped promote capital mobility at the end of the 1970s.7 It is this capital mobility that ended the “social democratic contract” between capital and labor at the level of the nation-state and in the framework of the Bretton Woods international system of fixed exchange rates. It consequently paved the way for “disembedded” global capitalism, widespread debt-led growth, and, under worldwide conditions of financial contagion, massive social disorientation.8 The financial and economic crises of 2007–09 resulted from “de-regulation” of domestic and global assets (from mortgages to complex financial tools like swaps and derivatives). This de-regulation enabled financial capital accumulation from the 1970s onwards. It is now generally accepted that 60 percent of profits in the corporate sector have been finance-based in the last ten years (Brenner 2006: 293). To regulate offshore accounts in this context is therefore ideologically and structurally crucial for the political “adoption” of contemporary capitalism. For, owners of these accounts have fed the recent spiral of risk-taking (a half of global capital is estimated to lie in such accounts!), but they have continued to refuse the social costs of (their) national public life. The object of concern for critical political economy is consequently less the credit-card-consumer (and profits based on the capitalization of his or her external memory supports) than effective regulation of their economic causes.

That said, how, in today's world economy, can one regulate these capital accounts? This is the urgent political question. To stop the businesses of nations moving large amounts of their capital offshore to avoid domestic taxation suggests either the necessity of global taxation or renewed domestic regulation of capital outflow (as in the 1960s and 1970s in “embedded” liberal states). The political cosmopolitan response—global regulations of all international capital flows—is certainly the best response theoretically since capital competition thrives on exceptions to legal norms. It is however institutionally impractical given the weak status of international rule. Nation-state fiscal policy is practical since it can block capital displacement to more competitive national markets. National monetary policy requires, however, clear leadership, democratic example, and effective bureaucratic surveillance (and in the case of the EU it is already not possible given the monetary sovereignty of the European Central Bank). And so forth. My point is this.

These kinds of dilemmas immediately face any progressive thinking of political economy today: they require careful ethical and empirical exposition before one can make general critical claims. The regulation of financial offshore centers is actually one of the more simple problems of global cooperation to solve, although its structural effects will be deep concerning finance-led growth. How much more conceptual and empirical thinking is needed to work out market and government motivation for effective climate change mitigation; or to work out long-term the global imbalance between Chinese savings and US debt … Regarding these political dilemmas concerning effective regulation of global capital flows, I remain unconvinced that Stiegler's philosophico-technical reading of the economy can (1) properly delimit the economic problems that need to be adopted; and (2) tease out the differences of approach required to adopt contemporary economic conditions effectively. Under the general conditions of a capitalist world economy, however, these differences constitute the very condition of more local social re-motivation (Stiegler's very concern).

Economic alienation from social life should consequently not be thought within the “Greek” framework of technology (however differentiated this framework is). Dis-embedded global capitalism requires a new international political theory of legitimate and effective regulation. The above economic alienation includes the convergence between consumerism and the logic of the market and the importance of adopting the new media and informational economies. Of these Stiegler speaks with originality and impressive intellectual force. However, technical supports—and their lack of present political adoption—do not fundamentally determine our lack of a “we.” To argue so runs the risk of unilateral technological determinism. And this form of determinism ends up, ironically, missing its political end.

Stiegler and Freud: Sublimation and De-Sublimation

In a move that has become a trait of critical French philosophy, Bernard Stiegler moves to Freudian libidinal economy to underpin his analysis of contemporary capitalism, specifically the displacement of “alienation” from the producer to the consumer. As we saw above in his general re-reading of Marx, cognitive capitalism distinguishes itself from previous capitalist forms through the convergence between objects of the mind and the short-term logic of the market. This convergence creates the general crisis of memory and poverty of “spirit” that marks our time. As is now clear, the convergence and its consequences call for a critico-technological response, which Stiegler advances through his re-writing of the German and French phenomenological traditions in the contemporary context of the new media (the hyperindustrial support). Through this convergence, capitalism's capture of energy for production and consumption becomes increasingly invasive and unilateral. Since human memory lies in the technical support, and since we temporalize ourselves from out of this support, our contemporary industrial condition affects the whole mind–body complex of the human (Stiegler's current term for this is “organology'). Given, however, the rules of capital accumulation, decline in the rate of profit, and short-term profit-motivation, cognitive capitalism so captures the energy of the consumer that it blocks the sublimating processes of energy that constitute, for depth psychology, the condition of work, art, family, love, and the social bond in general. Hence the importance of Freud to Stiegler, but, equally, the need to inscribe Freud's meta-psychological model of “ego–superego–id” within the technical history of tertiary memory, retention, and protention.

For Stiegler, cognitive capitalism increasingly reduces desire to its constituent drives. Stiegler calls this reduction “negative sublimation” (2006a: 163–8, 173–4). It implies the break up of desire into its constituent elements of aggregation (the principle of life) and destruction (the death drive). This is a complex step in his technological critique of capitalism, and I do not have space here to develop it in full. I am also unsure that I could do so without a much deeper rehearsal of the Freudian problematic. Suffice it to say the following for my own argument. I refer to Pour une nouvelle critique de l'économie politique and Prendre soin de la jeunesse et des générations (Stiegler 2009, 2008a).

Under the negentropic logic of capitalist profit and its use of the contemporary technologies, it is the young consumer who is targeted. Due to this targeting, s/he is losing her/his primary identifications. Hypermnesic technical supports (from television, through CDs to the Internet, all soon in the one support of the “mobile” phone) confuse generational roles and differences and are gradually replacing the “care” of parenthood, and its attendant authority and role-modeling, with a violent disorder of dispersed identifications without meaning or rhythm. This replacement and confusion is leading—among the younger generations that temporalize out of the tertiary memory of the new technologies—to disintegration of the family intergenerational model, disaffection, and disindividuation. These generations lack—in depth psychological terms—a structuring superego to determine in their psychological apparatus the reality principle and conscience and, thereby, open up a human understanding of, and path to, law and justice. In other words, for Stiegler, cognitive capitalism attempts “to control the id” (2008a: 25) and “displace primary identifications with our ascendants” (2008a: 25, 31, 83) towards a new libidinal economy of commodity fetishism.

The human apparatus (technico-psychological from the beginning given ephiphylogenesis) is fundamentally threatened. Now, for Stiegler, this threat is radically new within the technical history of memory. The legacy of transgenerational identifications between the unconscious and conscious (mediated by our superego) is today undermined by the specifically “psychological” nature of the new “psychotechnologies” (2008a: 31). As Stiegler neatly puts it, Foucauldian “biopower” is being supplemented by this new “psychopower” of normalization (2008a: 31). With this replacement of the superego, desire is broken down into its primary constituents: the principle of life, on the one hand, and the death drive, on the other. Stiegler's “negative sublimation” focuses on the death drive: the “psychopower” of the new technologies “destroys desire” (2008a: 47) and, with “the confusion of generations” leads to “nihilism” (2008a: 47, 69, 79; compare also Stiegler 2006: 65–6: “the over-turning of the order of generations […] comes at the moment of […] of the revelation of economic vanity, of increasingly despairing existences”). Without the primary identifications with their parents, the young generations are also unable to envisage change since such identifications create the psychical framework within which we can alter our identities (2008a: 117). When the technical support becomes hyper-industrial, and cognitive capitalism comes to conjoin mind and matter, the concomitant displacements of desire risk, in other words, the very decomposition of desire. As a result, desire no longer projects itself out as the fulfillment of itself as a non-existent justice (to come).9 Due to this technological invasion of the id, “public reason” radically regresses (2008a: 47).

What is required in response, for Stiegler, is a politics of adoption of our new technological “environment” that is centered on a re-founding of public education (2008a: 137–43). The political struggle against cognitive capitalism becomes one of educating youth so that the young can begin to synthesize the deep attention-span of learning and critical reflection with the market-led hyper-attention of zapping (2008a: 137–43). This politics of education would prevent present technological sophists from destroying the legacy of “spirit” (unconscious and conscious retention/protention), return the technological pharmakon to its proper ambivalence, and open up the future. As Stiegler rightly argues in the context of the Internet, we need to “envisage new processes of transindividuation” (2008a: 158).

This overall argument on “psychopower” is dynamic, imaginative, and singular in its use of the “French” legacy of Freud. I will briefly pose some questions that rhyme with my larger observations concerning his re-writing of Marx. The question is again one of the specific autonomy of the domain under technological consideration and the political consequences of losing this autonomy theoretically.

Just as Stiegler gives us a technological reading of political economy, so he also gives a technological reading of libidinal economy. (They are obviously one and the same reading given his synthesis of both to describe the specificity of cognitive capitalism; I have broken them down here for analytical purposes.) Since the 1990s Stiegler re-thinks the Freudian problematic through technics (see Stiegler 1996b). Technics constitutes the condition of sexuality qua desire. This critique of Freud inscribes the whole of the psychical apparatus within the technical history of epiphylogenesis. It is clear that human sexuality has both evolved and is altered through technical developments. Stiegler is right to insist, with the paleontologist Leroi-Gourhan and Gilles Simondon, that hominization is a technical process of evolution and psychic and collective individuation. That said, sexuality is not reducible to technics. Human sexuality, together with the problematic of desire that it underpins, both transcends technological determination and is itself dependent on many variables. There are depth psychological constants (for example, the Oedipus complex) that determine the transgenerational legacy of the id beyond technical evolution. To argue otherwise (as Stiegler does; see 1996b) is not to engage with the autonomy of the depth psychological. What with the neurosciences' penetration into the mind–body complex, we are probably only now beginning to under stand this autonomy and multi-causality.

Stiegler is therefore correct, following Herbert Marcuse, to place technics within the evolution of sexuality and the vagaries of desire. There would be no Oedipus complex, specific to human animals, without the technological evolution of the human. But he goes too far when he makes the relation between technics and desire one of unilateral determination. The above argument that the “psychotechnologies” are attempting “to control the id,” if not “the psychical apparatus in general” (2009: 31), is one consequence of this unilateral determination. This is another technologically determinist judgment. It makes a background condition (technology) into a radical determination of the psychic apparatus as a whole. Such determinism tempts Stiegler into arguing for a general “crisis of spirit” at the moment of cognitive capitalism.

Let me recall in this context that, for Freud, sublimation (the turning of desire into law) constitutes a complex process that is dependent on many contingent factors. In distinction to all other animals, humans sublimate because they are diphasic: we undergo the latency period and, therefore, puberty—due, without doubt, to our technological specificity. As a result of this diphasic nature, the human animal turns its love of its protectors into an identification that, with the reversals of puberty, comes to structure and occupy the space of the superego. Identifying with our parents (and their parents, etc.) or taking distance from them constitutes, from the beginning, a complex process of love and hate that may lead, from puberty onwards, to too rigid a superego or too dissipated a one (or rather, to variations in-between). Freudian psychoanalysis suggests that it is very difficult to generalize with regard to this development. The absence of identifiable, recurrent, and protecting love can indeed create an uncoordinated psyche. It leads, in this case, to other forms of parental identification that are always ongoing in the infantile years precisely because the id transcends technically organized memory. Until the nuclear family is literally dissolved and not replaced by another form of social organization, we cannot consequently speak of a new generation that has lost its primary identifications and, therefore, following the Freudian logic of sublimation, lost a sense of the future, of law, and of justice. There are too many variables at play within the depth psychological dynamic of infantile protection and care for Stiegler to be so clear. Under new conditions of technology, one must be proactive and prudently regulate Internet flows (regarding collective security, obscenity, etc.). One must, however, wait to see what new forms of parenthood adopt the hyperindustrial support and what new forms of sublimation will come to structure the coming generations' sense of conscience. These new forms may be weaker than either traditional or modern forms of the close social bond. But this cannot be a cause of excessive concern—unless this polemical pitch is judged to be the right means to attract political concern and change public policy (and even here, I am unsure that it is). Ontologically speaking, these forms may lead to more innovative and creative behavior as much as to destructive and self-destructive behavior. I am arguing that we cannot know at this very early stage of our hyperindustrial age, although Stiegler is nevertheless right to call for critical synthesis. The political adoption of the hyperindustrial support will take time—as did monotheism to adopt non-orthographic writing and the social contract to adopt the alphabetical word.

The above uncertainty regarding the direction of the contemporary technology–human symbiosis constitutes, in Stiegler's terms, the “ambivalence” of technology. In Freudian terms, it is more simply the complexity of the human mind–body complex (on these themes, see Beardsworth 1996b). In these processes there is a constant dialectic between “negative” and “positive” sublimation: here, the reduction of law to capitalism on the one hand, and the embedding of capitalism within artistic and legal forms on the other. Stiegler cuts the knot of this ambivalence too quickly, or rather, generalizes too fast from almost exclusively French examples of de-sublimation (see Stiegler 2008a, esp. on the advertising techniques of Canal J.).

Regarding Freud, I would argue, in sum, that Stiegler gives a strong, original reading of contemporary affective life through the bridging of technology and the psyche. Conversely, it is a technological re-reading of Freud that flattens out the vagaries of human affect and human conscience, preventing a nuanced, comparative account of the relation between contemporary consumerism and normative thought and behavior. As a result, public education may be posited too quickly by Stiegler as the right political response.

This is not to deny the need for change in public education: far from it. The Internet clearly poses a problem. As the contemporary teacher knows, Internet-surfing produces a form of consciousness that is adept at “copy and paste,” but finds synthesis and judgment increasingly difficult. Stiegler's politics of critical reflection, with its emphasis on the vital role of education, is in this sense persuasive. That said, I would wish to keep a sense of global perspective. As is well-known, use of the Internet was crucial to the election of Barack Obama: it helped create a cultural transformation that proved strong enough to shift the American political landscape to the center. The use of mobile phones has transformed the electoral process in West Africa. The Internet is, in other words, already highly creative politically. Education must certainly help to supplement this emerging creativity with the art of judgment. Obama's domestic fate regarding healthcare reform since the campaign has shown, at the same time, how powerful the traditional media remain in shaping political perception and interests. Progressive liberal politics in one of the most technologically savvy of countries depends as much today on restructuring the power-bases of the traditional media as it does on providing an education in response to capitalist-led technological transformation of human memory. Stiegler would not disagree with this last point. As I said at the beginning of this paper, his political voluntarism was in the 1990s singular on the French theoretical continent. It means, to my mind, however, that philosophico-political reflection should consider the political adoption of technology at several levels of analysis and of policy, in a spirit of prudence, and with a sense of intellectual limits.

Conclusion

I have addressed the work of Stiegler through the names of Marx and Freud. In doing so, I have attempted to suggest that his work goes too quickly over what puts a break on the destructive side to capitalism. The future political project of democracy is, without doubt, to embed capitalism at the world level. And democratic freedom means that one must renounce gratifying one's immediate desires. This means political institution and self-restraint. Stiegler focuses rightly, and sometimes brilliantly, on the urgency of the political today, and on the importance of a political adoption of contemporary forms of industry within a general intellectual framework of retentional finitude. This latter framework of analysis is theoretically innovative and disciplinarily rich. Not to analyze the forms of institutional change at the appropriate level and not to give credit to the specificities of sublimation within capitalism tend, however, to make capitalism's field and dynamic too uniform, and Stiegler's responses to it too unilateral and too general (if not, too French). As a result, his theoretical world turns too quickly, at the precise moment when a slower speed and a finer set of distinctions are needed. Not that there is not enormous danger in our present world, not that a sense of urgency is not vital. Our description of it requires, however, theoretical terms that exposit it in its complexity so that theory can provide, precisely, the occasion for suitable political adoption and decision.

### 1NC---AT: Psychoanalysis

#### They say drives are necessary to understand debate and capitalism---that is non-empirical and false

Sadovnikov 7 — Slava Sadovnikov, 2007, York University, "Escape from Reason: Labels as Arguments and Theories", Dialogue XLVI (2007), 781-796, philpapers.org/archive/SADEFR.pdf

The way McLaughlin shows the rosy prospects of psychoanalytical social theory boils down to this: there are people who labour at it. He reports on Neil Smelser’s lifelong elaborations of psychoanalytical sociology, which prescribed the use of Freudian theories. Then he presents a “powerful” psychoanalytical theory of creativity of Michael Farrell, commenting on how the theorist “usefully utilizes psychoanalytic insights,” though McLaughlin does not specify them. He correctly expects that I might not view his examples as scientiﬁc. Their problems begin well before that. First, due to their informative emptiness, or tautological character, all they amount to is rewordings of everyday assumptions. Second, due to their vagueness these accounts are compatible with any outcomes; in other words, they lack explanatory and predictive power. The proposed ideas are too inarticulate to subject to intersubjective criticism, and to call them empirical or scientiﬁc theories would be, no matter how comforting, a gross misuse of words. On the constructive side, a psychoanalytic theorist may be challenged to unambiguously formulate her suppositions and specify conditions of their disproof, to leave out what we already well know and smooth out internal inconsistencies, and revise the theories in view of easily available counter-examples and competing accounts. Only after having done this can one present candidate theories to public criticism and thus make them part of science, and fruitfully discuss their further reﬁnements. Another suggestion is not to label them “powerful theories,” “classics,” or anything else before their real scrutiny begins. That criticism and disagreement are indispensable for science is not a “Popperian orthodoxy,” although Popper does champion this idea; it is the pivot of the tradition (which we owe to the Greeks) which identiﬁes rationalism with criticism. 4 McLaughlin ostensibly bows to the critical tradition but does not put it to use. Instead of critical evaluation of the theories in question he writes of “compelling case,” “powerful analytic model,” and “useful conceptual tool.” On the methodological side of the issue, we should inquire into the mode of thinking common to Fromm and all adherents of conﬁrmation-ism. The trick consists in mere replacement of familiar words with new, more peculiar ones; customary expressions are substituted by “instrumental intimacy,” “collaborative circles,” and “idealization of a self-object.” Since the new, funnier, and pseudo-theoretical tag does the job of naming just as well, it “shows how” things work. The new labels in the cases criticized here do not add anything to our knowledge; nor do they explain. We have seen Fromm routinely abuse this technique. The vacuity of Fromm’s explanations by character type was the central point in my analysis of Escape , yet McLaughlin conveniently ignores it and, like Fromm, uses the method of labelling as somehow supporting his cause. The widely popular practice of mistaking new labels for explanations has been exposed by many methodologists in the history of philosophy, but probably the most famous example of such critique comes from Molière. In the now often-quoted passage, his character delivers a vacuous explanation of opium’s property to induce sleep by renaming the property with an offhand Latinism, “virtus dormitiva.” The satire acutely points not only at the impostor doctor’s hiding his lack of knowledge behind foreign words, but also at the emptiness of his alleged explanation. (Pseudo-theoretical literature is boring precisely because of its “dormitive virtue,” its shufﬂing of labels without rewarding inquiring minds.) Let me review notable criticisms of this approach in the twentieth century by Hempel, Homans, and Weber leaving aside their forerunners. This problem was discussed in the famous debate between William Dray and Carl Hempel. Dray argues, contra the nomological account of explanation, that historians and social scientists often try to answer the question, “What is this phenomenon?” by giving an “explanation-by-concept” (Dray 1959, p. 403). A series of events may be better understood if we call it “a social revolution”; or the appropriate tag may be found in the expressions “reform,” “collaboration,” “class struggle,” “progress,” etc.; or, to take Fromm’s suggestions, we may call familiar motives and actions “sadomasochistic,” and any political choice save the Marxist “escape from freedom.” Hempel agrees with Dray that such concepts may be explanatory, but they are so only if the chosen labels or classiﬁcatory tags refer to some uniformities, or are based on nomic analogies. In other words, our new label has explanatory force if it states or implies some established regularity (Hempel 1970, pp. 453-57). For example, you travel to a foreign country and, strolling along the street, see a boisterous crowd. Your guide may explain the crowd with one of several terms: that it is the local soccer team’s fans celebrating its victory, or it is a local religious festival, or a teachers’ strike, etc. The labels applied here—celebration, festival, strike— have explanatory value, because we know that things they refer to usually manifest themselves in noisy or unruly mass gatherings. If, on the other hand, by way of explaining the boisterous crowd the guide had invoked some hidden social or psychological forces, or used expressions such as embodiment, mode of production, de-centring, simulacra, otherness, etc., its causes would remain obscure. If she had referred to psychoanalytic “character types” (say, Fromm’s authoritarian, anal, or necrophiliac types), the explanation would not make much sense either. Nothing prevents us nevertheless from unconditionally attaching all these labels to any event. The mistake McLaughlin and conﬁrmationists persistently make is in thinking that labelling social phenomena alone does theoretical and explanatory work. 5 George Homans observed the prevalence of this trick some decades ago: Much modern sociological theory seems to us to possess every virtue except that of explaining anything. . . . The theorist shoves various aspects of behavior into his pigeonholes, cries “Ah-ha!” and leaves it at that. Like magicians in all times and places, the theorist thinks he controls phenomena if he is able to give them names, particularly names of his own invention. (1974, pp. 10-11)

#### Deploying psychoanalysis reproduces racism, regardless if it’s reformed

Frosh 17, Department of Psychosocial Studies, School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London, UK. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology (Stephen Frosh, 2017, Primitivity and violence: Traces of the unconscious in psychoanalysis,” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 9-11. doi:10.1037/teo0000049)

Primitive Remains

To return to the main argument, there is something else to consider in relation to psychoanalysis, understood as a theory that is infected by violence, yet positions itself as an approach of enlightenment. This concerns how the theorizing of violence is underpinned by certain assumptions that “unconsciously” reproduce the terms of a colonial imagination. For Freud, psychoanalysis was an emancipatory practice that would bring illumination and reveal the infantilism at the source of so much individual and social behavior; this revelation would be a way of taming the unconscious and using its energy in the pursuit of a more creative, more civilized world. This has barely happened, of course, and in Freud’s lifetime it became clear that the European world was slipping into barbarism—with Freud himself associated with the victims. The traces of this in psychoanalytic theory are very pronounced, and none of it should really have been a surprise. Indeed, they are theorized explicitly in Civilisation and its Discontents (Freud, 1930/2001k): society is hypocritical, the unconscious is at loggerheads with it; there is little likelihood of dramatic change; violence is the source and origin of the social; death comes to dominate us all. If barbarism breaks down the “garrison” of civilization, it can hardly come as a shock to those who devote their intellectual and professional energy to tracing the impossibility of coming to terms with the unconscious. But let us go a little further too, in thinking through Freud’s and psychoanalysis’ positioning of the space of violence and savagery. For this word— “savage”—is quite a key one in the formation of psychoanalysis. Freud’s (1913/2001b) adoption of a binary differentiation between savage and “primitive” on the one side, and civilized on the other, has been discussed extensively in many places, as has the way in which this “colonial” discourse is disrupted by the Freudian assertion of the presence of “primitivity” within every subject, however ostensibly civilized they may be, in the form of an unconscious that does not obey the dictates of rationality (e.g., Frosh, 2013b). The issue here is the way in which this imagery of savagery and primitivism is reproduced in accounts of violence, with the effect of running together the ideas of the primitive “other” of colonialism and the violent elements in all human subjects. That is to say, where destructiveness is observed, it is commonly interpreted as a reflection of primitive elements of the subject, and accretes around it associations and fantasies of the “uncivilized” other, to which the colonial mentality is well attuned. Thus, the opposition between “civilization” and “the individual’s dangerous desire for aggression” holds in the example given earlier (Freud, 1930/2001k, p. 124), as does the notion of the death drive as something that returns as a primordial situation, associated with primitive fantasies about dissolution. Hence Freud’s (1919/2001f) gloss on death: Since almost all of us still think as savages do on this topic, it is no matter for surprise that the primitive fear of the dead is still so strong within us and always ready to come to the surface on any provocation. (pp. 241–242) This “regressive” framework, assuming a kind of “descent” into savagery, is present too in the Kleinian fascination with destructiveness, which is made consequent upon an inbuilt death drive that produces envy as a primitive affect linked with attacks on the maternal object. (Notably, Klein uses the notion of primitive freely to describe early, passionate affects and desires; but she also uses it in the same way as does Freud, as in opposition to civilized, e.g., “Another question applies to the effect of late weaning, as is customary with primitive peoples and also in certain sections of civilized communities”; Klein, 1952/1975, p. 119.) The positive move in Kleinian theory through the depressive position and into reparation retains a sense of needing to overcome impulsivity through managing more complex (one might call them civilized) thought patterns that tolerate uncertainty and ambivalence in a way assumed to be difficult for children to manage. Under the conditions that prevailed in these great moments of formation of seminal psychoanalytic theories— and that still exert significant influence today— the idea of primitive thinking and emotion slips easily into the figure of the primitive, who by virtue of precisely this primitivity (irrationality, impulsivity, etc.) becomes other to the civilized. Only certain colonized individuals—“elite natives” with complex and conflicted psyches that could be subjected to psychoanalysis (Anderson et al., 2011)—are potential citizens; the others are infantilized in their childlike consciousness, justifying European dominance in everyone’s interests. There are many ways to defend psychoanalysis against the charge of simple colonialism, and as mentioned above these are supported by the adoption of psychoanalysis by many postcolonial thinkers (Frosh, 2013b; Khanna, 2004, 2011). Nevertheless, something disturbing recurs here. Anderson et al. (2011), whose edited book is an eloquent testimony to ways in which psychoanalysis has been used as part of the decolonizing movement, also point out how it sustains an understanding of primitivity that faces both ways—it carries forward what is effectively a racist account of the colonized but also shows that the genuine “heart of darkness” lies on the side of the colonizer. Tracing the complex manner in which this happens, Anderson et al. note how psychoanalysis expresses some of the patterns of post-World War One destructiveness in terms familiar from colonialism. If a central project of psychoanalysis was to demonstrate the universality of its central tenets, then finding vestigial traces of such ‘primitive’ characteristics as the incest taboo, filial ambivalence, fetishism, and the tension between the indulgence and repression of the drives in modern Westerners provided an explanatory logic for the evolution of the ‘family of man.’ The irruption of savagery among the civilized was less pathology than it was atavism . . . Psychoanalysis, as practiced and elaborated in colonial settings and, particularly, as adopted and adapted in the emergent postcolony, became reconfigured as a powerful critique of colonialism. (Anderson et al., 2011, p. 11) However, it only seems to do this by carrying forward the previous vision of otherness in terms of the primitive and savage—which has to do with the norms of a colonial society in which black and brown others were seen as undeveloped and infantile. In an associated way the unconscious was understood as passionate, wishful, uncontained, and immature; and violence as a form of atavism was linked with primitive remains. While other psychoanalytic schools not discussed here (e.g., intersubjectivists and possibly Lacanians) show less dependence on the primitive-civilized binary, the point is that psychoanalysis carries over the traces of this binary as it moves forward into the postcolonial era. Unconsciously, it reproduces them even when used in the decolonizing movement—this being part of the ambiguity of Fanon’s (1952/1986) account and perhaps also why every postcolonial psychoanalyst seems to be drawn back to him as a point of origin and fascination. In relation to the spread of psychoanalysis beyond its original European and North American heartlands, the continuing pull of colonial assumptions can also be found. For example, in one of the most densely psychoanalytic cultures in the world, Brazil, there is a clear history of psychoanalysis as a civilizing force that reinforces colonialism as well as providing tools for resistance—in much the way that Anderson et al. (2011) describe in the quotation immediately above. Early Brazilian psychoanalysis was embedded in a vision of nationbuilding that tackled questions of racial mix and sexuality as primary concerns of a society emerging from slavery and supposed primitivism (Russo, 2012a). This early history of Brazilian psychoanalysis was reshaped through encounters with authoritarianism and social control during the 20th century, resulting in a set of theoretical and practical concerns that were characteristically split between a conservative, “conforming” psychoanalysis tied to normalizing visions of “race” and sexuality (that is, psychoanalysis as a tool for social control) and a more critical psychoanalysis offering support for resistance to authoritarian dictatorship. One consequence was a tension that arose during the Brazilian dictatorship of 1964–1985 between the official institutions of psychoanalysis and much of its clientele. Russo (2012b), for example, noting the contrast between the psychoanalytic promise of individual “liberation” and the conformism of the psychoanalytic societies, comments: The silence or even the connivance of the “official” societies with regard to the military dictatorship was a hallmark of psychoanalysis in Brazil . . . “official” psychoanalysis . . . became a symbol of political conservatism at a time when psychoanalysis—at its height—was regarded as an instrument of liberation by a good number of its clients. (p. 174) Similar tensions occurred in Argentina (Plotkin, 2012), although the specific history there showed different colonialist dynamics, as psychoanalysis was deployed to reinforce the idea of a “European” dominant class. Conclusion The idea that psychoanalysis has its own unconscious is no more and no less metaphorical than the idea that any individual person has an unconscious. We cannot see this thing, the unconscious, in any way; we know, in fact, that it does not actually exist as a physical entity. Instead, it is evident from what people say and do, in their guarded as well as their unguarded moments, that stuff happens, it seeps through and the process of understanding it is always retrospective. The claim here is that we can see such “seeping through” in the theory of psychoanalysis, and no doubt elsewhere too (e.g., in institutional practices and clinical work) if we take the time to look for it. This seeping through takes a number of forms, but the one emphasized here is the link psychoanalysis makes between violence and primitivity, a link that has its origins in Freud’s thought and in the social forces of his day, but is reproduced in later psychoanalysis and continues to freight contemporary discussions.

### 1NC---Turn

#### They criticized antitrust, but it’s good and turns case---two impacts:

#### 1---Health consolidation spikes health care costs and drastically lowers quality of care---antitrust is reverse causal

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Covid-19 has initiated yet another wave: A wave of hospital mergers and acquisitions that will have devastating consequences for public health if industry doesn’t soon execute an about-face. Whether because they’re on the brink of bankruptcy and have subscribed to the half-truth that size is protective, or because they think they can score some good deals and believe scale and success are synonymous, the financial fallout of Covid-19 has caused many hospital executives to make consolidation a core part of their future plans. With the intent of increasing care quality and decreasing consumer costs despite these challenging times, the merger between Shannon Medical Center and Community Hospital and partnership between Intermountain and Sanford Health are just two examples. There are multiple reasons why consumers absolutely cannot afford for industry to bulk up in an effort to weather this storm. The first is that the positive efforts executives claim consolidation will help them accomplish often prove to be futile. Research shows that wherever market concentration is high, there are also higher prices for both consumers and the employers who provide their healthcare coverage. In the absence of competition, costs increase and quality deteriorates. That’s the opposite of progress. Second, generally speaking, the union of two institutions with operational shortcomings only creates one larger institution with even more operational shortcomings! That’s not progress either. Third, Covid-induced consolidation will only make future progress many times more difficult. The larger an organization is, the more it will struggle to rapidly adapt to healthcare disruptions like we’re seeing today. Retail giants like Walmart, Walgreens, Amazon and CVS are pivoting to cater to healthcare consumer demands for affordability and accessibility. Right now, they’re still a blip on the radar relative to mainstream healthcare delivery, but they are looking to eventually corner the market and drive the industry forward. And as they continue down this path, consolidated healthcare systems will be left behind, potentially at the expense of the consumers in that area. The potential impact of continued consolidation on rural patients is especially concerning. Rural communities may have a limited number of the big-box retailers mentioned above. And the unfortunate fact of the matter is that when a larger hospital or health system purchases a smaller, rural hospital, it’s usually only a matter of time before the purchasing system realizes that unless they drastically pare down and reconfigure operations, the acquired hospital will never be profitable. Many eventually decide to close up shop, in some instances reducing or even eliminating rural patients’ options for care delivery. In the absolute worst-case scenario, this is exactly the reality all consumers could face if consolidation continues at its current pace. In theory and if left unchecked, all of the hospitals in the United States could be owned by only a handful of mammoth systems that then lack incentive to continually deliver quality services at lower total cost of care.

#### Health care antitrust is a premier vehicle for social change and solves the disproportionate racial impact of rising health costs.

Kritter 21, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, (Dani, March 2021, “Antitrust as Antiracist”, <https://www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist/>)

The [federal antitrust laws](https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws)—three statutes enacted over a century ago—are in the spotlight. The year 2020 brought a [new reckoning with corporate power](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/dec/18/google-facebook-antitrust-lawsuits-big-tech) and a [resurgent interest in using antitrust law](https://newrepublic.com/article/160646/biden-antitrust-blueprint-monopoly-busting) as a force for populist change. The “hipster antitrust” movement argues that the focus of antitrust policy should not be limited to market power and consumer welfare. Rather, antitrust can and should be a remedy for a suite of societal ills, from workers’ rights to campaign finance and income inequality. The year 2020 also marked an awakening to [racial injustice](https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/09/22/racial-justice-in-america-a-deeper-look/) in America. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery sparked nationwide outrage and demands to reform institutions built on systemic racism. Yet the recent plans for [antitrust reform](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/117th-congress-takes-early-steps-6904745/)—which primarily focus on monopolies in tech—ignore the fact that the antitrust status quo perpetuates [racial injustice](https://theappeal.org/how-antitrust-perpetuates-structural-racism/). But it doesn’t have to be this way. This blog identifies consolidation in healthcare and vertical restraints in franchising as two examples of how lax antitrust enforcement has disproportionately harmed people of color. It also argues that by dusting off existing antitrust tools, antitrust enforcement can be [antiracist](https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-race/topics/being-antiracist). Background: The Antitrust Toolbox Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to check the power of massive corporations run amuck. These laws—the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act—were originally designed to control corporate power, protect individual economic freedom, and ensure a fair and equal society. But beginning in the 1970s when Robert Bork published the still-influential “[Antitrust Paradox](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/12/20/antitrust-was-defined-by-robert-bork-i-cannot-overstate-his-influence/),” courts slowly narrowed the focus of antitrust law to protecting consumer welfare. Today, antitrust enforcement prioritizes preventing the anticompetitive acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power that threatens consumer welfare and competition—a much narrower goal than its populist origins. Dusting Off the Tools Recent years have seen [bipartisan](https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-shows-bipartisan-support-for-tech-antitrust-action-c3794ff5-120d-44d8-bac1-58b033efbd8a.html) interest in reining in powerful corporations with more aggressive antitrust enforcement. One of the few agency voices calling for an antiracist approach to antitrust is Rebecca Slaughter, the acting chair of the FTC. Slaughter [has recently spoken out](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1583714/slaughter_remarks_at_gcr_interactive_women_in_antitrust.pdf) about using antitrust enforcement to “right the wrongs of systemic racism.” She challenges what she views to be a faulty premise of antitrust law: “that antitrust can and should be value-neutral, and therefore social justice problems like racism do not have a role in antitrust enforcement.” Slaughter argues that antitrust has never been and never will be value-neutral. Antitrust addresses market structures, and racism is entrenched in the historic and current market structures in the United States. When agencies make decisions about how to deploy antitrust tools, they can choose whether to reinforce these structural inequities or to dismantle them. Healthcare and franchising are two examples of how a shift in antitrust enforcement from “value-neutral” to antiracist can break down market structures that perpetuate racial injustice. Honing in on Healthcare Monopolies Consolidation in the healthcare industry is a driving force behind the sky-high cost of medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Due to a wave of healthcare mergers, most hospital markets in the United States are dominated by a single corporate entity. The lack of competition means the dominant hospital is free to exercise market power by raising prices and restricting output. [Recent studies](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/health/covid-hospitals-medicare-rates.html) of prices for hospital and outpatient treatment report that healthcare mergers have resulted in large networks charging private insurers 2.5 to 3 times more than Medicare rates for the same patient care. These rising costs lead to higher insurance premiums paid by employers and individuals. Artificially inflated healthcare costs disproportionately burden people of color and create a barrier to accessing quality care. Black families spend a greater share of their household income on health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs than the average American family. And of the thirty million [uninsured](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/02/19/there-are-clear-race-based-inequalities-in-health-insurance-and-health-outcomes/) individuals in the United States, half are people of color. The [COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html) has put this health inequity in sharp focus: racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to contract the virus, get severely ill, and die from coronavirus infections. What can antitrust do? First, antitrust merger review can be antiracist. Mergers between competitors are scrutinized under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. When determining whether a merger lessens competition, the FTC, Department of Justice (DOJ), and courts consider the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. An antiracist application of the Clayton Act would consider racially disparate outcomes like health care costs, insurance premiums, and the quality of care provided as anticompetitive effects. Business practices that perpetuate systemic racism are anticompetitive because they exclude people of color from full participation in the market. And this exclusion is expensive: a study by Citigroup estimates that discrimination cost the U.S. economy [$16 trillion](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-discrimination-bank-says) since 2000. Moreover, there is precedent for applying a broad conception of anticompetitive effects in merger review. In [Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-giants-antitrust-law.html), the Supreme Court held that a meager 7.2 percent combined market share of two merging shoe manufacturers was unhealthy market concentration under the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged that concentration in the shoe industry might offer some efficiencies and lower prices for consumers, but “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses” was a priority. Therefore, agencies can and should argue that mergers that reinforce racial inequity substantially lessen competition. Second, antitrust enforcement actions can hone in on industries like healthcare where the anticompetitive effects are acutely felt by people of color. As California attorney general from 2011 to 2017, [Vice President Kamala Harris](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/health/kamala-harris-health-care.html) prioritized taking on healthcare prices through antitrust. Her investigation laid the groundwork for California’s suit against [Sutter Health](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/health/sutter-hospitals-medical-bills.html) for using its market power to raise prices and extort better deals from insurers, which resulted in a $575 million settlement. The DOJ and FTC should follow in California and Vice President Harris’s footsteps and crack down on healthcare, utilizing an antiracist approach.

#### 2---The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Cap good links to their method---tags, epistemology, and cards are criticisms of capitalism so they cannot say no link.

#### If the 2AC says no link reject the team or vote neg presumption because that is argumentative cowardess---aff conditionality destroys debate and proves their model does not have an endpoint and does not require the 1ac to defend anything.

#### Cap is sustainable---capitalism is sustainable

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

There is no shortage of examples of dematerialization. I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are: We do want more all the time, but not more resources. Alfred Marshall was right, but William Jevons was wrong. Our wants and desires keep growing, evidently without end, and therefore so do our economies. But our use of the earth’s resources does not. We do want more beverage options, but we don’t want to keep using more aluminum in drink cans. We want to communicate and compute and listen to music, but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets; we’re happy with a single smartphone. As our population increases, we want more food, but we don’t have any desire to consume more fertilizer or use more land for crops. Jevons was correct at the time he wrote that total British demand for coal was increasing even though steam engines were becoming much more efficient. He was right, in other words, that the price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s. But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand can change over time for several reasons, the most fundamental of which is technological change. Coal provides a clear example of this. When fracking made natural gas much cheaper, total demand for coal in the United States went down even though its price decreased. With the help of innovation and new technologies, economic growth in America and other rich countries—growth in all of the wants and needs that we spend money on—has become decoupled from resource consumption. This is a recent development and a profound one. Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather not spend. The root of Jevons’s mistake is simple and boring: resources cost money. He realized this, of course. What he didn’t sufficiently realize was how strong the incentive is for a company in a contested market to reduce its spending on resources (or anything else) and so eke out a bit more profit. After all, a penny saved is a penny earned. Monopolists can just pass costs on to their customers, but companies with a lot of competitors can’t. So American farmers who battle with each other (and increasingly with tough rivals in other countries) are eager to cut their spending on land, water, and fertilizer. Beer and soda companies want to minimize their aluminum purchases. Producers of magnets and high-tech gear run away from REE as soon as prices start to spike. In the United States, the 1980 Staggers Act removed government subsidies for freight-hauling railroads, forcing them into competition and cost cutting and making them all the more eager to not have expensive railcars sit idle. Again and again, we see that competition spurs dematerialization. There are multiple paths to dematerialization. As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources, they can go down four main paths. First, they can simply find ways to use less of a given material. This is what happened as beverage companies and the companies that supply them with cans teamed up to use less aluminum. It’s also the story with American farmers, who keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Magnet makers found ways to use fewer rare earth metals when it looked as if China might cut off their supply. Second, it often becomes possible to substitute one resource for another. Total US coal consumption started to decrease after 2007 because fracking made natural gas more attractive to electricity generators. If nuclear power becomes more popular in the United States (a topic we’ll take up in chapter 15), we could use both less coal and less gas and generate our electricity from a small amount of material indeed. A kilogram of uranium-235 fuel contains approximately 2–3 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil. According to one estimate, the total amount of energy that humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium fuel. Third, companies can use fewer molecules overall by making better use of the materials they already own. Improving CNW’s railcar utilization from 5 percent to 10 percent would mean that the company could cut its stock of these thirty-ton behemoths in half. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them, for clear and compelling financial reasons. For example, the world’s commercial airlines have improved their load factors—essentially the percentage of seats occupied on flights—from 56 percent in 1971 to more than 81 percent in 2018. Finally, some materials get replaced by nothing at all. When a telephone, camcorder, and tape recorder are separate devices, three total microphones are needed. When they all collapse into a smartphone, only one microphone is necessary. That smartphone also uses no audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, or camera film. The iPhone and its descendants are among the world champions of dematerialization. They use vastly less metal, plastic, glass, and silicon than did the devices they have replaced and don’t need media such as paper, discs, tape, or film. If we use more renewable energy, we’ll be replacing coal, gas, oil, and uranium with photons from the sun (solar power) and the movement of air (wind power) and water (hydroelectric power) on the earth. All three of these types of power are also among dematerialization’s champions, since they use up essentially no resources once they’re up and running. I call these four paths to dematerialization slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. They’re not mutually exclusive. Companies can and do pursue all four at the same time, and all four are going on all the time in ways both obvious and subtle. Innovation is hard to foresee. Neither the fracking revolution nor the world-changing impact of the iPhone’s introduction were well understood in advance. Both continued to be underestimated even after they occurred. The iPhone was introduced in June of 2007, with no shortage of fanfare from Apple and Steve Jobs. Yet several months later the cover of Forbes was still asking if anyone could catch Nokia. Innovation is not steady and predictable like the orbit of the Moon or the accumulation of interest on a certificate of deposit. It’s instead inherently jumpy, uneven, and random. It’s also combinatorial, as Erik Brynjolfsson and I discussed in our book The Second Machine Age. Most new technologies and other innovations, we argued, are combinations or recombinations of preexisting elements. The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors plus a touch screen plus an operating system and population of programs, or apps. All these elements had been around for a while before 2007. It took the vision of Steve Jobs to see what they could become when combined. Fracking was the combination of multiple abilities: to “see” where hydrocarbons were to be found in rock formations deep underground; to pump down pressurized liquid to fracture the rock; to pump up the oil and gas once they were released by the fracturing; and so on. Again, none of these was new. Their effective combination was what changed the world’s energy situation. Erik and I described the set of innovations and technologies available at any time as building blocks that ingenious people could combine and recombine into useful new configurations. These new configurations then serve as more blocks that later innovators can use. Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. It’s not easy to foresee when or where powerful new combinations are going to appear, or who’s going to come up with them. But as the number of both building blocks and innovators increases, we should have confidence that more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated, occurring as the result of interactions among complex and interlocking social, technological, and economic systems. So it’s going to keep surprising us. As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization accelerates. Erik and I coined the phrase Second Machine Age to draw a contrast with the Industrial Era, which as we’ve seen transformed the planet by allowing us to overcome the limitations of muscle power. Our current time of great progress with all things related to computing is allowing us to overcome the limitations of our mental power and is transformative in a different way: it’s allowing us to reverse the Industrial Era’s bad habit of taking more and more from the earth every year.

#### Antitrust is key to sustainability.

Rebecca M. Henderson 20, Harvard’s John and Natty McArthur University Professor, based at Harvard Business School, and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, “Reimagining Capitalism in the Shadow of the Pandemic,” Harvard Business Review, 7/28/2020, https://hbr.org/2020/07/reimagining-capitalism-in-the-shadow-of-the-pandemic, kyujin

The Pandemic’s Challenges — and Opportunities Capitalism is one of the great inventions of the human race — an unparalleled source of prosperity, opportunity and innovation. We won’t solve the problems that we face without it. To solve inequality, we need good jobs — and lots of them. To solve climate change, we need (among other things) to transform the world’s energy, transportation, and agricultural systems. Only the relentless pressure of the free market can drive this kind of transformative innovation at scale. In this context, the pandemic is both a massive challenge and an opportunity. A challenge because more than a half a million people have died, the global economy has been massively disrupted, and tens of millions of people have lost their jobs. A challenge because the combination of deep economic disadvantage — at the beginning of May nearly 61% percent of Hispanic and 44% of Black households had experienced a job or wage loss due to the corona virus, for example, compared with 38% percent of whites — and the killings of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, Breona Taylor and countless others have brought anger and calls for justice to our streets. The world will almost certainly be poorer, more divided, and more fearful in 2021 than it was in 2019. It’s an opportunity because it has also shown us so vividly what is wrong. Inequality is no longer simply an abstract idea. It’s a reality that many “essential” workers must show up even when they’re sick because they have no savings and no paid leave. That racism is not something that was solved by the civil rights movement. As the skies clear and early research suggests that the reduction in fossil fuel pollution is saving lives, the costs of continuing to rely on dirty energy have become much more tangible. Watching states bid against each other for vital medical equipment while the federal government fumbles its response to the virus has made the reality of our broken politics very clear. The pandemic has reminded us that we stand and fall as a society and that the welfare of the poorest among us is integral to everyone’s welfare. It has shown us that planning for the future is essential and that, when the chips are down, a capable, responsive government is a necessity, not a dirty word. We’ve learned that when we must do something, we can: Fundamental change no longer seems impossibly out of the reach. We can do better. We already have the resources and the knowledge we need to build a more equitable, sustainable capitalism. But to get there, business will have to change how it understands its role in the world (and in the U.S. in particular) — and how it thinks about government. A New Path Forward While free markets are an unparalleled source of prosperity and freedom, the free market can only take us where we need to go if externalities such as carbon pollution are properly priced, if there is genuine freedom of opportunity, and if the rules of the game are such that competition is free and fair. Markets do not police themselves; they must be balanced by transparent, capable, democratically accountable governments. Today — in large part due to the rise of shareholder primacy, the increasing role of money in politics, and the systematic attack on government as a necessary or effective institution — that balance is largely absent. As a result, one of the fastest routes to profitability is often to persuade politicians to write the rules in your favor. Firms feel free to dump greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, for example, while spending hundreds of millions of dollars to lobby against carbon regulation. We’re even seeing this dynamic in the U.S. government’s response to the pandemic: It’s increasingly clear that an uncomfortably large share of the benefits from the recent stimulus has gone to very large firms and to very wealthy individuals. I’m not suggesting that firms neglect their duty to their shareholders. Focusing on profitability is essential if a company is to thrive in today’s brutally competitive market. But profit maximization has always been a means to an end, justified by the idea that when markets are genuinely free and fair, there’s good reason to believe they lead to both prosperity and freedom. But when markets are no longer held in check by governments that can police the rules of the game, appropriately control externalities, or provide the public goods necessary to support real opportunity, they become too powerful for their own good. The chaotic and uneven pandemic response we are experiencing today flows directly from 30 years of treating government as something that should be “drowned in the bathtub.” Now more than ever, I believe firms have not just a moral duty to contribute to the health of the institutions that keep our society strong and our capitalism genuinely free and genuinely fair, but also an economic interest in doing so. We need to rebuild our democracy, strengthen our public conversation so that it’s firmly based on facts and mutual respect, commit with everything we have to building an inclusive society for everyone, and yes, find ways to rediscover the importance of democratically accountable, capable, responsive government. Why? We cannot decarbonize the world’s energy supply without government regulating fossil fuel emissions and providing positive incentives to embrace low carbon solutions. Yes, individual firms can provide better jobs — paying employees a decent wage and providing ongoing training, among other necessary steps — but we’ll only successfully address inequality and racism at scale through structural reform, if we can do things like: provide quality education and health care to everyone, no matter their parents’ income; raise the minimum wage; and find ways to give employees more power as they negotiate with increasingly powerful firms. Most fundamentally, we’ll only rebuild trust in the political system, and with it a government that is genuinely responsive to ordinary people, if we can get money out of politics and stop tolerating business’s attacks on government. These attacks are often framed in terms of defending the free market, but too often are simply attempts to block the action we need to build a more equitable society. Collective action — a sustained effort by coalitions of firms — could make a huge difference in helping to drive this kind of institutional change. Firms are already working together to solve some of the world’s toughest problems. A third of the world’s invested capital is already committed to insisting that the firms in their portfolios plan for the challenge of climate change. Businesses across the world are increasingly coming to realize that democratically accountable, freely elected, capable governments are critical to long term economic health — and are willing to say so in public. But they need to do more. A “Kodak Moment” for the World I can feel your skepticism as I write. Can business really change — and help government change along with it? Can it embrace a version of capitalism that focuses on the longer term and the common good? Can it help to rebuild the power of the very institutions that are needed to keep it in check? I believe it can. We already know that it is possible to make money by addressing the world’s social and environmental problems. Walmart saved a billion dollars in fuel costs by increasing the efficiency of their trucking fleet. Elon Musk has revolutionized the automotive business and built a company worth more than GM and Ford combined in the process. The most successful $200M+ IPO of the last 20 years was a company that promised to replace beef with a burger made largely from soy. At Unilever, so called “purpose-driven” brands are growing 69% faster than the rest of the portfolio as consumers increasingly vote with their wallets. Change on a broader scale will be much harder. But not impossible. Think of this as a “Kodak moment” for the world. I spent the first 20 years of my career at MIT as a professor of innovation and strategy. For much of it I was quite literally the Eastman Kodak professor of management. My title was a coincidence — but a deeply ironic one, since I spent most of my time trying to understand why large, successful firms like Kodak had so much trouble responding effectively when the world around them changed. By now the company’s story is well-known: Kodak was once one of the world’s most successful firms. The firm invented classic film-based commercial photography and used it to build one of the world’s most iconic brands. As one senior vice president and director of Kodak research noted in a 1985 Wall Street Journal article, “We’re moving into an information-based company…[but] it’s very hard to find anything [with profit margins] like color photography that is legal.” But Kodak went bankrupt in 2012, having failed to master the transition to digital photography. The business community now faces a similar transition. As the Business Roundtable’s historic decision last year to “lead their companies for the benefits of all stakeholders” suggested, the vast majority of the world’s leading firms know that we must tackle the challenge of climate change, that we must find a way to ensure that everyone has a chance to share in the world’s wealth, and that it’s vital that we not let democracy lose out to either oligarchy or tyranny. We know that we need to change. But too often it’s tempting to emulate Kodak, claiming that change will come — but not now. Insisting that it’s more profitable to stick with the old ways, that if it’s really important we’ll get around to doing something new — later. Change is hard. It’s not surprising that we’re struggling to adopt new ways of thinking about the world and business’s role in it. But I am hopeful. Not optimistic, in the sense that I’m sure everything will work out just fine — I’m not sure of that at all. But hopeful. As a species, we have a gift for problem solving. Kodak failed to manage the digital transition, but Nikon, Canon and Fujifilm continue to be billion-dollar companies. Thousands of firms and millions of people are even now exploring ways to solve our common problems — for example, firms are partnering with each other and with governments to search for vaccines and to bring people back to work safely. This kind of cooperation must continue beyond the pandemic. As recent data shows, trust in business has fallen during the pandemic, but trust in government has risen dramatically. There is no better time for business to see government as a partner, not an adversary, in helping to make society work everyone — not just the lucky few. We can learn from the horrors of the pandemic. We must. We don’t need to go back to “normal” — we need to reimagine capitalism instead. We need to find a way to balance the energy of the free market with the power of competent, responsive government. Together, they can help us build a more just and sustainable world.

#### Three cap good impacts:

#### 1---War

Mousseau 19, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida. (Michael, “The End of War,” International Security 44:1, 2019, https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2019/07/IS\_End-of-War.pdf)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states’ concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides’s Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek’s claim that Sparta’s fear of Athens’ growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3 This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of selfdetermination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6 To support my theory that domestic factors determine states’ alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I ªnd that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states’ interest in the global market order by ªnding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker. Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states’ behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other’s regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### 2---Climate change

Smith 19 – (Noah Smith, assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet”; Bloomberg; D.A. August 25th 2020, [Published April 5th 2019]; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism>) //LFS—JCM

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes [are unlikely](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/a-carbon-tax-cant-solve-climate-change-but-we-should-do-it.html) to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards [have improved](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-22/bolivia-s-problem-is-macroeconomics-not-socialism) substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free [cement](https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/worlds-first-zero-emission-cement-plant-takes-shape-in-norway/) production and so on. The best [climate](https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/15/how-to-decarbonize-america-and-the-world/) policy [plans](https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal) all involve technological improvement as a key feature. Recent developments show that the technology-centered approach can work. A [recent report](https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-powers-latest-plunge-costs-threatens-coal-gas/) by Bloomberg New Energy Finance analyzed about 7000 projects in 46 countries, and found that large drops in the cost of solar power from photovoltaic systems, wind power and lithium-ion batteries have made utility-scale renewable electricity competitive with fossil fuels. A 76 percent decline in the cost of energy for short-term battery storage since 2012 is especially important. In a blog post, futurist and energy writer Ramez Naam [underscores](http://rameznaam.com/2019/04/02/the-third-phase-of-clean-energy-will-be-the-most-disruptive-yet/) the significance of these developments. Naam notes the important difference between renewables being cheap enough to outprice new fossil-fuel plants, and being inexpensive enough to undercut existing plants. The former is already the case across much of the world, which is among the reasons for an 84 percent [decrease](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/28/global-collapse-in-number-of-new-coal-fired-power-plants) in the number of new coal-fired plants worldwide since 2015. But when it becomes cheaper to scrap existing fossil-fuel plants and build renewables in their place, it will allow renewables to start replacing coal and gas much more quickly. Naam cites examples from Florida and [Indiana](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/even-in-indiana-new-renewables-are-cheaper-than-existing-coal-plants/540242/) where this is already being done. He cites industry predictions that replacing existing fossil-fuel plants with renewables will be economically efficient almost everywhere at some point in the next decade. Electricity is far from the only source of carbon emissions — there’s also transportation, manufacturing (especially of steel and cement), home and office heating, and agriculture to worry about. But the rapid advance of solar technology is a huge victory in the struggle against climate change, because it will allow people all over the world to have electricity without cooking the planet. And how was this victory achieved? A combination of smart government policy and private industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Goksin Kavlak, James McNerney and Jessika Trancik in a [recent paper](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518305196?via%253Dihub) evaluated the factors behind the solar-price decline from 1980 to 2012. They concluded that from 1980 to 2001, government-funded research and development was the main factor in bringing down costs, but from 2001 to 2012, the biggest factor was economies of scale. These economies of scale were driven by private industry increasing output, but with government subsidies helping to increase the incentive to ramp up production. It’s apparent, therefore, that both government and profit-seeking enterprises have their roles to play. Government funds the development of early-stage technology and then helps push the private sector toward adopting those technologies, while private companies compete to find ever-cheaper methods of implementation. Instead of eco-socialism, it’s eco-industrialism. If there’s any system that can beat climate change, this looks like it.

#### 3---Globalization is immensely beneficial for improving quality of life in the Global South---it’s also widely supported which proves their epistemic skepticism is from an ivory tower.

Horner et al. 18 (Rory, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK, “Globalisation, uneven development and the North–South ‘big switch’,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2018, 11, 17–33 doi:10.1093/cjres/rsx026)

Citizen surveys further reveal dramatic changes in attitudes to globalisation across and within the global North and South. While such surveys have methodological limitations,1 the results indicate distinctive trends that support the thesis of the ‘big switch’. Among people in the global South, polls have consistently found quite positive attitudes towards globalisation. In 2007, the Times of India claimed that ‘Indians believe globalisation benefits their country’, citing a poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion that 54% of Indians answered ‘good’ compared to 30% ‘bad’ to the question of whether increasing economic connections ‘with others around the world is mostly good or bad’. More recently, Stokes (2016) reported on Pew Research Surveys from 2016 which found that 60% of Chinese think their country’s involvement in the global economy is good (compared to 23% who think it is bad), while 52% of Indians surveyed thought it was good compared to 25% who said it was a problem. A recent YouGov survey of 20,000 people across 19 countries found a majority believed that globalisation has been a force for good. That survey found the most enthusiasm for globalisation in East and South-East Asia, where over 70% in all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam, a relative latecomer to globalisation (Smith, 2017).

By contrast, public support for globalisation in the global North has plummeted. Bhagwati (2004) cited an Environics International Survey presented at the 2002 World Economic Forum Meetings to argue that disillusionment with globalisation was not universal; ‘anti-globalisation sentiments are more prevalent in the rich countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers and the public in the poor countries of the South see globalisation instead as a positive force’ (2004, 8). Although Bhagwati suggested this was an ‘ironic reversal’, it proved to be in line with a 2007 BBC World Service poll that found 57% of people in G7 countries thought the pace of globalisation was too rapid, whereas the majority of those in ~~developing~~ countries surveyed thought it was just right or too slow (e.g. IMF, 2008; Pieterse, 2012). A 2007 Pew Global Poll similarly found a decline in the percentage of people in many Northern countries who believed trade had a positive impact. In its analysis of the survey results, Kohut and Wilke (2008, 6–7) commented that ‘it is in economically stagnant Western countries that we see the most trepidation about globalisation’. Almost 10 years later, The Economist (2016) reported on a YouGov survey of 19 countries, which found that fewer than half of people in the USA, UK and France believed that globalisation is a ‘force for good’ in the world. This broad change in attitude toward globalisation is playing out in national electoral politics as well as gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The ‘big switch’ and the geography of uneven development

The ‘big switch’ seemingly confounds the predictions of the most vocal proponents and critics of globalisation alike. Uneven development is dynamic and relates to differences both within and among countries (Sheppard, 2016). Naïve claims that the world is flat or that economic globalisation is ‘win-win’ have rightly been dismissed (Baldwin, 2016; Christopherson et al., 2008; Turok et al., 2017), yet it is also insufficient to suggest that globalisation simply leads to a reproduction of existing inequalities, overlooking how that unevenness may be changing as a result of new macroeconomic geographies (Peck, 2016). While trade theory could predict that there would be ‘losers’ in the global North from international economic integration, proponents of economic globalisation have asserted that they would be few in number and could be compensated. More recently, it appears that a large group of people feel more forsaken than compensated. Similarly, for those who embraced Marxian political economy, and warned of its negative consequences in the South, the apparent optimism and support for globalisation in the South may have been unexpected. The sceptical internationalists (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) should be acknowledged, however, for forecasting downsides in the global North. As we outline below, many people in the global North have experienced relative stagnation, whereas, albeit from a very low starting point and amidst considerable inequality, many people (but not all) have experienced improved development outcomes in the global South. We then explore what this apparent ‘big switch’ may tell us about contemporary economic globalisation.

The new geography of global uneven development

Significant portions of the population in the USA and other countries in the global North have experienced limited, if any, income gains in an era of globalisation. Milanovic’s (2016) ‘elephant graph’ (Figure 1) has quickly become a popular way to demonstrate the relative stagnation experienced in North America and Europe in recent decades. Exploring changes in real incomes between 1988 and 2008, he showed that those who particularly lost out on any relative gain in income were the global upper middle class (those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution) and the poorest 5% of the world population. Of these least successful percentiles, 86% of the population were from mature economies in the global North (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 23). Considering these contrasts more widely, a growing body of evidence shows that the global North’s dominance in the global economy is receding, with the share of high-income countries in global GDP having fallen from 76.8% in 2000 to 65.2% in 2015 (see Figure 1).

A different picture emerges in the global South. In Figure 1, it was Asians who comprised 90% of the population in the percentiles which did best in terms of relative income gains from 1988 to 2008 (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 223). The UNDP has remarked that

A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many ~~developing~~ countries into dynamic economies…doing well in economic growth and trade … they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other ~~developing~~ economies, reducing poverty and increasing wealth on a grand scale. (UNDP, 2013, 43)

The share of global GDP of low and middle income countries increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% in 2015 (Figure 2). Much of this increase is accounted for by China, as well as India and Brazil. Their share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, had almost doubled in the 21st century to 18% by 2015.

The development context of the global South has changed significantly since the turn of the Millennium, across a variety of important indicators. The total number of people in the world living on less than $1.90 per day (i.e. extreme poverty) has more than halved from 1.69 billion in 1999 to 766 million in 2013. At least by official estimates, the share of the population in the global South who are living in extreme poverty has fallen considerably this century. Whereas the percentage of the population in the global South with a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 was 33.4% in 1999, it was just 13.4% in 2013.2 The percentage of the world’s countries classified by the World Bank as low-income, albeit a very low threshold, more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century. Moreover, the total number of countries which are highly dependent on aid (having a net ODA > 9% of GNI) has fallen considerably, from 42 in 2000 to 29 in 2015, or from 34.1% to 23.2% of all low and middle-income countries with data available over that period.3

Considered overall, in comparison with the 1990s, the global South, in aggregate, now earns a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middleclass people, less aid dependency, considerably greater life expectancy and lower child and maternal mortality. Table 1 provides some summary indicators for high-income countries (HICs) and low and middle-income countries (L&MICs), as somewhat imperfect approximations for global North and South.

After two hundred years of a ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997) between developed and ~~developing~~ countries following the Industrial Revolution, recent measurements suggest a change in the pattern of global inequality across a number of indicators (Horner and Hulme, 2017). The Global GINI of income distribution across all individuals in the world has fallen from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016, 81). Analysis presented in the World Bank’s Taking on Inequality (2016) suggests that, in 1998, 26% of global income inequality was related to differences within countries, with the remaining 74% relating to differences among countries. By 2013, these shares were 35 and 65%. Two hundred years of a great divergence between global North and South now seems to have had some reversal, although more than half of an individual’s income can be accounted for by the country where he/she lives or was born (Milanovic, 2013). Inter-country inequality, rather than intra-country inequality, is still dominant, but it accounts for a diminished share of income-based and other inequalities (World Bank, 2016).

#### Capitalism isn’t intrinsically racist---the relationship is contingent even if the two systems have coincided.

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Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11

#### Prefer our evidence over narrative pessimism---their ev succumbs to negativity biases that downplay the world’s improvements.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

Max Roser’s Our World in Data is one of my favorite websites, for two reasons. The first is that it contains a lot of valuable information. The second is that it tells an invaluable story—an optimistic and hopeful one. The evidence presented in Our World in Data and in books like Julian Simon’s The Ultimate Resource, Bjørn Lomborg’s Skeptical Environmentalist , Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now , and Hans Rosling’s Factfulness shows clearly that most of the things we should care about are getting better. Not all, but most. This happy fact applies both to the state of nature and the human condition.

The Power of Negative Thinking

But do your friends and family believe that a lot of important things are getting better? Do you? If not, they and you are far from alone. Most people don’t appreciate that things are improving as the four horsemen advance. For example, Rosling writes, “Over the past 20 years, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty has almost halved. But in online polls, in most countries, fewer than 10 percent of people knew this.” Most people believe things are get ting worse. Across all countries surveyed in 2017, only 20 percent of people correctly answered that poverty rates have declined over the previous twenty years.

Why isn’t the good news sinking in? A few factors are at work. One is our basic human “negativity bias”: bad news makes a bigger impression on us and stays with us longer than does neutral or good news. Another factor is that the press tends to emphasize sensationalistic news, which is often negative. Journalism’s jaded motto is “If it bleeds, it leads.”

One other important factor, I think, was identified by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in an 1828 speech: “I have observed that not the man who hopes when others despair, but the man who despairs when others hope, is admired by a large class of persons as a sage.” In many elite circles and publications negativity seems to be a sign of seriousness and rigor, while optimism and positivity seem naive and under-informed.

Simon, Rosling, Pinker, Roser, and others have pushed back against this institutional negativity bias. They’ve done work that is both rigorous and positive. In fact, they’ve shown that doing rigorous work—looking systematically at the best available evidence—often compels you to be positive about many things because the evidence is so encouraging.

#### Transition is impossible.

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‘Locked’ into growth and rising wellbeing expectations? Having set out in the previous sections the discussion about wellbeing in the degrowth discourse so far, we now examine two additional wellbeing related challenges to the political feasibility of degrowth. First, it can be argued that the dominance of growth-based economics has taken on a ‘structural’ quality in current societies. This means that a transition to degrowth that can successfully support wellbeing would need to involve very fundamental social, economic, political, cultural and technological changes – some of which are difficult to achieve through political means. Second, these changes would ideally need to happen very fast, to present a meaningful response to the climate change crisis. We argue here that the process of transition itself is likely to bring about challenges for achieving aspired wellbeing outcomes. Third, and based on the argument that the framework of universal basic needs is most appropriate for discussing wellbeing in a degrowth context, we raise the question how well (or not) applying this framework to think about wellbeing aligns with current societies’ wellbeing expectations. 3.1. Growth ‘lock in’ Economic growth, as an attribute of market capitalism, has structural properties – it is needed to stabilise modern societies as it provides employment, public sector provision through tax revenues, rising wages, and hence social stability ([Petridis et al., 2015: 178](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0375), [Rosa et al., 2017](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0405)). Economic growth is organised around and shapes a range of tightly coupled structures, including institutions, norms, discourses, culture, technologies, competences, identities, etc. Historically speaking, growth is a fairly recent phenomenon which only picked up in the 19th century together with the industrialisation of Western economies. In a co-evolutionary process, a range of institutions developed which are now coupled to a growth-based capitalist economy, including the nation state, representative democracy, the rule of law and current legal, financial, labour market, education, research, and welfare systems. These are based on philosophies which emerged to justify and give meaning to these institutions, for instance on individualism, freedom, justice, sovereignty, or power. The embeddedness of the growth-based capitalistic economic system in these co-evolved institutions and ways of thinking makes it difficult to transition to a degrowth system because the change of the economic system would need to involve a parallel transformation of those coupled systems. In Luhmann’s words, the constitution of the current system “defuturises” ([Luhmann, 1976: 141](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0305)) the future, it reduces the “openness” of the future; “path dependency” or even “lock-in” are related expressions that capture this idea. Two examples which directly link to people’s wellbeing can illustrate this point: the relationship between welfare states and growth, and between growth and people’s mind-sets and identities. The satisfaction of needs is influenced by the character of socio-economic institutions, including the ways in which work, welfare, retirement, health, education and family life are governed; as well as by the structure of the distribution of a range of resources that support health and wellbeing. Welfare state institutions play an important role in these areas in high income economies, and they are closely coupled with economic growth ([Bailey, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0015)). Rising economic prosperity in the post Second World War period provided the resources for establishing welfare states in Europe and elsewhere, and the funding of current welfare state institutions is closely coupled to economic growth as it largely depends on income-related taxes and [social security contributions](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/social-security-contributions). The positive relationship between economic growth and welfare states in many ways also works the other way round: welfare states support growth by enhancing the population’s health and education levels, providing unemployment and minimum income benefits for people out of work. This helps to increase productivity, maintain consumer demand, and more generally contain and minimise social conflict through redistribution and institutionalised conflict resolution between employers and employees. Evidently, a fundamental [reorganisation](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/reorganization) of the economic and welfare system would be required under degrowth to sustain investments in health, education, and the reduction of poverty and [inequality](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/inequality). This will be crucial in a context of decreasing material and financial resources, because if left unmanaged, this could provide fertile ground for new social conflicts with potentially detrimental implications for wellbeing. Various degrowth authors have made suggestions for alternative welfare institutions and policies, including working time reduction and redistribution as mentioned above ([Victor & Rosenbluth, 2007](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0460)), a basic income ([Gorz, 1980](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0190); [Dietz & O’Neill, 2013: 94](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0110)), and, from a Marxian perspective, the establishment of a cooperative economy in which businesses will be worker-owned and managed ([Blauwhof, 2012](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0020)). These are all relevant suggestions, however, it should not be underestimated how radical the changes to existing social systems are that these new institutions represent. They challenge deeply entrenched ways of thinking about rights, justice, freedom, private property, individual responsibility, etc. A change of these deeply rooted ‘logics’ on which these institutions are based is not impossible, but very difficult to steer with political means. This point closely links to the idea that economic growth is not only at the core of various socio-economic institutions but is also very deeply anchored in people’s minds, bodies and identities which is likely to make the transition to degrowth additionally challenging. The concept of social practices helps us understand the ways in which agents (and their mind-sets and bodies) and broader social structures are continuously implicated and reproduced in the performance of social life ([Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0060)). From this perspective, economic growth is not just an external premise that actors can decide to act upon or not, but it is a principle with structural properties that is engrained in ways of thinking and acting – for the most part habitually. Growth thus becomes something that is perceived as ‘natural’ by the vast majority of actors. A range of scholars have argued that the growth paradigm is deeply embedded in people’s minds and bodies ([Göpel, 2016](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0185); [Lane, 1991](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0285); [Welzer, 2011](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0475); [Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0060)). This implies that people’s identities and life goals are closely aligned with the idea of growth – shaped by ideas of social progress, personal status and success through careers, rising income and consumption. Even seemingly alternative goals such as ‘personal fulfilment’ can be infused with ideas that remain tied to the growth paradigm, for instance if fulfilment is sought through high consumption and high emissions practices such as extensive long haul travel or expensive hobbies and gadgets. As [Meadows (1999)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0325) has pointed out, the most effective, but also the most difficult step in system transformation is the shift of paradigms that underpin the system. Again, since this is difficult to influence politically, it presents a major hurdle for a departure from growth-based systems that also maintains wellbeing.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Group the information debate here---tech is great and inevitable:

#### 1---Algorithmic governance is good ­and solves crisis escalation

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).

Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

#### It prevents endless warfare.

James Andrew Lewis 18, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/180108\_Lewis\_ReconsideringCybersecurity\_Web.pdf, p. 16-17

Cyber Operations and Interstate Conflict

International relations are being reshaped by the confluence of several powerful trends, some created by new technologies, some by the powerful reaction to American hegemony, and some from the fraying of the international order created after 1945. In contrast to sunny millennial optimism, efforts to improve cybersecurity must be designed for a period where, for an unknown duration, there will be increased conflict as states challenge the liberal postwar order. We are at the end of a sustained period of strategic stability17 and conflict, albeit at low levels, will be the norm. Conflict between states will take new forms and cyber operations will be an important part of this. They are ideal for the new strategic environment, given their opacity, the lack of clear norms, and inadequate defenses.

Opponent actions that stay below this threshold inhabit a "gray area," that is neither peace nor war, where the United States and its allies, unable to use military force in response, have so far been stymied in designing and articulated an effective reply. Opponents will exploit gray areas in international law to coerce without triggering armed conflict. Deterrence will be more difficult in this opaque environment, and we will see increased use by our opponents of coercive acts that fall below thresholds for the use of force or armed attack.

The future of armed conflict is that major powers will try to avoid armed confrontation. Wars between big, heavily armed states are expensive and risky, particularly if they have nuclear weapons. The major powers will not renounce the use of force and coercion—Russia, the United States, China, Iran, North Korea, and others use force or the threat of force all the time— but they will try to avoid war with each other. If major powers do stumble into conventional war, cyber attacks will be a part of the fighting, but the real nature of cyber conflict involves something other than warfare and lacks the sharp discontinuity between war and peace. The experience of the last decade suggests that the norm for interstate conflict will be increasingly continuous and not kinetic.

#### 2---Data combats racial biases

John Zerilli 18, Professor of law and philosophy at the University of Sydney, with; Alistair Knott, James Maclaurin, and Colin Gavaghan; 9/5/18, “Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6#Sec4

Human bias is often intrinsic, in the above sense, because it bears an important relation to emotion, itself a constitutive feature of personality (Angie et al. 2011; Pohl 2008; Stephan and Finlay 1999). Racial bias is a good example of intrinsic bias in human beings, because the connection with emotion is relatively clear (the emotion being fear), as is its tolerance to falsifying evidence. When someone has been conditioned to believe that an ethnic minority poses a threat to safety, or is more susceptible to crime, merely supplying that person with evidence to the contrary may be insufficient to dislodge a lifetime of encrusted prejudice (Bezrukova et al. 2016). Racist conditioning may permanently (or semipermanently) affect the way a person processes information and makes decisions. Of course this is not to say that intrinsic bias is always irrational. Many human biases could be thought to result from the misfiring of an ancient and conserved cognitive adaptation to make generic judgements (Begby 2013; Leslie 2017). Because such judgements are based on dispositional rather than probabilistic factors, they too tend to be resistant to disconfirming evidence.

As against intrinsic bias, bias that is not intrinsic (i.e. extrinsic) derives from a system’s inputs

when they do not effect a permanent change in the system’s internal structure and rules of operation. In these cases, false information may affect a system’s outputs, but so long as the information is corrected, the outputs will be unbiased pro tanto. Thus, if a person is given information that leads them to the erroneous belief that p, and the belief that p plays a relevant role in decision-making, leading to the decision that q, the person will be nonintrinsically biased towards the decision that q if, upon receiving the correct information, the person no longer believes that p, and either abandons or revises the grounds for the decision that q.

Overall, while it is true that an algorithm can be intrinsically biased (see below), nonintrinsic bias is probably the bigger issue for AI (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996; Johnson 2006). The so-called dirty data problem is a neat illustration. Errors and biases latent in data training sets tend to be reproduced in the outputs of machine learning tools (Barocas and Selbst 2015; Diakopoulos 2015). This is a significant problem, and one that is compounded—of all things—by copyright and intellectual property laws, which presently limit the access users have to better quality training data (Levendowski 2017).Footnote9 But nonintrinsic bias is still in principle less difficult to overcome than intrinsic bias. Most of these problems arise from the use of unrepresentative data sets. For instance, face recognition systems trained predominantly on Caucasian faces might reject the passport application photos of Asian persons, whose eyes appear closed (Griffiths 2016). Speech recognition systems, too, are notorious for being less accurate when decoding female voices than male ones (Tatman 2016). Both situations arise from a failure to include members of diverse social groups in training data. The obvious solution is to diversify the training sets (Klingele 2016; Crawford and Calo 2016). While there are political and legal barriers in the way of this, as Levendowski (2017) documents in her careful analysis of intellectual property laws, it is not nearly as intractable a problem as the one posed by intrinsic human bias (Bezrukova et al. 2016; Plous 2003a; Allport 1954).

#### Abandoning the university, as per Francis ev, is bad – denounces science and cedes the argumentative terrain to skeptics

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(Marcel Kuntz, EUROPEAN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORGANIZATION, EMBO reports, 13.2)

**The scientific method has been the guiding principle for investigating natural phenomena, but postmodernist thought is starting to threaten the foundations of the scientific approach**. The rational, scientific view of the world has been painstakingly built over millennia to guarantee that research can have access to objective reality: the world, for science, contains real objects and is governed by physical laws that existed before our knowledge of these objects and laws. **Science attempts to describe the world independently of belief by seeking universal truths, on the basis of observation, measurement and experimentation. The postmodernist school of thought arose to question these assumptions, postulating that claims about the existence of a real world**—the knowledge of which is attainable as an objective truth—**have only been relevant in Western civilization since the Enlightenment**. In recent decades, the movement has begun to question the validity of claims of scientific truth, whether on the basis of their belonging to larger cultural frames or through heavy criticism of the scientific method. However, postmodernist thought has mostly gone unnoticed by scientists, despite its growing importance in the twentieth century. The origins of this ‘deconstruction' of the ‘Enlightenment project' can be traced back to Friedrich Nietzsche, who was among the first to question our ability to discern objective truth: “In so far as the word ‘knowledge' has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings” (The Will to Power, 1883–1888; [1]). During the late twentieth century, postmodern philosophy picked up where Nietzsche left off. In his book, Against Method (1975; [2]), philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend argued that the progress of acquiring scientific knowledge is not governed by any useful and universal methodological rules, and summarized this “epistemological anarchy” as “anything goes”. The concept of paradigm shift proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his famous book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962; [3]), has also given weight to the critics of science and of its pretension to understand reality. If science is not a gradual process of accumulation of knowledge, but rather subject to sudden “revolutions” that overwhelm outdated theories, they argue, how can one trust scientific knowledge? If, as according to Kuhn, scientific revolutions are also political upheavals in scientific policy, it is easy to understand why Kuhn's theory has attracted so much attention in a period that calls into question the established political order in the Western world. **The rational, scientific view of the world has been painstakingly built over millennia to guarantee that research can have access to objective reality** This ‘**deconstruction' gained momentum when it was also adopted in the realm of the sociology of science, particularly in the so-called ‘strong programme' belonging to a school of thought known as ‘science studies'** [4]. The ‘strong programme' or ‘strong sociology' was a reaction to previous sociologies of science that had only been applied to failed or false theories. ‘Strong sociology' claims that the existence of a scientific community, bound together by allegiance to a shared paradigm, is a prerequisite for scientific activity, and that as such, both ‘true' and ‘false' scientific theories should be treated equally, as both are the result of social factors or conditions. Several deconstructionist thinkers, such as Bruno Latour and Ian Hacking, have rejected the idea that the concepts of science can be derived from a direct interaction with natural phenomena independently of the social environment in which we think about them. The central goal of science, defining what is true and what is false, becomes meaningless they argue, as its objectivity is reduced to ‘claims' that are simply the expression of one culture—one community—among many. Thus, all systems of thought are different “constructs” of reality and all additionally have political connotations and agendas. As Simon Shackley and Brian Wynne have written with regard to defining uncertainty in climate change science policy from the perspective of science studies: “…the mere occurrence of uncertainty talk is not interesting unless we can document and interpret its construction, representation, and/or translation. According to constructivist accounts, representations of uncertainty do not reflect an underlying ‘reality' or a given ‘state of objective knowledge' but are constructed in particular situations with certain effects” [5]. The inverted commas around ‘reality' and ‘objective knowledge' are there to shed doubt on what is expressed. Thus, science being in constant dispute, controversy becomes the essence of science. As Shawn Lawrence Otto discussed in his book, Fool Me Twice: Fighting the Assault on Science in America (2011; [6]), in conjunction with the emergence of multiculturalism and the civil rights movement, ‘relativism'—and its direct attacks on the validity and the authority of science, and not only that of scientists—gained a strong moral influence, first in post-Second World War America and then in Europe. If there is no universal truth, as postmodern philosophy claims, then each social or political group should have the right to the reality that best suits them. What, then, are the consequences of applying postmodernist thinking when it comes to science? Risk assessment provides illuminating examples of how it corrupts the role of science in the public sphere, especially if one considers the dispute over genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The idea that GMOs are harmful to the environment and humans arose mainly from opposition to biotechnology from some agricultural groups and environmentalists. These farmers in particular felt disempowered by globalization and feared that technology and scientific research might increase global corporate power to their detriment. Whilst environmental groups initially raised sensible concerns about potential environmental damage, they soon shifted to an ideological position of opposition, as science demonstrated that such risks are often small, sometimes hypothetical and generally not specific to GMOs. Given the lack of scientific evidence to support the purported health or environmental effects of GMOs, opponents have moved on to attack the risk assessment of GM crops. Scientific authorities are not only questioned on the quality and honesty of their experts—which is unpleasant for them but a matter of legitimate debate—but also attacked, by postmodernism, on the scientific method and its universality. **Scientific authorities are** not only questioned on the quality and honesty of their experts […] but also **attacked, by postmodernism, on the scientific method and its universality** In such a postmodern framing, these politically constructed claims about the dangers of GMOs bear as much ‘truth' as science-based risk assessment. Scientists who object to these claims on the grounds of a lack of scientific merit often find themselves accused of being intellectually stuck in the old paradigm of ‘scientism', or are told that scientists cannot be trusted, as illustrated by examples of past health scandals or scientific errors unrelated to GMOs. At the extreme, such thinking can lead to violence against research and researchers, such as the destruction of field trials designed to assess the safety of GM crops [7]. In this way, not only do anti-GM groups assert their own ‘truth' in justifying their actions—such attacks are rarely condemned—but they also deny scientists the opportunity to discover and demonstrate the objective truth about the safety of GMOs. Has a postmodern framing given more power to the people or more control over the use of biotechnology? Has it enhanced the public understanding of scientific processes? Apparently not, as opinion polls still indicate that after 15 years of ‘debate', most people—74% in a March 2012 poll in France—think “it is difficult to form an opinion about GMOs” (http://www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/attachments/rapport\_quanti\_ogm.pdf). As part of their campaign against GM crops, activists have tried repeatedly to undermine the credibility of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which performs risk assessments for GM crop varieties (http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/news/efsaanswersback.htm). The reason that the EFSA and its scientists have become targets is that individual EU member states cannot reach consensus on whether to allow the cultivation of GM crops [8]. As such, the decision falls to the European Commission, which usually follows the EFSA's advice. Given the political paralysis, the EFSA has become the de facto reference for risk management and, consequently, the target of political groups seeking a complete and indefinite ban on GM crops. Thus, anti-GMO activists are following Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788–1860) ‘ultimate stratagem' for a dispute that your opponent is winning: you move on from the subject of the dispute to the disputant himself, attacking his person and, in this case, his independence (Eristic Dialectics: The Art Of Being Right, 1831). …if science is not objective […] then risk assessment by the EFSA is merely a ‘framing of truth' […] which can be countered by any other group of people with their own […] ‘truths' In this context, some postmodern discourses have sought to undermine the EFSA's science-based risk assessment, by accusing it of wearing “a false mantle of objective, singular and uncontestable science” [9]. From this it follows that if science is not objective and that if its truths are heavily influenced by the opinions of scientists—and the EFSA does call its scientific conclusions ‘opinions', rather than facts, for example—then risk assessment by the EFSA is merely a ‘framing of truth' by a panel of people with shared presuppositions, which can be countered by any other group of people with their own frame or set of ‘truths'. More insidiously, such thinking can convince political authorities to abandon the “rigid division” [9] between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, and thereby open the door wide for what are called ‘participative' policies. However, if these ‘participative' policies and the involvement of stakeholders can be considered as relevant and legitimate where decision-making is concerned, they cannot and ought not to interfere with what are ultimately scientific questions. For example, the French Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) and several other laboratories have developed transgenic grapevine rootstocks that are potentially resistant to the grapevine fanleaf virus (GFLV). Non-GM plants were grafted onto these GM rootstocks and a first field trial was set up in the Champagne region of France in 1996. This trial was terminated in 1999 due to pressure from a retail chain on the Champagne producer involved. INRA resumed its interest in these trials in 2001, officially to “deal with the challenges” that field trials are essential for research but might face public opposition [10]. A participative approach was chosen and a working group was set up in 2001. This initial consultation step provided support to restart the trial under certain conditions. However, even these conditions did not satisfy radical anti-GMO activists, who criticized the INRA initiative as being a “programme of opinion manipulation” [11]. In the spring of 2003, a Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) was set up for the new field trial at the INRA Centre in Colmar in France. The LMC had ‘broad stakeholder representation', which is to say that a large number of representatives from ‘green' organizations were involved. As a result, INRA congratulated itself for having developed “a research-action method based on the principle of both acknowledging the learning of all parties and also the validity of other modes of reasoning” [10]. In truth, under the influence of the ‘green' organizations, the LMC had actually redesigned the transgenic grapevine research trial to push for new research “on the environmental impact of GMO rootstocks as well as on the alternatives for controlling GFLV using organic viticulture”. Ultimately, the field trial was vandalized by an individual in September 2009, restarted with unanimous support from the LMC and then uprooted by 65 activists in August 2010 (INRA press statement, 2010: http://www.international.inra.fr/press/destruction\_of\_a\_gmo\_trial). …the danger of a postmodern approach to science, that seeks to include all points of view as equally valid, is that it slows down or prevents much needed scientific research In May 2009, the French High Council of Biotechnologies (HCB; www.hautconseildesbiotechnologies.fr) was founded to advise French politicians on biotechnology. It is composed of two separate entities: the Scientific Committee (CS), which has 39 members, and the Social, Ethical and Economic Committee (CEES), which has 26 members who represent a range of stakeholders from ‘green' organizations, farmers' unions and workers' unions, to representatives of state institutions, political parties and a few ‘qualified' personalities. The scientific points of view of the CS are examined by the CEES, which then makes recommendations to deal with the economic and social impacts of GM crop imports and cultivation. In line with its anti-GMO policy [4], the government of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy gave most positions on the CEES to members of organizations known to oppose GMOs. As a result, and as explained by representatives of the workers union, the CFDT: “instead of analysing the pros and cons of each innovation, a diffuse majority favours description of methods allegedly to avoid the use of the examined biotech crops. Ideological assertions are mixed with agronomic arguments” (http://alternatives-economiques.fr/blogs/bompard/archives/150; translated here from French by M. Kuntz). The French government has repeatedly cited the CEES as a model for ‘improved' GMO evaluation in Europe, but the CEES has never produced a consensus, which was its alleged mission. For example, after the destruction of the Colmar field trial, several organizations represented in the CEES endorsed the criminal act through statements in the press and during a plenary CEES meeting (http://alternatives-economiques.fr/blogs/bompard/archives/150). This shocked members of the CEES, and the ongoing disagreements between environmental groups and organic farming unions on the one hand, and other stakeholders on the other, eventually led to the resignations of several members of the CEES, including the representative of the CFDT, on 17 January 2012. The latter, Jeanne Grosclaude, has written of the problems: “The reason was the radical refusal of any rule or agreement for coexistence claimed by a small number of environmental associations and organic farmers organizations. Their attitude forbids the CEES in the future to analyse any demand for growing genetically modified plants with an open-minded view and to provide decision-making authorities with a balanced proposal. Any further participation to the debate would be useless” (http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/1/39/38/37/Comments-from-J\_Grosclaude.pdf). …implicit in the idea of an EFSA scientist and a non-EFSA scientist is the idea of ‘EFSA science'—which cannot be trusted—and ‘non-EFSA science'—which presumably can Thus, the danger of a postmodern approach to science, that seeks to include all points of view as equally valid, is that it **slows down or prevents much needed scientific research**, even **denying that science should have a role in such decisions**. **Of course, such a postmodern approach**, which raises the value of ‘independent’ views to the same level as scientific ones, **is usually justified by the** apparently reasonable political and **democratic need for the pluralistic expression of opinions**. Indeed, **some politicians openly support anti-technology activists** in the name of democracy and freedom of speech. For example, in January 2011, members of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE; www.alde.eu), a group of politicians within the European Parliament, organized a seminaron the risk evaluation of GMOs. The invited speakers were a Senior Scientific Officer from the EFSA, who faced representatives from both the European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility (ENSSER) and the Committee of Independent Research and Information on Genetic Engineering (CRIIGEN); two openly anti-GMO organizations.¶ The announcement of the seminar was steeped in thinly veiled accusations against the EFSA and the independence of its scientists. Member of the European Parliament (MEP)—and founder of CRIIGEN—Corine Lepage, who co-organizedthe ALDE seminar, asserted that “it is crucial for policy-makers to have access to unbiased expertise and to consider all sides of an argument. Fact-finding processes should be systematically organized to hear all sides, as in a court room.” MEP George Lyon, co-organizer, found similarly that “it is vital for farmers, consumers and the environment that the impasse between the two opposing sides be broken”. ALDE itself announced the seminar on its websiteby stating that the EFSA “has been criticizedby independent scientists, NGOs [and] farmers’ unions” (http://www.alde.eu/event-seminar/events-details/article/seminar-gmo-risk-evaluation‑a-contradictory- debate‑35941/). The whole event implied that EFSA scientists are not independent and that trustworthy views from outside the EFSA should be sought. Moreover, implicit in the idea of an EFSA scientist and a non-EFSA scientist is the idea of ‘EFSA science’—which cannot be trusted—and ‘non-EFSA science’—which presumably can. In reality, however, there is only one science, as defined by the application of the scientific method in an objective and unbiasedmanner.¶ Given the foregoing, with the respectable aim to ‘break’ an impasse, it becomes clear that politicians hoist to the rank of major interlocutor a kind of ‘parallel science’. Unlike regular science, ‘parallel science’ serves political goals and describes itself with positive-sounding terms such as ‘science in society’, ‘concerned’, ‘responsible’, ‘independent’ and ‘citizen’ science, which the ‘other’ science is **not. It aims to substitute apolitical scientists**, especially for risk assessment, with ‘experts’ sympathetic to the cause; they can be from official institutions, universities or self-proclaimed, irrespective of whether their opinion is accepted by other scientists or whether their research methodsand conclusionsare trustworthy.¶ ‘Parallel science’ emulates normal scientific research: it is published in scholarly journals, it is the subject of international meetings, seminars and congresses, and it is supported by both public and private funding. What distinguishes parallel scientists from ‘normal’ scientists, however, is that their conclusions are invariably predictable—that GM crops are a danger to human health and the environment for instance—and that criticisms or rebuttals of their results or conclusions will neither change their views nor the conclusion of their next publication.¶ Since anti-GMO organizations have based their communication strategy on claims of risk that are by and large rejected by the scientific community, it is logical that these organizations, in their non-compromising political strategy, try to deconstruct science. Thus, anti-GMO groups and environmental organizations at large have a vested interest in teaming up with a postmodernism view of science as a social construct; the aim is to attack the science that stands against their agenda. Thus, postmodernist sociologists—mostly in the discipline called ‘science studies’—have recognized this opposition to innovation as an opportunity to increase their influence and funding possibilities: “not only¶ must existing controversies be welcomed and recognized as participating in democratization of democracy, but in addition they should be encouraged, stimulated, and organized” [12].¶ In the face of alleged uncertainties, many politicians and citizens find it reassuring to examine several ‘truths’ and shifting paradigms in risk assessment. However, doing so with **no reference to indisputable scientific knowledge** [13] renders risk assessment unscientific, **increases uncertainty and paves the way for arbitrary decisions.** **This form of postmodernist assault on science has been difficult to grasp for many scientists, because it comes disguised in the clothes of democracy, freedom of speech and tolerance of opinion.** However, as the GMO dispute has shown, scientists will never be able to win in postmodern courtroom—style debates: all “social constructs” of science are equal, but some are more equal than others.

### 1NC---AT: Method

#### I’ll answer the bottom of the 1AC here:

#### Their solvency advocate says legal apparatuses are important and dismissal is bad

1AC Francis 19 (John James, PhD Candidate @ University of Birmingham, “Spectres of a crisis: reading Jacques Derrida after the global financial crisis of 2008”, University of Birmingham Archive, July 19, pages 100-103) arnav \*edited for ableist language

Subsequently, in Chapters Three to Five I have pursued a deconstructive approach that has examined the logocentric by way of the deconstruction of the political. To do this I have paid particular attention to Derrida’s updating of his concepts of the trace, différance, and deconstruction in his later works through the concepts of ‘hospitality’ and ‘autoimmunity’. This has led me to move from the political in the traditional sense of the nation-state, to the intellectual, scholarly construction and deconstruction of the political, and finally to the secretion of the political in contemporary media practices. Ultimately, I argue that the most radical location of political intervention is that of the media. I argue that it is here that there is the most urgent task of intervention, but also the most radical disruption of inheritances that have troubling ethico-political implications. However, to reach this conclusion I nonetheless argue that it is important to not be too dismissive of politics in the traditional sense, either in terms of its conceptual importance or pragmatically in terms of the manner in which it registers difference through specific legal apparatuses and moments of interaction and exchange.

#### Information doesn’t dissuade---we should engage in communicative politics.

**Robinson ’04** – is a political theorist and activist based in the UK (Andrew, “Baudrillard, Zizek and Laclau on "common sense" - a critique’, POST-MARXISM, POST-STRUCTURALISM AND EVERYDAY WORLDVIEWS, 11/15/04, Andrew Robinson Theory Blog, <http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html)//CW>

The critique captured in this statement was to produce important theoretical effects. While philosophy cannot directly change the world, it can aim to participate in projects to change it by redirecting its attention away from closed debates about a limited range of supposedly foundational concepts, and towards the study of the political and philosophical beliefs, attitudes and practices which make up the everyday life of the diverse strata of the world's population who do not engage in specialised political thought. To be sure, many philosophers stuck to their old ways; but a sizeable number of critical-minded theorists began, from a number of different angles, to describe, analyse, and discuss the transformation of everyday beliefs. If the point is to change it, and this change is to extend beyond the limited circles of political theory and philosophy specialists, theorists need to find ways to influence and alter beliefs and practices. And if it is to extend beyond the superficial field of official politics, theory has to engage with beliefs and practices as they occur in everyday life - the sole area in which most people are politically and philosophically active.

Gramsci's work is an outstanding example of this. For Gramsci, philosophy and politics are not the sole preserve of specialists; everyone engages in philosophical activity since everyone holds some conception of the world and life which underlies their practice, and everyone engages in politics since everyone's practical activity promotes some ways of thinking and acting over others. Everyone is also on some level an ethicist, a scientist, an aesthete and so on. Gramsci calls the conception or conceptions of the world which presently occur in everyday life "common sense". It is important to treat these everyday worldviews with respect, and not to leave them in the state of voicelessness to which social inequality often consigns them. However, theorists should not automatically endorse these views, which are often confused, contradictory, manipulable, neophobe, and prejudiced. Instead, one needs a CRITIQUE and a critical practice, similar to the critique of a particular theorist's philosophy but directed against common sense instead. This critique should be taken to the masses by "organic intellectuals", who should aim to encourage more critical and coherent beliefs through a political, cultural and pedagogic practice drawing on immanently critical elements within common sense itself. The critique of common sense is for Gramsci the main goal of political and philosophical theory - MORE important in terms of its social relevance than the critique of specialist philosophers.

A similar project can be detected running through the work of many other critical theorists in the period from the 1920s to the 1970s. Barthes, Benjamin, Goffman, Hoggart, Krauss, Marcuse, McLuhan, Negri, Reich, Sartre and Vaneigem, to mention only the a few, embarked on an analysis and critique of everyday beliefs, alignments and practices as part of their diverse theoretical projects.

It is my contention, however, that this concern has abated substantially since about the 1980s, and that it is far less common in contemporary political theory. To be sure, a few writers, such as Foucault and Deleuze, still take up these kinds of concerns to some extent. Many recent theorists, however, have moved away from the critique of common sense and the analysis of everyday beliefs, often returning to a purely metaphysical type of theorising. Their politics has similarly moved away from projects of overcoming common sense and towards a faith in the immediate effectiveness of purely INDIVIDUAL acts, pragmatic politics, or, in a few cases, waiting for a nihilistic catastrophe. While transgressive acts may have some value in shaping individual identities and constituting countercultural group identities, they are unlikely to transform POPULAR beliefs unless they can find a way to bypass the pervasive processes of labelling transgression as abnormal, immoral or unnatural. Similarly, it is unlikely that any transformative event, or social reforms with wide-ranging effects, can occur without a prior basis in everyday worldviews, which is unlikely unless common sense can be overcome.

This paper focuses on three theorists who I feel demonstrate this tendency particularly strongly: Slavoj Zizek, Ernesto Laclau (including his collaborations with Chantal Mouffe), and Jean Baudrillard (excluding his early, Barthesian-inspired work). I shall critique each of these thinkers in relation to how they deduce or describe everyday beliefs, the analysis they offer of these beliefs, and how their transformative strategy relates to common sense.

BAUDRILLARD - COMMON SENSE The work of Jean Baudrillard, examined over time, shows within one body of work the pattern I am suggesting is affecting contemporary thought as a whole. In his early work, especially The Consumer Society, written in 1970, Baudrillard provides an intriguing account of how everyday perceptions and actions may be influenced, constructed or manipulated by a variety of processes which substitute SIGNS of social phenomena for their actuality and which produce a new, generalised oppression based on consumption as a process of production of sign-value. This insightful approach still shines through from time to time in Baudrillard's work - for instance, in some of his discussions of simulation in the Gulf War. On the whole, however, his recent work is set on a different trajectory, away from this kind of structural discourse analysis and towards an abstract set of asserted claims of dubious theoretical status.

His short essays on the masses are particularly problematic in this regard. Unlike his earlier work, Baudrillard makes little effort to examine the discursive character of mass subjectivity in essays like "In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities", instead deducing mass alignments from his own, prior assumptions about the nature of society. His basic project - to analyse mass indifference without resorting to ideas of alienation and failure (13) - is valid; but his means of pursuing it is highly problematic.

Baudrillard takes a contradictory position on common sense which runs to the roots of his method. On the one hand, he poses as offering an approach which annihilates the existing system of meaning, and he attacks it constantly. On the other, several of his most important concepts, such as "the masses" and "the social", are plucked straight from everyday usage, with their contradictions intact. Baudrillard makes no attempt to define these concepts and, indeed, plays constantly with their contradictory usages. This can lead to confusion, as for instance with Baudrillard's indecisiveness over whether peasants are a part of the masses or not. Indeed, it is not even clear whether the masses exist or not. Defending his use of the concept, Baudrillard claims he is merely prowling round acritical notions to achieve theoretical effects (SSM 4). It is a leitmotif not a concept (SSM 4) and has nothing to do with any real body of people (SSM 5), Baudrillard tells us; "statistics and surveys" are a "ritual" with "no real object", and the masses are constructed by them through circular signals (SSM 31-2). The masses "don't exist", they are merely the shadow cast by power, he says (SSM 48). This implies that the concept of "masses" is a purely discursive construct with no relation to the people who fill in surveys or, if it relates to them, which constructs them entirely.

but he uses the concept as if the "masses" ARE a real,

more-or-less autonomous group who act and even have strategies. The masses are a group of people with a specific status, he tells us elsewhere (SSM 5). Throughout his account, the masses are a "they", who are a stratum (albeit an opaque and blind one - 21), have existential conditions (eg. atomisation)and social effects (eg. causing a vaccuum in society - 6). When he tries to resolve this contradiction, he does so via further contradictions: the silent majority is an IMAGINARY referent, but it exists; the masses exist statistically but not socially; they only exist via simulation (SSM 20). His theory is therefore confused about its relationship to common sense at the very level of his own relationship to language. If surveys construct the masses, the masses cannot be a group with their own dynamics, outside the official discourse; besides, surveys require a "matter" so to speak which is "worked" by them but autonomous of them.

Baudrillard's attitude to the masses in Consumer Society was straightforward enough: they are participating in a dominant structure which is pervasive but unsatisfying. In his later work, his position becomes confused and contradictory. On the one hand, he denies subjectivity to the masses, claiming they are a void without demands or identity which refuses meaning, a silent, "dumb like beasts" (SSM 28), a "nothing", a force which absorbs and neutralises through its inertia (SSM 1-2), with no history or enemy or desire (SSM 2-3), "A black hole which absorbs the social" (SSM 4), with no self or other or political potential (6). Their nonexistence falsifies political discourse which wrongly assumes that the masses EXIST behind all the surveys and information about them, when in fact they do not exist and especially are not committed to any historical or political agenda (SSM 37-8). They "do not choose", producing only a lack of differentiation (SSM 35); they are "innumerable, unnameable and anonymous", and their strength is rooted in destructuration and inertia (SSM 43). Further, they have "nothing to say to us" and "no meaning" (SSM 49) (which raises the question of how Baudrillard can nevertheless write of their significance).

On the other, he refers to them as if they are players in a game or one side in a class struggle, with goals, strategy and intentionality: they "free" themselves from "simplifying terror" via "an explicit and positive counter-strategy" of absorbing information without giving feedback (SSM 10-11), a "retaliation" and "refusal" (SSM 14), a "revenge" on the political elite for silencing the masses (SSM 23); there is no manipulation, only a "game", "played on both sides with the same weapon" (SSM 29-30), a "denial" of meaning (SSM 49), an "antagonism" between an elite which wants to spread power and meaning and a "residual, senseless mass" which tries to distort, neutralise or diminish this (SSM 38); with an "allergy" or "defiance" towards meaning (SSM 36), an "offensive practice" or "ruse" (SSM 43), a resistance to manipulation, a withdrawal into privacy to avoid manipulation (SSM 39), and a "strength" built on inertia which enables them to absorb the system's imperatives but redirect them into "fascination" (SSM 43-4); an "inescapable confrontation" between the masses and the social (SSM 47), and a resistance which is not even passive (SSM 104), which uses the media as a tool to resist meaning (SSM 105-6). By a purely interpretive sidestep, Baudrillard converts passivity into activity.

This active mass can furthermore be manipulated, in contradiction to Baudrillard's earlier claims; the media makes the masses prefer medium to message (SSM 35-6).

Baudrillard's claims about mass beliefs in "Consumer Society" are backed by evidence, albeit often from the discourse of the dominant rather than the masses themselves. Even at this point he assumes too rapidly that a tendency present in the media or among elites will automatically root itself very deeply in the personalities of the masses. In his later essays, this gets even worse. For instance, he claims that a lack of a "differential term" - that is, of enemies or conflict - is crucial to massified consciousness (SSM 21). This accurately reflects the surface ideology of adverts and many politicians, but spectacular societies also involve the INVENTION of enemies. David Matza (BD 196-7), for instance, claims that the model of consensus is mainly created by MISidentifying social problems with a specifiable group of outsiders. There is also much literature on "moral panics" which Baudrillard seems to have entirely missed.

Baudrillard thinks his account of the masses is confirmed by disinterest in politics and "public" debates (12-13), and that this is a resistance to political manipulation (SSM 39). He is wrong. This disinterest is relative: at the time of The Consumer Society, Baudrillard still recognised that this disinterest can be shattered by sudden uprisings. Further, it is quite possible to explain such disinterest without falling back on the crude kind of theories of mystification Baudrillard cites as the only alternative to his view (SSM 12-13). Brinton, and Albert and Hahnel, for instance, have analysed disinterest as an insulation built into authoritarian character-structures which enables people to cope with capitalism. Baudrillard's earlier work similarly involves a model of how the consumer society produces disinterest. Furthermore, political manipulation is, as Gramsci and others show, closely intertwined with the supposedly "meaningless", "apolitical" discourses of everyday life. It is simply not possible to withdraw from politics; one always participates in practices which influence social outcomes and others' actions, so that the illusion of withdrawal from politics is actually a naturalisation of a particular kind of political system. Baudrillard's explicitly stated view that everyday practice is beyond representation and the politics (SSM 39) is therefore wholly mistaken and leads him to effectively endorse the naturalisation of politics (even though he tries to avoid ENDORSING something he sees as meaningless and therefore not endorsable - 40-1. Actually he does endorse indirectly via loaded language). He also misses the dimension of political INTRUSION into everyday life - for instance, the aggressive police presence which blights so many inner-city communities, and the linked phenomenon of a politicised fear of "crime". At this point, in contradiction to Vaneigem, Reich and Foucault as well as his earlier work, Baudrillard also wants to deny a liberatory potential to resistance in everyday life (SSM 40-1).

#### It doesn’t solve.

Zechner and Hansen, 10—both have Ph.D.s from Queen Mary University (Manuela and Bue Rübner, “Unchained melodies of the new proletariat,” <https://www.generation-online.org/other/stieglerreview.htm>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Stieglers argument points to a de facto impoverishment of everyday and collective intelligence, and as such points the way to important investigations into this contemporary everyday and its forms of solidarity an reproduction. But Stiegler ends up with a relatively limited critique that speaks from the position of paid labour only – even if it's now flexibilized, fee-based and possibly even precarious labour that is at stake. He is clear about the poverty of cognitive labour:

We thus have pure cognitive labour power utterly devoid of knowledge: with cognitive technologies, it is the cognitive itself which has been proletarianized. In this consists, then, cognitive capitalism, also known as 'creative' or 'immaterial' capitalism. And this is concretely expressed in the fact that the cognitive has been reduced to calculability – logos has become, pharmacologically and economically, ratio.(5)

Yet he still does not look beyond this cognitive field to find other cultures of knowledge and sharing. He talks about 'economies of contribution', imagining modes of networked production that put resources in common: however this still seems to be mainly about the sharing of ideas and IPs in generally competitive settings, a narrative by and for white educated males in industrialized countries of the west (6). Reading Stiegler's New Critique of Political Economy', one finds many sensitivities and intuitions, yet he insists on projecting new political economies into cognitarian fields rather than elsewhere. Missing out on the wealth of self-generating knowledges in the experiences of women and subaltern people, Stiegler also fails to address the repression and deprivation of reproductive knowledges that have occurred with colonization, housewifization and capitalist accumulation across the globe and centuries. Whether women and the subaltern have a different point of view on contemporary 'proletarianization' remains unknown: a promising story reverts to its usual protagonists.

While the proletarianization of workers was a condition of the development of the productivist model of Fordism the proletarianization of consumers was a solution to its limits, its inherent tendency to overproduction. The creation of a mass market did not only involve an increase in demand - presupposing both an increase in purchasing power and desire for goods - but the reliance of consumers on the market – that is, on their decreasing ability to live without it. This process, according to Stiegler, ‘fundamentally and practically weaken[ed] the Marxist theory of class struggle’ (p.40). However, this model has increasingly hollowed out savoir-vivre, and diminished the time necessary for the constitution of desire. In short the consumerist model undermines its own basis, tending towards crisis because it exhausts the libidinal energy which keeps it running.

Stiegler thus thinks of 20th century consumerism not as a question of class compromise (on the background of class struggle, imperialism and the global division of labour), but rather as an occasion to question as compromised the very concept of class antagonism itself. As consumerism itself, Stiegler’s consumption centred account tends to depoliticise capitalism. Stiegler diagnoses the ‘first planetary economic crisis’ as the crisis of the consumerist model, symptom of an ever falling rate of profit, yet without paying much attention to the fall of real wages in Western Countries in the past 25-30 years, or to the growing consumerist economies of China, India, Brazil, etc. (7)

Economies of contribution

The economy of contribution stands for a world of meaningful communalist relations, an economy that reclaims technologies and knowledges of work in ways that make both economics and work more meaningful – in Stieglers case (as in the case of so many theorists of 'cognitive', 'immaterial', 'creative' or 'knowledge' labour), via the emergence of digital technologies and computer networks. In this tech economy, 'work' can emancipate itself from the abstracted, alienated and measured activity that consists in the execution of programmed gestures, in the pushing of buttons upon a surface one can't grasp or hack: hacking is an exemplary self-driven activity that reinvents work, creativity and meaning, according to Stiegler. Work as the constant re-invention of meaning at the interface of the psychic, social and political: Stiegler insists on new hacker and geek cultures constituting such a new economy of contribution. A fair point, yet what revolutionary potential can be derived from such a minority white industrialized culture – is this really where the potentials to break with proletarianization have a privileged place today, should we really invest all that hope into relatively privileged knowledge workers? What about the 99% of others, who restlessly push buttons in call-centres, offices and home workstations? I very much doubt that the emancipation of creative labour as such can achieve any more than relative privilege for some people with computers.

As many philosophically and scientifically positioned theorisations, Stiegler's too fails to position itself with regards to its object, and as such presents a relative monofocal perspective which ends up resembling a 'god trick' in Donna Haraways terms – a perspective that fails to articulate itself in relation to its place, its others, its history in a thoroughly critical way. Donna Haraway calls for developing situated knowledges in the face of disembodied objectivity:

We need to learn in our bodies, endowed with primate colour and stereoscopic vision, how to attach the objective to our theoretical and political scanners in order to name where we are and where we are not, in dimensions of mental and physical space we hardly know how to name.(8)

The absence of a feminist and postcolonial viewpoint – or even recognition thereof – does make itself felt in Stiegler's work, and with this, questions of care and sustainability become somewhat shallow. Reproduction and the feminised everyday are finally left behind in favour of the conceptual pair production/consumption (9): this is why Stiegler’s 'care' remains too abstract a concept, without much indication of a practice beyond that of certain people working with computers. The notion of care sits in the right place, addressing an absence of certain practices of attention-giving within contemporary networked capitalism, and pointing to the need to invent new ways of putting things in common:

The economy of contribution is the stimulation of desire through the reconstitution of systems of care founded on contemporary pharmaka and constituting a new commerce of subsistences in the service of a new existence.(10)

Yet how to imagine 'subsistences' without an attention to reproduction, to care in its proper embodiment? As the Heideggerian concept of Sorge on which he draws heavily, Stiegler's 'care' is blind to [ignores] how any mode of care is internally and antagonistically split according to class, gender and race. Like many Marxist theorisations of labour, it overlooks the very activities that make life - and production and consumption – sustainable. The 'economy of contribution' sits rather awkwardly historically with women, who whether as mothers, wives, witches or prostitutes have developed and passed on an incredible wealth of knowledges and practices of care and communisation, despite having no access to mainstream institutions, public spaces or high technologies. It also sits strangely with cultures that haven't yet gone through quite as many cycles of accumulation to arrive at the techno-individual of Stieglers narrative: what about subsistence in this context, and all the knowledges that exist there? In the end, one senses a preference for white, male, philosophical referents in this work.

Interestingly, in relation to questions of care, Stiegler (11) points out that spaces of collaboration are not a matter of autonomy merely: a point missing in many autonomist and network theories that are purely affirmative of digital collaboration. This questioning of autonomy is a point feminists have made for decades, in speaking about an ethics of care, vulnerability and interdependency. What is at stake, what we must invent, is a way of thinking autonomy and heteronomy together: if we think 'economies of contribution' as spaces of both creativity and care, of interdependency as well as self-determination (12), and if we think the beyond the experiences of creative or cognitive labourers. Within Stieglers work, the frame of reference remains the state and an idea of encouraging spaces modelled on digital cooperation via policy (13): no touching upon non-industrial work, no referent beyond a bourgeois male subject, no rapport to embodied practices.

Technologies of attention

In speaking about how new information and communication technologies reshape work and relationality, Stiegler points to the ways in which new modes of attention formation emerge. Technology always differentially structures our attention, whether it is papyrus, the printing press, television, the telephone or internet - attention is a matter of the way we relate to the world, and thus of care. He sees new possible modes of care emerge from collaborative cultures across the internet in cultures of hacking and open source programming. For us, this opens a pertinent question particularly in context of the precarious, flexible and insecure work that neoliberal economies today run on: how might people look out for each other in these contexts, avoiding exploitation and collaborate and organise with both their autonomy and heteronomy in mind?

If one is looking for a hint at an answer that runs beyond the much-theorized realms of hacker culture, 'immaterial' and 'cognitive' labour, one may not find it in this book, however (14). The absence of a feminist viewpoint makes itself felt, and with it the questions of care and sustainability become somewhat shallow, leaving reproduction and the feminised everyday behind in favour of the conceptual pair production/consumption (15). Stiegler’s 'care' remains too abstract a concept. As the Heideggerian concept of Sorge on which Stiegler draws heavily, it is blind to how any mode of care is internally and antagonistically split according to class, gender and race. Meanwhile, as many Marxist theorisations of labour, it overlooks the very activities of reproduction that make life - and production and consumption - sustainable.

The New Critique of Political Economy risks leaving these questions untouched in its affirmation of an ‘economy of contribution’ that speaks always from the perspective of the universal and the rational – against a system of stupidity and short-termism, against the very being of the proletarians as proletarians. Having defined proletarianization as a sort of becoming-incapable we must ask: who can change this system? Are proletarians something other or more than simply

#### Our model of debate is effective at discerning contingent truths—their framework is the style of argumentation that enables post-truth by mooting the burden of rejoinder—voting against them has unique value as a form of deontic scorekeeping that bolsters collective faith in debate’s process.

Quirk 17, The New School, Information Technology Manager (Michael, “The Resuscitation of Truth,” <http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/05/the-resuscitation-of-truth/#.WWK-7xMrK8U>, dml)

Being indignant about a “post-truth” world is entirely justifiable. But I am not sure that grumbling about a widely distributed oblivion toward the true, the factual, and the objective accomplishes anything other than frustration and anxiety. Railing about facts rarely convinces anyone predisposed toward ignoring them, and this is not exactly news. As Upton Sinclair put it: “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” What goes for salaries goes double for worldviews and triple for satisfying pipedreams.

While there may seem to be something quixotic about persuading the stubborn, it is timid to avoid that task, however fruitless it might turn out to be. Maybe, as the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre once quipped, the only thing that works with persistent skeptics or relativists is to tell them “go away.” But that reply is understandable only as a last resort, because I think a solid, pragmatic case can be made that objectivity, fact, and truth are live, forced, and momentous options that can be given a successful defense. Because the defense is pragmatic, rather than theoretical, it is an argument that works because it can be defended on the same grounds as the nihilist’s, even if they are armed with “alternative facts” tailored to their worldview. Thus if this defense fails to persuade them, it is no fault of yours. Rather, skeptics, relativists, and nihilists don’t and can’t really believe what they say they believe, because what they do puts the lie to it. They fail to practice what they preach, and they cannot but fail given the constraints of human discursive conduct.

Pragmatists are often caricatured as being indifferent toward objectivity and relativistic about truth, but unlike their postmodernist cousins they are supposedly “cheerful nihilists.” Most pragmatists are widely thought to affirm Richard Rorty’s offhand (and incautious) remarks like “truth is what our peers will let us get away with saying”, or that we would do well to “reduce objectivity to solidarity.” Rorty seemed at times to place everything in the hands of the local, cultural beliefs of a given epistemic community, which is the first and final court of appeal for what counts as “fact.” If this is what Rorty believes (I think there is ample textual evidence that it is not) then all facts are “alternative facts,” indexed to the actual assertions of a given community. It is therefore inevitable that Trump’s base and his fiercest critics will simply talk past each other. Persuasion implies enough common ground to agree on certain key premises of argument, and since this is precisely what is lacking, quibbling about truth and objectivity is pointless. Does this torpedo any conception of truth and objectivity that is not, in Swain’s words, “rhetorical or rooted in perspective”?

Robert Brandom, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and was a student of Rorty’s at Princeton. He shares Rorty’s antifoundationalism and also self-identifies as a pragmatist. Nevertheless, he believes that Rorty’s views do not support the sort of “post-truth” philosophy he is often accused of having, and which he unwittingly supports when he tries to shock rather than patiently construct persuasive arguments. Brandom’s philosophical project, in his magnum opus Making It Explicit and other works, can be seen as an attempt to knock off the rough edges of Rorty’s pragmatism and to refashion it as a systematic philosophy of language that makes sense of truth and objectivity, and not just an “edifying” philosophy that provides groundless epistemic hope without “metaphysical comfort.” Any post-truth regime would be over before it starts.

Making It Explicit contains over 700 pages of dense, complex prose written in an intensely technical analytic style. (If you can imagine the late modal logician David Lewis rewriting Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, you might have some idea of how Making It Explicit reads.) But there are two strands that can be teased out of Brandom’s reflections on language that are directly relevant to contemporary Trumpian politics and its oblivion of truth and objectivity.

First, Brandom follows C.S. Peirce and Donald Davidson in drawing a sharp distinction between truth and justification. This distinction is rooted in our practices of making claims, defending them with reasons, and withdrawing those claims when evidence or argument shows them to be baseless. To use the most common example: I would be justified, if I were an 11th century cloistered monk, in believing that the earth was at the center of the universe. I could cite many reasons for this belief that could support this belief and command assent: the best available astronomical science of the day, scriptural testimony, and the ordinary experience of watching the sun, stars, and planets rise in the east and set in the west. The belief is held to be true, and the monk is justified in believing it true, but as a matter of fact, it is false. The relationship between justification and truth is a complicated and important one, but neither concept can be reduced to the other. I could be justified in believing X which turns out not to be true, and for that matter I can believe Y, which is true, without being justified in believing it — my facts could be wrong, my reasoning could be off. What Brandom is drawing our attention to is the sound linguistic practice involved in the giving and assessing of reasons. What we call “rational discourse” will involve weighing and evaluating our own reasons and that of others, responding to challenges and revising or even dropping our own convictions. There is no foggy metaphysical speculation or transcendental deduction behind Brandom’s truth/justification distinction. It is simply an unavoidable part of human sapience as expressed in our discursive practices.

Second, sapient human discourse invariably involves norms, elements of discursive practice that distinguish valid from invalid “moves”, and that enable participants in the practice to both track and evaluate those moves as better or worse. “Moves” in discursive practices are usually inferences: I draw conclusions from premises to which I am committed, and therefore are committed to the conclusions as well; I track the claims and inferences of other participants in the dialogue, and gauge whether (or to what extent) they too are entitled to their own commitments. So rational discourse centers around the inferences we draw, inferences that emerge from the sapient social practice of making claims and engaging in what Brandom calls “deontic scorekeeping”, employing shared practical norms to assess entitlements and commitments of fellow participants, and ourselves.

Meaningful human discourse, then, is a) constrained by shared norms that b) guide inferences articulating one’s commitments that c) one may or may not be entitled to hold. Our judgment of how well we, and our conversation partners, avoid error or get things right is what Brandom calls a “normative status” — a judgment that someone is entitled to believe or assert something. Those beliefs to which one is committed one takes to be true (what sense does it make to say “I believe X but it’s false”?), but I am entitled to those beliefs only to the extent that I can justify them. In discursive practices, we hold ourselves and others responsible for the commitments we hold by determining whether we are entitled to them, whether the inferential moves made in the linguistic social practice pass muster with the norms that make the social practice what it is.

There is, of course, something going on in discourse besides inference: there are also what Brandom dubs “discursive entry” and “discursive departure” moves. We are causally affected by non-linguistic beings, which cause not just sensations but perceptions, which give non-inferential access to the world but are possible only for sapient beings that are capable of drawing inferences from them and engaging in deontic scorekeeping. “Discursive entry/departure” moves anchor us to a world external to language, but it is the normative activity of holding ourselves responsible to the inferences drawn from these moves that constitutes “objectivity.”

Brandom was deeply influenced by many other philosophers in developing this “social practice” conception of objectivity: Wittgenstein’s “meaning-as-use” trope, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as “Being-in-the-world,” Sellars’s rejection of “the Myth of the Given” and his epistemology of “the logical space of reasons.” Brandom leverages this account of the primacy of social practice into a comprehensive theory of meaning, where pragmatic ideas like “inference”, “commitment” and “entitlement” are primary, and semantic notions like “truth” and “reference” are derived from them, rather than the other way around, where meaning depends on a general theory of representation. For Brandom, we do not start out with a distinction between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” and then proceed to show how the objective world is correctly (and incorrectly) represented in subjective knowers, a path that has generated all manner of aporiae since Descartes and Locke. Rather, we establish the ebb and flow of human, sapient social practices, of assertion and reason-giving, and articulate “objectivity”, “fact”, and “truth” from there.

This is obviously just a thumbnail sketch of a few main ideas in Making It Explicit. It is a book of many virtues: clarity and ease of expression is not one of them, however. Brandom is a philosopher’s philosopher: his work is crammed with philosophical “shop talk”, and it is difficult to show how this might be relevant to what another pragmatist, John Dewey, called “the problems of men” [sic] that philosophy must address if it is to remain a worthwhile endeavor. But I do not think the connection between Brandom’s musings and constructing an escape-route past “post-truth politics” is farfetched, and I do think there are several political lessons to be teased out of Brandom’s “inferentialism.” One of Brandom’s obsessive points about inference is the inescapable normativity of human discourse, and that such norms, like “holding oneself and others responsible for commitments made” are built-into discourse and shared in common. Put in the vernacular: if you want to talk politics and make sense, you have to recognize and honor these shared norms. You can’t just do or say whatever you want. You can’t just make shit up.

The first political lesson to learn is: don’t let them gaslight you. By “them” I mean Trump and his base, their right-wing media enablers, and those critics like Barton Swain who give the former far too much credit for ushering in a supposedly postmodern “post-truth” regime. This is no time to get all wobbly about “truth”, “fact”, and “objectivity.” They are still meaningful, because discourse does not get off the ground without them. The post-truth regime is a mirage. The emperor has no clothes, so do not give him more power by fearing that the concept of truth has lost its resonance.

The second lesson is to view objectivity not as something given, as something obvious, but as something one must achieve in social practices that involve the giving and taking of reasons. One of the many shortcomings of Hillary Clinton’s hapless campaign was her assumption that facts speak for themselves and that truth follows on their heels. This would be fine if this were a campaign like any other, where everybody is on the same page when it comes to holding both others in the dialogue and oneself responsible for commitments by appealing to shared norms. There has to be an attunement to the context of discussion. No attunement, no background norms, and no compelling appeals to facts. Dropping facts as if they were truth-bombs will not work if your adversaries are unwilling to recognize their force. Decontextualized facts convince no one, certainly not anyone spoon-fed by Fox and Breitbart and the right-wing echo chamber. Little truths are no match for “the big lie”.

Third, what needs to be cultivated is not appeal to “the obvious”, but the disposition to take normative scorekeeping seriously — to hold every foot to the fire of showing one is entitled to the beliefs one claims to be true — and to make this manifest to others who might have lost their way. I think this is the most important lesson to be learned from Brandom’s magnum opus: that ultimately discourse is guided by a kind of ethical constraint, the need for both inferential consistency and inferential relevance, and a sort of guilt or shame when one deliberately fails to honor that constraint.

So when Trump claims that he would have won the vote had there not been “millions of cases of voter fraud” in California, he needs to be able to back that commitment up in order to be entitled to it, and not just any reason will suffice given the nature of the norms guiding that kind of public discourse. Appealing to “alternative facts” as if they were givens, or insinuating “Lots of people said they witnessed voter fraud,” without saying who or citing sources, don’t cut the mustard, not so much because they “fly in the face of the facts” as that they betray a mammoth irresponsibility toward the norm-governed practice of justifying whatever one claims to be true in a manner consistent with shared standards of evidence and inference. There is something worthy of guilt and shame to fail to follow these norms. If Trump has no shame, which I think clearly is the case, one cannot assume that everyone in his base lacks it as well.

It is thus wrong and counterproductive to accuse avid Trump supporters of stupidity. Partly because “Trump supporters” are a heterogeneous lot, and no one should assume that they all have the same axe to grind or the same sociopolitical agenda, and therefore can be dismissed in the manner of, say, a Bill Maher as a collection of Yahoos. But stupidity is not what is at stake here. A kind of irresponsibility is, though. For to talk of “alternative facts,” as Kellyanne Conway did, or to unthinkingly accept them as gospel, without acknowledging the social requirement of putting up good public reasons or shutting up, is to admit that either one does not mean what one says, or does not care one way or the other. It is not to play the game of political discourse by different rules. It is to refuse to play it at all. Some Trumpians fall into that category, I think. And that is a kind of ethical failure.

#### Psychoanalysis relies on explicitly anti-Black and colonialist tropes of primitivity and civility in its evaluations of reasoning – this reinforces violent tropes and justifies colonization

Frosh 13 — Stephen Frosh (Department of Psychosocial Studies, School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London, UK. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology), 2013, “Psychoanalysis, Colonialism, Racism” 2013, Vol. 33, No. 3, 141–154

This article explores the prospects for a psychological contribution to postcolonial thought through the mediation of psychoanalysis. It does not attempt to deconstruct or historicize postcolonialism itself, at least to any significant extent, further than to state the need for a postcolonial theory of the subject that incorporates an understanding of affective and “subjective” issues—precisely the area with which psychoanalysis is primarily concerned. The positioning of psychoanalysis as a progressive, critical approach is not, however, a particularly secure one. The central difficulty is the way psychoanalysis has frequently aligned itself with conformist and even “repressive” tendencies that reproduce colonial and at times racist tropes, often in the context of psychological individualism, but sometimes in an explicitly political manner (Jacoby, 1983; Frosh, 1999). This is despite the existence of a contrary urge in psychoanalysis, especially reflected in the “critical theory” tradition that made use of it in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., Marcuse, 1955) but also in the work of several followers of Lacan (Stavrakakis, 2007) and some British social reformists (Rustin, 1991). The tendency of American ego psychology to give prominence to “adaptationist” perspectives has been widely noted and has been criticized both by political radicals (e.g., Jacoby, 1975, 1983) and by Lacanians (cf. Roudinesco, 1990, p. 175: “According to [Lacan] such a psychological science had been affected by the ideals of the society in which it was produced”). The adoption of a strong antihomosexual bias by orthodox mid-20th century psychoanalysts has had particularly damaging consequences for the practice and reputation of psychoanalysis as a whole, even though recent attempts to reconcile psychoanalysis and queer theory are beginning to bear fruit (Frosh, 2006; Campbell, 2000). Psychoanalytic assumptions about the nature of a civilized mind will be briefly discussed below; but overt forms of racism, notably antisemitism, have also on occasions been evident in its institutional practices (Frosh, 2005, 2012). Most relevantly, colonialism is a deeply problematic issue for psychoanalysis, because it is engrained in much psychoanalytic thinking and terminology, and this has effects on contemporary theory and practice in ways that are not always recognized. For example, as discussed further below, psychoanalysts often draw on the language of the “primitive” to refer to unreasoning elements of people’s psychic lives. Thus, a notion that someone might be evincing a “primitive fantasy of destruction” is a very familiar one, but what is not acknowledged is that this terminology not only has its roots in a colonial opposition between primitive and civilized, but it also reproduces this division “unconsciously” when it is used. This is to say, the terminology is full of associations that position some ideas as civilized and some as primitive, reinforcing a developmental scheme that is heavily inflected by assumptions about the relationship between seemingly irrational and rational thought processes— and in particular who might “own” them. The history of this stretches back to the beginnings of psychoanalysis, reflecting the colonial and racist (including antisemitic) assumptions prevalent in the Europe out of which psychoanalysis arose. Freud deployed the idea that the thinking of what he called “savages” was not only contrasted to “civilized” mentality, but also revealed the origins of mental life both for the culture as a whole (the contemporary savage being a throwback to the precursors of modern “man”) and for the individual (the savage mind being like that of a child). For example, at the beginning of Totem and Taboo, subtitled Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, he wrote, There are men still living who, as we believe, stand very near to primitive man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore regard as his direct heirs and representatives. Such is our view of those whom we describe as savages or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own development. (Freud, 1913, pp. 1) The repetitive first person plural pronoun is notable here: “we believe,” “we do,” “we regard,” “our view,” “we describe,” “us,” “our own development”. The savage is the other, the not “us”; though as will be outlined briefly below, there is quite a degree of subtlety in what this might mean. Freud also was explicit about how “savages” share attributes with children, both in terms of how they think, and how they are thought about by “we adults”. “It seems to me quite possible,” he wrote (p. 99), “that the same may be true of our attitude toward the psychology of those races that have remained at the animistic level as is true of our attitude toward the mental life of children, which we adults no longer understand and whose fullness and delicacy of feeling we have in consequence so greatly underestimated”. The adoption of a binary between savage and civilized is not perhaps intrinsically racist and colonialist, but the assumption that the latter always displaces the former and, more importantly, that the terms can be applied to different people, is. In Freud’s thought, savage societies hold to various types of irrational thinking (concreteness, mystical attitudes to death, etc.), processes reviewed throughout Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1913) and explicitly linked with children in more “civilized” societies. For instance, in writing of wish fulfillment (p. 84), Freud commented, If children and primitive men find play and imitative representation enough for them, that is not a sign of their being unassuming in our sense or of their resignedly accepting their actual impotence. It is the easily understandable result of the paramount virtue they ascribe to their wishes, of the will that is associated with those wishes and of the methods by which those wishes operate. These ways of thinking make them “primitive” in the developmental sense that they should normatively be overcome by more advanced modes of being—a theme also taken up in the analysis of religion in The Future of an Illusion (Freud, 1927). Although Freud himself does not press for political action that does this— he was interested rather in how science might overcome superstition—the general approach is consistent with the justification of colonialism and even slavery on the grounds of the inherent inferiority of the primitive. There is another subtle turn here, however, that is specific to Freud and the early history of psychoanalysis, relating to the intense antisemitism of Freud’s time. Gilman (1993) showed how deeply rooted antisemitism was in the beliefs of many Europeans, markedly so in the Viennese among whom psychoanalysis grew up, and how widespread were ideas such as that Jews were castrated (hence, feminine), that they were “oriental” and maybe even “black,” and that they were primitive in the religious sense (Christianity having displaced Judaism) but also psychologically, socially, and racially. Gilman suggested that Freud, consciously or unconsciously, constructed some of the most conspicuously radical elements of his theory in response to this. For instance, Gilman argued that the trope that Jewish men are castrated through circumcision is replaced in psychoanalysis by the idea that the castration complex is universal, so that all people— including the most gentile—follow a model set by the Jews. This Freudian impulse to disarm antisemitism by positioning the Jews as the truly civilized people (which was mirrored in the idea that as nationalism took hold in Europe at the end of the 19th century, the Jews might be the only “true Europeans” oriented toward a transnational comity) results in a shifting of the “other” of European society away from the Jew and toward the “savage,” that is, the colonized, Black “primitive” of slavery and the European imagination. This theoretical move attempts to relieve Jews from the opprobrium of primitivity (unsuccessfully, as was demonstrated unequivocally just a few years later) by passing it onto the colonized other. There is always a danger with summary accounts such as this one, that the history it sketches simplistically reduces a tension-filled and ambiguous process to a linear narrative. It is certainly the case, for example, that psychoanalysis was from the start full of impulses that challenged and subverted the assumptions of the societies in which it found itself. Indeed, this is one reason for the mixture of explosive embrace and resistance that characterized the response to psychoanalysis: On the one hand, it fuelled enormous shifts in self-perception, artistic creativity and even political and economic thought (not confined to outspoken radicals— see, e.g., John Maynard Keynes’, 1919, 1936, post-World War 1 use of Freudian ideas to argue for the importance of emotional factors in economics). In many respects, it is precisely in the tension between what Toril Moi (1989, p. 197) called, in relation to the attitude of psychoanalysis to femininity, Freud’s “colonizing impulse” and its contrary acceptance of “the logic of another scene”—the specific expressiveness of unconscious life—that the creativity of psychoanalysis inheres. Nevertheless, consideration of the rootedness of much psychoanalytic thought in colonial assumptions is important not merely to sweep away the ideological detritus, but also to identify where the investments of psychoanalysis can provide leverage for understanding the place of psychosocial theory in the postcolonial project. A further example of the “detritus” might be found in some work by Celia Brickman (2003), which offers an extensive account of how the language of primitivity infects psychoanalysis. Like Gilman, she notes how Freud’s “universalizing reconfigurations” (p. 165) turn the despised Jewish body into the model for humanity as a whole. From the perspective of postcolonialism, however, this move, which is subversive in relation to antisemitism, is “made at considerable expense,” because “the modalities of inferiority previously ascribed to the Jews did not simply disappear but were ambivalently displaced onto a series of abjected others: primitives, women and homosexuals”. Brickman elaborated on how the assimilation of the Jewish other to Europeanism positions psychoanalysis as a colonialist discipline and incorporates racism into its fabric of argumentation. Categorized as a member of a primitive race, Freud repudiated primitivity, locating himself and his work within European civilization, with both its scientific and colonizing enterprises, and replacing the opposition of Aryan/Jew with the opposition of civilized/primitive (p. 167). In relation to psychoanalytic practice, primitive usually means either or both of fundamental and irrational. A primitive impulse is never a rational one; it always arises unmediated from the unconscious and hence has not been worked over by the secondary processes of thought. The sleight of hand then is to link this kind of primitivity with the irrationality of the colonized other and then to make rationality itself the marker of civilized human society— or even of what it means to be human at all. After all, when one loses one’s power of reason, one ceases to be able to function as human at least to the degree that equal citizenship is at risk. In the colonial context, this justifies colonization: irrational primitives cannot be trusted to run their own affairs; the civilized European is justifiably superior, for everyone’s good. Commenting on Freud’s anthropological speculation, Brickman (2003) noted how the psyche comes to be envisaged as a representation of colonialism and hence how Freud explicitly parallels the structure of the mind with that of (colonial) society: [By] correlating the progression of narcissism, the oedipal stage, and maturity with animism (savagery), religion (barbarianism), and science (civilisation), Totem and Taboo transposed the racial assumptions of the cultural evolutionary scale onto the modern psyche . . . The psychoanalytically conceived norm of mature subjectivity was, by virtue of the correlation of libidinal development with the cultural evolutionary scale, a rationalism whose unstated color was white, just as its unstated gender was male. (p. 72) Even though these Freudian assumptions are mainly unstated, the terminology and the conceptual baggage of the “savage” and the barbarian remained with psychoanalysis for some time and is still lying only just-dormant in those references to “primitive feelings” that often can be found in clinical psychoanalytic discussions. A certain mode of rationality is given priority here, which is attached to masculine “reason” as it has developed over the period of industrial modernity (Frosh, 1994). That which falls short of it—the “unreason” attributed to women, children, and primitive cultures—is derogated and made subject to reason’s imperialism. This is not, of course, to imply that one should fully affirm unreason as a simple alternative to colonial reason; it is rather to claim that the reason– unreason opposition is itself rooted in a colonial mentality that supports it and narrows the range of what is culturally validated. In a similar vein, Neil Altman (2000, p. 591) commented, “When Freud the ego psychologist said, ‘Where id was, there ego shall be,’ he defined the goals of psychoanalysis in terms reminiscent of the colonial mentality. In this sense, the structure of racism is built into structural psychoanalytic theory, particularly in its ego-psychological form”. This claim is itself resonant of the critique of ego psychology mentioned earlier. The argument runs that because this form of psychoanalysis assumes reason to be superior to unreason, its concurrent assumption that unreason is characteristic of “primitives” means that it is promoting a colonizing process (reason trumping unreason; civilized displacing primitive) that is embedded in a racist paradigm. As an instructive aside, it is perhaps worth noting that ego psychology itself has a complex set of origins, one of which regularly gets lost when its notions of adaptation are pronounced solely conformist and colonialist. The occlusion here is of the personal history of most of the postSecond World War American ego psychologists as migrants or refugees from Nazi Europe. Their concerns were indeed to find creative ways to adapt to a new society; in addition, they were exercised by the explosion of irrationality that had overwhelmed their lost homelands, and their impulse to find ways to fend this off and protect future societies from its recurrence was perhaps understandable.

# 2NC

## Framework

### 2NC ⁠— TVA

#### Their evidence shows it offers two in-roads to their lit: first, the proletarianization of the economy and second, replacing the framing of the “consumer”. KU reads blue.

1AC Stiegler 11 (Bernard, Head of the Institut de recherche et d'innovation and Founder of Ars Industrialis—*The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit (Volume 1)*, p. 85-99) NIJ, edited for language

With the advent of capitalism, issuing from a new stage of grammatization, which is also a new epoch of Western psycho-social individuation, we must however adapt to a system that no longer has any need for support from any religious force, and this adaptation substitutes for all other motivation the necessity of what is called the cult of accumulation, that is, of capitalization as generalized calculability. Now, such a cult is self-destructive: it is irrational in the sense that it destroys motives, for which it substitutes addictions. And this means that the calculation of trust leads to disbelief and miscreance, and ruins trust itself. The rational development of trust - rational understood here as accountable - leads to the destruction of rational belief, the destruction, by ratio as particularization of all singularities, of logos understood as motive, that is, also, and I will return to this in the final chapter, of theos, of that which according to Aristotle animates each soul, as absolute singularity. The rational development of trust is therefore irrational. This is the meaning and the final consequence of the absorption of the practices of hypomnemata - previously devoted to otium as cult of the absoluteness of the singularity of existence, that is, as cult of what I characterize as that which constitutes the consistence of existence - into negotium, as efficiency of calculation rationalizing all layers of existence, such that existence thereby becomes nothing more than the struggle for survival, reduced to the busyness of subsistence. This being so, elevation, as eris, that form of competition [emulation] which in Greek tragedy is turned towards the ariston, is what, degraded by the ideology of trust [confiance], becomes the theory of competition [concurrence], conceived no longer as elevation but as levelling, lowering, as the constitution of trust [in English]. And hence the game of calculated capitalist trust involves a new paradox, given that the game of competition is in principle guaranteed by anti-trust laws. Now, the reality is that the production of trust [in English] as calculated trust necessarily results in the trust [in English] as monopoly, that is, as entropy: calculation is that which eliminates all negentropy, all singularity, all opacity, as Jean-Francois Lyotard saw very well. And trust [in English], being substituted for belief [in English], leads inevitably to degradation, to decadence, to the encouragement of equally degraded and degrading behaviours—in the sense that, whereas eris designates competition [concurrence] as co-occurrence of occurrences, as the arena [concours] in which singularities compete in concert, that is, in the dialogue [concertation] that is this concerted action in which psycho-social individuation consists (in Simondon's sense), confidence [confiance] as calculation constitutes trusts which corrode all confidence and all belief and are at the same time self-destructive. We have seen that workers whose pay is increased tend to reduce rather than increase the time they spend labouring, in order that they might exist within their own free time, rather than merely survive and subsist. And we have further seen that this contradicts the 'spirit of capitalism', and thus that it was necessary to lower salaries in order to make workers work - and it was for this reason that proletarianization was analysed and understood essentially as pauperization, which does indeed accompany it in the nineteenth century. But with Fordism, as a new industrial as well as political model, the producer becomes, at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States, a consumer. Everyone, or nearly everyone, gaining a salary, this everyone essentially comes to constitute 'the market'. A new rationality thus appeared, the expansion of which will be all the more necessary within what affirms itself as industrial democracy, even though the Great Depression of the 1930s will appear to be the sudden expression of the 'contradictions of capitalism'. It is at this moment that marketing becomes king, and that the process of proletarianization of the consumer begins, while at the same time credit begins to be made available to consumers and not merely to investors. But this credit is going to irresistibly become 'lifetime value' [in English]:70 an investment in the consumer as constituting a lifetime, insofar as they can be sustainably inscribed within the vast circuit of desubjectivated subsistence, because they are entirely enslaved to the subjectivation of an industrial group. The lifetime of a consumer thus becomes, in turn, a calculable value. This induces, however, the standardization of savoir-vivre, that is, the loss of knowledge of how to live, in particular through the service economy that delegates the consumer's existence to bibles (bibles being understood here in the managerial sense according to which they explain precisely how to serve a customer, as, for example, in fast-food restaurants).

# 1NR

## Case

#### They link to all their Ks of rational communication---theorizing and asking for a ballot rely on the same underlying ideas and subjectivities.

Friedrich 11—Department of Classics, Dalhousie University (Rainer, The Enlightenment Gone Mad (I) The Dismal Discourse of Postmodernism’s Grand Narratives, http://www.bu.edu/arion/the-enlightenment-gone-mad-i-the-dismal-discourse-of-postmodernisms-grand-narratives/)

Yet the sweeping proclamation of the death of all metanarratives is itself a totalizing metanarrative. It connotes all the postmodern death certificates, each of which is a grand récit in its own right. In their ensemble, they amount to postmodernism’s overarching metanarrative totally contesting Western civilization. In current philosophical parlance, this is known by the somewhat unwieldy term, performative self-refutation. Its ancestry reaches back to the notorious Cretan’s proposition that all Cretans are liars. Performative self-refutation occurs when an argument undercuts itself in the very act of its enunciation, by the form and means through which it is performed. In the attempt to abolish it, Lyotard’s postmodernism is itself practicing the discourse of the grand narrative.¶ Yet the grand narrative of the end of the metanarrative is not the only one of Lyotard’s grands récits. Libidinal Economy, the most Sadean of Lyotard’s books, offers the grand narrative of libidinous intensity as an ubiquitous universal force. Here the dismal science and the dismal discourse converge: “every political economy is libidinal.” Its totalizing Sadean mechanism is patent when dealing with the early industrial proletariat’s conditions of extreme misery, once described in all their horror in Friedrich Engels’ classic, The Condition of the Working Class in England. It translates this misery into erotic jouissance: the proletariat is alleged to have wished, willed, and desired the ruin of its health in the hell of mines, foundries, and factories, along with the disintegration of personal identity in anonymous slums, because it experienced all this as the gratification of masochistic desire. It was only when its libidinous intensity grew too strong and thus became unbearable, that the proletariat turned to revolt.22 Libidinal Economy amounts to a bizarre metaphysics of libido, a totalizing metanarrative involving emancipation: the liberation of Desire as the marginalized and suppressed Other.23¶ Yet this is not all. Confronted, after his verdict on grand narratives, with a triumphalist capitalism acting out its grand narrative of market-fundamentalism, Lyotard changed register. Capitalism’s triumph became part of a narrative he dubbed a “postmodern fable” (moralité).24 This tells the story of energy from the beginning of life on earth to the ineluctable disappearance of the solar system, and beyond. Spanning nine billion years of development, of which capitalism’s rise to an unrivaled global system is but a tiny subdivision, it grows into the grand narrative of entropy and negentropy. Negentropy denotes the force counteracting entropy through the organization of energy into ever more complex systems, ultimately enabling mankind, according to Lyotard, to “elude the catastrophe by abandoning its cosmic site, the solar system.” The catastrophe is entropy—“a tragedy about energy. Like Oedipus Rex, it ends badly. Like Oedipus at Colonus, it admits a final remission.”¶ Lyotard does his level best in trying to present his postmodern fable as a non-metanarrative. He insists that it is not a narrative of emancipation, for there is no human subject to be emancipated: “humans are an invention of development. The hero of the fable is not the human species, but energy.” The human species, in his fable, “is taken for a complex material system; consciousness, for an effect of language; and language, for a highly complex material system.” Humankind is presented as the effect of the development of energy: it will, if all goes well, develop into “the negentropic system” that will make possible “the final exodus . . . far from the Earth.” One discerns the usual suspects: postmodern anti-subjectivism asserting a process without a subject; postmodern anti-humanism reducing humanity to an effect of such a process, the outcome of which is not the rescue of an emancipated humankind, but “the rescue of a very differentiated system, a kind of super-brain”; and post-modernity’s linguistic-textualist ontology that turnsall andeverything into the effects of language. The fable’s lack of finality, the absence of a promise of,or the hope for, a “final perfection,”Lyotard claims, are proof that his postmodern fable is not a totalizing metanarrative.25 It ends with a Nietzschean flourish, echoing the amorality of Libidinous Economy: “the fable is unaware of good and evil.”¶ It’s a nice try, and a very elegant one at that, a far cry from the feverish rhetoric of Libidinal Economy. But Lyotard is protesting too much. Calling it a fable—that is, a petit récit—cannot conceal that its content is that of a grand récit, and one of emancipation to boot.26 For all the post-structuralist spin that Lyotard puts on his moralité of entropy and negentropy, the fact remains that it is the human brain—unmaking and remaking itself to strive for ever-increasing complexity—that becomes the motor and the agency of the process. In Lyotard’s grand narrative, the human brain may have originally been the effect of development; but once it has attained the capability of self-consciousness, self-reference, and self-critique, it takes charge of the process as its chief agent. In short, the Lyotardian fable of mankind’s escape from the doom of entropy surpasses in scope all known metanarratives as the grand narrative of human self-emancipation from its ties to a doomed earth. So much for his incredulity towards metanarratives!¶ As for performative self-refutation: at the height of his insouciance, Lyotard offers, as another definition of post-modernity, its ready acceptance of paradox coupled with disdain for coherence. “Post-modern science,” he says, “is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, non-rectifiable and paradoxical”—with the consequence, it would seem, that one does not abjure reason and its principles with impunity, and that goofing and screw-ups are the price one pays. Thus postmodern discourses, when critically analyzed, emerge as pitted against themselves and become the opposite of what they claim to be.¶ The mother of all postmodern performative self-refutations, their archetype as it were, is found in deconstruction’s totalizing critique of logocentric reason. Jacques Derrida himself gives it its most pronounced expression:¶ The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason . . . is that one cannot speak out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within it; and within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to stratagems and strategies. The revolution against reason . . . can be made only within it.27¶¶ In order to dismantle logocentric reason, deconstruction is bound to have recourse to—logocentric reason! It has to reason against reason. Thus Deconstruction remains inescapably trapped in the “unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur” of reason’s order; and it is to Derrida’s credit that he, unlike his fellow post-structuralists, is fully aware of it. To try to escape it, Derrida would have to resort, as he does elsewhere with other terms, to the procedure of putting “under erasure” (sous rature), i.e., of crossing through in the cited passage that which he is forced to use and practice, but aims to deconstruct: Reason. Crossing through, not crossing out: it could not be crossed out because reason, while being deconstructed, is nevertheless operative as the indispensable framework and vehicle of its deconstruction. But to no avail. This elegant sophistic trick of having it both ways, inherited from Heidegger,28 would simply highlight deconstruction’s fatal flaw: that it has to feed on, and is thus parasitically dependent on, what it endeavors to dismantle. Invisible erasures perforce accompany all operations of deconstruction, using the panoply of LOGOS (reason) to dislodge and dismantle logos and truth, and implicitly making truth-claims for deconstructive tenets. Thus, far from being able to demolish the logos, it confirms its ineluctability. Through its parasitic dependency on the very logos that it tries to deconstruct, Deconstruction deconstructs itself by revealing itself as a latent logocentrism.¶The same parasitic dependence on the object of their attempted destruction obtains in the Nietzschean and Heideggerian project of the “destruction of metaphysics” and its modern derivation, enlightenment reason. Here is Derridaon the Nietzschean and Heideggerian anti-metaphysical discourses:¶

[Derrida Quote Begins]

But all these discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.29¶

[Derrida Quote Ends]

Postmodernism’s wholesale critique of enlightenment reason, arising from these roots, faces a similar dilemma. It implicates itself in the most virulent performative self-refutation, as Habermas has demonstrated.30 In fact, the whole development from Nietzschevia decisionism to post-structuralism appears to be one colossal performative self-refutation. The postmodern enterprise of enlightenment-bashing from Nietzsche to Foucault and Derrida is predicated on the enlightenment (“the implicit postulation of precisely what it seeks to contest”). Or rather, the postmodern enterprise is itself enlightenment: what has started in Nietzsche’s critical thinking, and continues in the postmodern discourses, is the attempt to enlighten the enlightenment about itself and its perceived evils. The Nietzschean and postmodern critique of enlightenment reason is essentially the application of enlightenment reason’s own principle, critical reflection, to itself. Kant had done this, aiming at circumscribing the legitimate realm of pure reason; his critique was, in fact, reason’s self-critique, the only possible form of Vernunftkritik. But the totalizing nature of the Nietzschean and postmodern critique of enlightenment reason—critique of reason tout court—aiming, as it does (unlike the Kantian) not at its delimitation, but at its destruction, gives rise to nothing less than reason’s self-cannibalization—just like that of Appetite in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida: “And Appetite, an universal wolf / (so doubly seconded by will and power) / must make perforce an universal prey / and last eat up himself.”31 This can only result in a dreadful irrationalism. It is this, in Stanley Rosen’s striking aphorism, that renders postmodernism “the enlightenment gone mad.”

#### Rationality might not be sufficient for ethical choice, but it is necessary—their framework is utterly impractical and opportunists fill in while we radically question everything

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Ethics can be viewed as rational choice. A decision must have a consistent rationale behind it, or else it is not an ethical decision. Rationality may not be a sufficient criterion for ethical choice, but it is necessary. It is useful as well. It can provide an objective guide for decision making in business situations and everyday life. Although rational choice is popularly identified with rational self-interest, the ethical literature has developed a broader point of view. Neglecting the interests of others is irrational—not because it may eventually damage your own interests—but because it is logically inconsistent. ¶ This essay presents three specific conditions that a decision must satisfy in order to be logically consistent. They might be viewed as three Laws of Ethics, analogous to Newton’s Laws in physics. They help explain our intuitions as to what is right and wrong. More importantly, they are useful for resolving cases in which our intuitions are unclear. ¶ There are several advantages to viewing ethics as rational choice in this broader sense. It provides a conceptual framework that allows you to analyze complex business decisions that involve multiple stakeholders (as nearly all do). It offers a style of argument that can appeal to all parties, since rational choice, by definition, considers all points of view. It provides a vocabulary with which you can articulate an ethical position and defend yourself from pressure to compromise. ¶ Learning to Make Rational Choices ¶ Making rational choices is a skill, and like any skill, it requires practice. Reading this essay is only the beginning. You should work through “Ethical Analysis of Mini-cases” and make sure you follow the arguments. It is impossible to understand the ideas discussed here until you apply them to real ethical dilemmas. Additional exercises will be provided in class and as homework. ¶ Finally, you should practice analyzing cases in other courses, as well as decisions on the job, from an ethical point of view. Psychological research shows that the key to developing expertise in any endeavor is prolonged, continuous, intelligent practice. 1 This goes for ethical decision making in particular. ¶ Even with practice, intellectual analysis alone won’t make your decisions for you. You can’t just turn a crank and get the right answer. As in any field, judgment and experience are indispensable, and good decisions come from the heart as well as the mind. Yet wisdom must be built on a foundation of rigorous analysis and clear thinking.

#### Butler card explicitly defending theory of power based in the psyche and psychoanalysis as the basis for racial violence. [Kansas inserts BLUE]


Butler 21 – Scholar and psychotherapist a LMFT, a psychoanalytic psychotherapist organization, doctoral candidate in History of Consciousness. Prior to UC Santa Cruz, Daniel earned a BA in Liberal Arts (Concentration in Philosophy) from Sarah Lawrence College; an MA in Counseling Psychology from Santa Clara University; and two Certificates in Psychoanalytic Psychology from Access Institute for Psychological Services, a clinic and training institute in San Francisco [Daniel, “Feverish Nonknowledge, or Intuition at the Boiling Point,” 2021, The International Journal of Relational Perspectives, Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 31:3, 282-293, DOI: 10.1080/10481885.2021.1902734, DKP]

Dissociation, hyperindustrial society, and absolute nonknowledge Hyperindustry feeds on “information without knowledge” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 129), which is to say that it flourishes without human intervention (e.g., mass automation).2 The hyperindustrial subject consumes endless streams of information, gradually forgetting how to produce as an agent within an information economy. Consumerism itself becomes the hyperindustrial subject’s most prolific form of production, and the product that the subject consumes above all is data. Manualized and prescriptive information about how to live (skills, techniques, etc.) substitutes for the savoir-vivre (knowing how to live) and savoir faire (know-how in general) through which one experiences living itself. Absolute nonknowledge mortifies, deadens, and leads to mass dissociation (Stiegler, 2018, p. 194), while digital technology is vitalized and divinized at the expense of psychosomatic life. Feverish nonknowledge struggles with this technological nihilism, in part by espousing the concept of informé over information. Informé is often translated as formless but means something closer to alteration, which, in the Latin (alter), connotes both a change of time and state (Krauss, 1993, p. 162), “moving [the subject] . . . in the sense of e-moting them” (Stiegler, 2018, p. 195), or orienting them to a future that is not or is not yet. The informé moves toward an abyss of nonknowledge, wherein the difference between subject and object is absent, but it does not move toward a transcendence of knowledge by way of information channels. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s intuition as extraordinary knowing seemingly enacts such a transcendence, and in a world of computational capitalism or capitalism sans human labor, such extraordinary knowledge easily doubles as something like the algorithm that not only tells me what I want but notifies me that I want at all. The subject’s mimetic doubling as a cybernetic, extraordinary computer is exciting and even necessary for a “non-inhuman” future (Stiegler, 2013, 2018), and yet it currently besets us with a veritable confusion of tongues, specifically insofar as desire and libido are overwhelmed by digital technology and perhaps even overspecialized clinical technique, whereby intuition and spontaneity mimic algorithmic and programmatic formulas that the (neuro)sciences have always already foretold. To “know” is both about comportment or how-to and about the desire that is embedded in the term’s libidinized etymology. There is a default or a lack in relation to knowledge as a developmental acquisition, whereas information is always already thought to be there, like a thing without life that nevertheless exists. By contrast, “the transitional object . . . does not exist” (Stiegler, 2013, p. 1), which means that the child is feverishly oriented to an absence and the unknown as the epicenter of their most vitalizing encounters with play. Slightly emending Stielger, Winnicott’s (1975a) transitional phenomena yield a (non)knowledge that makes life worth living (Stiegler, 2013, 2018), and while this knowledge spreads across the cultural field, inspiring the various domains of knowledge production, Winnicott was not anticipating a world in which there is nowhere to hide, where subjects are so localizable and trackable, and where the privacy of the self that is necessary for transitional experiencing is supplanted by algorithms that threaten the most incommunicado enclosures of psychic space. The digital technologies that orient much of our everyday lives effectively collapse the superficiality of the image with the heterogeneity of the signifier, such that the image no longer represents the mysterious and incalculable play of signification (Han, 2020). Things are what they seem, and algorithmically produced images tell us what things are. Image economies contort the self into an assemblage of likes, notifications, and information channels that can be mapped by way of various imaging and tracking devices. The image functions like its own brand of religious iconography, even within the sciences themselves, such that the psyche becomes visible by way of neural imaging, which is in turn divinized as the incarnation of noetic life. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow are rightly critical of biological reductionism, and they take heed not to fall into the same materialist traps. They critique a highly intractable Cartesianism within psychoanalysis and its scientistic opponents, and their critique advances “a unitary psychophysical paradigm,” which “requires a more accurate translation of physical and complexity concepts in order to mirror the interpenetration of body/brain/mind informational dynamics in the clinical setting” (this issue, p. 278). They express concern at psychoanalysis’ alienation from the sciences, in part due to the former’s misapplication of scientific concepts. This is not only a pedantic point but a sincere and laudable effort on their part to cross a disciplinary divide. Larger cultural and psychopolitical reasons account for this divide in a more robust way, but their metaphor shifts are nonetheless instructive. Among the shifts, we have intersubjective “matrix” rather than intersubjective “field,” but we also have interobjectivity, a term that has no clear precursor in psychoanalysis and that denotes “the existence of a unitary objective reality of which we are all an integral part” (this issue, p. 276). The post-Cartesian amalgam of transsubjective and interobjective boundaries suggests a lifeworld in which “we are all an integrated part of psychophysical reality, where material processes and processes of the mind merge below the surface of the classical macroworld” (this issue, p. 276). We are always already connected by the information that is superordinate to representation and signification, which would of course include the world of cultural stereotypes, but to make this point – a point which partly derives from Bohm’s theoretical physics – is itself an utterance that, like all language games (Lyotard, 1984), is socioculturally and psychopolitcally contingent, if only because scientific and technological advances cannot escape the histories and libidinal economics of slavery, capitalism, and colonialism that made (and continue to make) them possible (Jackson, 2019; Lyotard, 1984) Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s post-Cartesianism seems to enfold metapsychology into natural science, such that the claims of psychoanalysis need to be coordinated with natural science if the interdisciplinary dialogue is to sustain itself. This is not a dialectic of natural science and metapsychology, for there is no struggle or agonism. Natural science, for our authors, is the way, which seems clear in their plea for a metaphor shift, and which also appears to be a shift, ironically enough, away from metaphor. Metaphor plays with the real, but play, in its most enlivening form, is an offense to the real insofar it reveals the latter’s contingency (Barthes, 1972). Thus, the metaphorical and the scientific agonistically meet at the boiling point, where the task for each is to survive a potentially annihilating show of difference. In practice, this is typically not what happens, and the adaptation of psychoanalysis to natural science, as in the metaphor shift, disavows the psychopolitical conditions that make such a shift so seemingly imperative. In a hyperindustrial society, where the profits of computational capitalism see no end in sight, the humanities and social sciences are often called upon to adapt to STEM models as if there is no other choice, and while this is no reason to dismiss STEM as an ally, there is good reason to query the ways in which a move toward STEM within non-STEM fields is overdetermined by sociocultural and political-economic threats to the latter’s existence. If psychoanalysis is indeed trying to survive this era of the so-called dark enlightenment, what this means, at least according to the admittedly more pessimistic tendencies in media philosophy, is that digital technology increasingly dominates if not replaces the psyche itself, largely by siphoning off libidinal energy; and what this diagnosis means for the collaboration between science and metapsychology is that the psychic subject of such collaboration is increasingly dead and dissociated or without much of a psyche to investigate. Is this why we might manically search for intuitive moments of transubjectivity, where rather than contending with feverish nonknowledge, we long for the intuition or extraordinary knowledge Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow so convincingly (and beautifully) narrate in their clinical vignettes? We might wonder about the search for extraordinary knowing from a psychopolitical perspective, given that the psychopolitcal struggle of our contemporary is, in my view, less about control over informational than libidinal economies or more about a struggle to feel alive as the precondition of that which enables us to know (for Bataille, knowing and living are, at root, incommensurable, even if the latter exceeds and anticipates the former); and while the natural sciences can indeed become a necessary comrade in this struggle, they are heavily instrumental in (and the least informed about) the deadening and proletarianization of psychosomatic life. Such proletarianization does not invigorate an underclass ala Marx but invades the subject’s nervous system ala Stiegler (2010); it is a generalized condition of “mindpsyches,” to use Winnicott’s (1975b) term. This diagnosis points to a massive psychic and political problem, and it is why psychoanalytic engagements with sciences demand a continual awareness of the science’s proletarianizing function in hyperindustrial society. While far from their presumable intent, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s metaphor shift could read like a proletarianizing gesture, insofar as psychoanalysis is asked to become more useful and productive to the sciences, instead of being critical, offensive, or even ruinous of the computational capitalism that basically controls the sciences as its handmaiden, and that leaves so many clinical dyads bored, unfilled, and generally unavailable for the varieties of intuition that Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow delineate. Wholeness, metanarrative, and the contingencies of science Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow specifically acknowledge Bion (and Jung) for bringing intuition into the psychoanalytic mainstream. Unlike Freud’s (1911) reality principle as the neonate’s confrontation with a frustrating unpleasure, Bion’s intuition apperceives a continuous reality that is irreducible to any spatiotemporal or psychosomatic coordinates. This ultimate reality is a global form of psychic continuity that many psychoanalysts are wary of due to its mystical connotations, but from a quantum physics perspective, such mysticism is partly dispelled by way of thinkers like Bohm, whose “implicate order” informs Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s holistic theory of intuition. I say holistic because they, like Bohm, treat “the mental and the material” as an implicate order, or “[as] two sides of one reality” (Bohm, 1987, p. 20), and this unitary reality or Jung’s unus mundus facilitates nonlocal information sharing and the extraordinary knowing of intuition. For Bohm, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow, the concept of wholeness is (explicitly, in Bohm’s case) tied to humanity and its survival. Conversely, Bataille’s boundlessness is a boiling point in relation to which human survival is risked and existentially held in suspense.3 Bataille argues that totalities cannot be conceptualized except by imaginary means, which is to say that a totality requires a thought from outside that undermines the totality itself. By extension, the greatest scientific truth is also the undoing of science or a transcendence of the point at which the object of science slips from view. This is not to suggest that science is unreal but that it is realest when it calls on the imaginary for its meaning or when its greatest meaning hinges on the disavowal of its insignificance. Where Bataille’s boundlessness aspires to an abundance of meaning that tips the scale into an absence of meaning, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow implicitly reject such absence by aligning their nonlocal neurodynamics with concepts like the unus mundus and the implicate order, both of which transcend meaninglessness through a superordinate metanarrative of wholeness. Feverish with nonknowledge, the Bataillean subject does not turn to metanarrative to account for the boiling point’s beyond. Stielger’s teacher, Jean-Francois Lyotard, deserves mention here, especially since, in The Postmodern Condition – his still highly relevant “report on knowledge” that was commissioned by the Quebec government – he makes specific reference to quantum physics and to the hyperindustrial inversion of science and technology, whereby the latter now exploits the former rather than functioning as a scientific tool.4 Lyotard (1984) acknowledges that “quantum theory and microphysics require a far more radical revision of the idea of a continuous and predictable path,” but its “quest for precision is . . . limited . . . by the very nature of matter. It is not true that uncertainty (lack of control) decreases as accuracy goes up: it goes up as well” (p. 56). Lyotard continues with a reference to physicist Jean Perrin, whose study of air molecules, Lyotard argues, “resolves into a multiplicity of absolutely incompatible statements; they can only be made compatible if they are relativized in relation to a scale chosen by the speaker” (p. 57). Knowledge reaches its limit in this incompatibility, and this is where science draws on the imaginary and plays language games or creates a meta-language to legitimate itself, which in turn relativizes its status as “scientific.” This crisis of knowledge is traceable to the late-nineteenth century when metanarratives ala Hegel’s science of Spirit, Marx’s critique of capitalism, and Darwin’s theory of evolution no longer inspired faith in ineluctable progress and/or preordained emancipation. While the materialist turn in humanities and social sciences tends to lambast what appears to be a crude subjectivism in such “postmodern” thought (a critique Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow seem to share), it is less that Lyotard assumes matter 3In the previous work, I associate this risk and suspension with riding instincts, even to die, or primary preoccupation as a libidinal process that undergirds transitional experience (Butler, 2019a). 4The demands of technology increasingly exploit science, dictating the research that is funded, and largely determining the purview of scientific research. only exists as an epistemological construction than that the sciences are partly contingent on metanarratives (or micronarratives) for their legitimation.5 Bohm’s holism would seem to be such a metanarrative. In order to supplement the localinteractive dynamics of interpersonal neurobiology with the nonlocal-participatory dynamics of quantum physics, Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow turn to thinkers like Bohm, who “postulated a unifying domain of active information, which underlies both matter and mind processes,” such that “matter loses its appearance of solidity and separate locality” (p. 18). Contra Bohm’s implicate order, Bataille’s espousal of boundlessness and nonknowledge suggests that any unity cannot account for the contingency by which it is constituted. In a conversation with Bohm (1987), an audience member challenges Bohm’s subsumption of contingency into wholeness, and Bohm (1987) admits to the speculative nature of his insights, adding “we are making models and . . . they are not models of ultimate reality, but proposals” (p. 57); the question, he notes, is “which presupposition are we choosing” (p. 53), and by presupposition Bohm would seem to mean the metaphysical premises, however propositional, that promote a world in which we want to live. Bohm is aware of the hermeneutics involved in interpreting science, but perhaps he is less aware of how the hermeneutic choices we make may or may not struggle against some of the more repressive forces that characterize every historical conjuncture. Like Bohm’s implicate order, the hermeneutic of Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s “inherent wholeness that unites us all” (this issue, p. 279) is arguably premised on a disavowed metaphysics as much as it is a speculative psychophysics. Their information channels that traverse psyche and physis are not, in my view, socially, politically, and culturally neutral. Borrowing a locution from afropessimist Frank Wilderson (2010), we might say that Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s conception of wholeness grounds itself in the “assumptive logic” of human ontology, which, even when recast according to an impersonal physics of information channels, takes for granted the “us” who are supposedly united. Following an anti-humanist reading of thinkers like Fanon, afropessimists do not accord human status to black “subjects,”6 and this discord extends to the natural sciences for at least two reasons: one, because anti-black violence epigenetically dehumanizes bodies that are epidermally black, thus leading to neurobiological conditions such as weathering (Jackson, 2019); and two, because modernity is built on economies of slavery that have libidinally and capitalistically funded scientific research as early as the Indian Ocean slave trade of 7th century Arabia (Vaziri, 2019).7 Whether one agrees with such positions or not, they surely highlight the contested terrain of the natural sciences, which is different from simply writing the sciences off or dismissing the realism on which scientific truths are based. When we speak of intuition, we might thus consider a racialized variety, namely that which reveals blackness as a potentially lethal encounter with the informé (Butler, 2020). I have written about this in relation to resignation syndrome as a condition that petrifies the refugee child into a protracted state of hallucinosis. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow’s description of nonlocal neurodynamics limpidly captures something akin to what I strained to describe in my own way. I asked how a child comes to encounter the informé which they realize their condemnation in a stereotype that could be said to exceed local-interactive channels of information sharing and that instead emanates from the nonlocal informational channels of a xenophobic and antiblack state apparatus. This apparatus induces devitalization by forcing refugee families into a seemingly interminable limbo where their applications for asylum are absorbed into informational and bureaucratic black holes. It is often but not always the oldest child, typically the most parentified or identified with devitalized parent figures, who are petrified by intuiting the blackness to which they are condemned. Here, blackness is inseparable from geopolitical violence against phenotypically black bodies, and yet the psychopolitical effect of this violence is such that blackness becomes the psychic abyss from which non-black subjects phobically flee and through which black subjects fashion a life that exists under social death (Sexton, 2011), to the side of being (para-ontology) (Chandler, 2014; Moten, 2008), or that is suspended like a tightrope straddling nothingness and infinity (Marriott, 2018, p. 204). Many black thinkers argue that such a life demands its own scientific imaginaries (Hammonds, 1994; Da Silva, 2017), in part because blackness is historically, ontologically, and psychosomatically cast out of the world; and yet, insofar as blackness is a paradoxically “non-negated negativity” (Marriott, 2018, p. 223), it is not so much cast out as it is the world’s most sacred yet defiled interior. The nonlocal effects of an antiblack geopolitics thus register psychically as a blackness that is informé rather than informational or an absence that begins with the condemnation and denigration of black flesh but that shapes the psychopolitics of hypermodernity such that blackness is the primally repressed thing against and around which the psyche itself is formed. Blackness is constitutive of the psyche insofar as the latter is organized around the former as an inassimilable absence, but what this means for black “subjects,” at least according to a certain reading of Fanon, is that the psyche – and most definitely the psychophysical – is only ever legible as white (or as that which is not black, not the thing). Grappling with such thought seems crucial for the frontiers of psychoanalysis and the natural sciences, which Fanon, a psychoanalytic clinician, and experimental neuropsychiatrist, already knew. Like Fanon, many black critical theorists refuse the concept of psychophysical unity for the same reason they refuse the notion of a science that is not already saturated with stereotypes. After all, Fanon (2004) is decisive in stating that antiblack colonization creates a species division, such that the very concept of the human undergoes a lysis in which the black subject is psychically and physically jettisoned from the family of man. Technology, breakdown, and the proletarianization of psychosomatic life Lyotard’s critique in The Postmodern Condition (1984) addresses the way in which scientific knowledge is inextricable from a political–economic relationship to technology that metanarratives unwittingly work to obscure. In effect, metanarratives themselves serve the technical function of naturalizing science itself, as if the study of nature is not socially, politically, and economically motivated. Technology has historically aided human perception so that scientific observation becomes increasingly reliable, but this optimization of the scientific project is now firmly coupled with the logic of capitalism, where minimal input (e.g., automation) yields maximal output (surplus value), and where “an equation between wealth, efficiency, and truth is established” for individual and collective alike (Lyotard, 1984, p. 45). If the sciences now produce data and information that perpetuates absolute nonknowledge, this is because of the libidinal and economic surplus that their subordination to hyperindustry yields, not because there is something inherently insidious about science or technology. And yet, if Lyotard is right about the coupling of science and capital, how might the sciences critically account for that coupling so as to distance themselves from its proletarianizing effects? A proletarianized world thrives on speculation and superstition rather than investment and the time that it takes to develop knowledge. What Stiegler calls proletarianization, Achille Mbembe refers to as the becoming Black of the world (Mbembe & Stiegler, 2019), by which Mbembe means, in part, that historically denigrated African cosmologies now explain how objectified human life can become animated by perversely vitalized technologies. “The human person is trying to turn himself or herself into a thing or manufactured object” (Mbembe, 2016, 1:02:58), which is to say that they are becoming Black, specifically insofar as blackness is naturalized as an animate thing by antiblack and colonial imaginaries that still found our national settings (Butler, 2019b). In tandem with this turn toward animism, Mbembe (2016) notes the rise of interest in new materialisms, occult phenomena, and speculative realisms, all of which, in their own way, intersect with the transsubjective in Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow. Transcendent connectedness and unmediated access to the (im)material world inspires manic reparation that allows proletarianized populations to adapt to an antiblack techno-capitalism by feeling as though they can access otherworldly truths. Shapiro and Marks-Tarlow invite us to consider how the clinical setting of local-interactive processes is always already informed by much more expansive, nonlocal, or even subatomic settings or information channels, and thinkers like Mbembe remind us of the way in which such channels and technologies (e.g., settings) are historically, ontologically, and geopolitically racialized phenomena that always already condition the nonlocal as a concept. In a vitalist and animistic world in which technology is sovereign, some kind of rupture in local or nonlocal connection, a rupture in which information becomes informé, could recalibrate technology’s relationship to psychosomatic life. For Bataille, the informé “serves to bring things down in the world . . . what it designates has no rights in any sense and gets itself squashed everywhere, like a spider or an earthworm” (Bataille, 1985, p. 31). The informé is like a debased life that paradoxically underscores the basics about what makes life matter. Like Winnicott (1971), Bataille sees the need for a formlessness that is never (in) formed but that remains an excess that is sacred in its indispensability. If information travels in an ultimately productive way, folding and unfolding bits of communicable data, the informé definitively interrupts such production, squashing the informational like a worm underfoot. Bataille goes so far as to view the universe as informé, as nothing, or the absence of meaning, and this absence is pharmacological in that it can be both a poison or a cure, inspiring creation or portending death. Bataille’s interwar and postwar writings meditate on a violence that is gratuitous, that admits no meaning, and that he, out of a vigorous anti-idealism, locates in a debased cosmos. His thought experiments press humanity to ask if it is implicated in a monstrosity that doubles as its disavowed constitution. This is a question natural science struggles to consider, especially when under the sway of a bio- and psychopolitical techno-capitalism in which the endless optimization of concomitantly automated life is the goal.


#### Conditions in the global south are improving.

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
How is it possible for people in a supposedly literate society like the US to be so wrong about reality? I don’t like to place blame, but in this case, it’s likely justified: the media has succeeded in a campaign to misinform us about the world. Instead of reporting facts, they have chosen to activate our natural inclination towards xenophobia (fear of outsiders) by convincing us there is a “developed world” with well-off people, and then there is everyone else, a mass of poor hordes that will never be able to rise from poverty. Fortunately, armed with the right data, we can correct our wrong beliefs about poverty. On doing so, we discoverable a remarkable fact: over the past few decades, people all over the world have undergone a remarkable increase in prosperity, resulting in measurably better living standards for billions of people. This is episode one of [the Reality Project,](https://medium.com/@williamkoehrsen/announcing-the-reality-project-e16cc71abb64) a weekly series dedicated to becoming less wrong about the world with data. The Facts about Global Poverty and Income First, we need to look at the statistics. The single best resource on this topic is the [Our World in Data “Global Extreme Poverty” page.](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) You can view all the numbers there, but one chart suffices to show the drastic decline in poverty:



Global share of the world population in extreme poverty. We can see that the definition of poverty varies by institution, but no matter which definition we use, the rates have drastically increased. Sure, the rate is decreasing, but because there are more people, doesn’t that mean more people are still poor? Nice try nightly news, but the number of people living in poverty has also declined precipitously, by over 1.2 billion since 1990.



Number of people living in extreme poverty. Where do these people go as they rise from extreme poverty? Simple: into the global middle class. As of this writing, [about 85% of people in the world (6 billion out of 7 billion)](https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Factfulness?WT.mc_id=04_03_2018_10_Factfulness_BG-media_&WT.tsrc=BGmedia) are at or above the middle part of the global income scale. Making a distinction between “developed” and “developing” is the wrong way of looking at the world: there are not two income levels, but rather a smooth scale which people everywhere are rapidly climbing. We can observe the drastic increase in worldwide wealth in the numbers. As global poverty declines, incomes increase as shown in GDP per capita over time ([from the Our World in Data “Economic Growth” page](https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth)): Gross Domestic Product Per Capita around the world. [CHART OMITTED] So, the facts are unequivocal that poverty is declining and incomes are increasing at an extremely rapid pace, but does this actually matter? It is possible that people are making more money but not having better lives? Why Wealth Matters: Rich Countries are Better Places to Live All of this may look nice, but you may be wondering if the rise in wealth actually means that people are better off. Well, based on the following chart showing life dissatisfaction vs GDP per capita, the answer is a resounding yes. Dissatisfaction in Living vs GDP [(Source)](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) [CHART OMITTED] As wealth increases, people become more satisfied with life. Money is not a magical cure for all ills, and the [effects only persist up to a certain income level](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/relationship-money-happiness/) but wealth is positive because of the side effects it brings with it: lower infant mortality, more educational opportunities, and fewer working hours. It can be easy to lose sight of the humans in all the numbers so it’s critical to remember that behind every one of these data points is a person. Billions of people rising out of poverty means mothers who don’t have to bury their children because [care improves with wealth](https://ourworldindata.org/health-meta), girls who are able to attend high school, and families that are living healthier, happier lives. I’m not very good at talking about individual humans, but Hans Rosling provides stories (in addition to facts) in his excellent book Factfulness. As for me, I’ll end this section with another chart from Our World in Data which demonstrates why less poverty is positive: [CHART OMITTED] Average Number of Years of Schooling vs Poverty Levels The data could not be more clear: around the world, humans are rising out of poverty and into the middle class. As a consequence, they are living longer, going to school more, working less, and leading more enjoyable lives. Cause of the global decline in poverty There are likely many factors at play behind this decline (as with any human phenomenon) but I’ll focus on the most compelling argument: commerce. (For a full treatment of this subject, see Matt Ridley’s The Rational Optimist). For hundreds of thousands of years, humans engaged in zero-sum interactions: one person stole or killed another person, so someone’s gain was offset by someone else’s loss. In this system, the overall state of humanity could improve only glacially if at all ([new tools](https://www2.palomar.edu/anthro/homo/homo_4.htm) that raised living standards spread very slowly when communication was limited to walking speed). However, [beginning around 1000 AD in Europe](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/commercial-revolution-of-the-middle-ages-9501350/27C2AF7F2C913BADCDC29631B71EA7BF), a new form of interaction emerged: economic exchanges in which both parties came out better off. This invention, [known as commerce,](https://www.amazon.com/Great-Transformation-Political-Economic-Origins/dp/080705643X) completely changed the game: people were now able to enter into positive-sum exchanges where both parties gained. This is a fundamental building block of civilization: in commerce, both the person selling a good and the person buying a good come out ahead. For most of history, humanity had a constant amount of material wealth which could change hands but did not increase overall. With the invention of commerce, the size of the economic pie itself increases as people trade goods and specialize. Both within and between country exchanges lead to a [division of labor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_labour) wherein people or countries specialize in fulfilling one role, leading to [massive increases in efficiency](https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization). It took humans a long time to figure out, but once we created exchanges and market economies, we started on the incredible upward journey in wealth that continues to this day. We can see the beneficial effects of trade in recent years on the following chart. As countries trade more, they grow wealthier: [CHART OMITTED] Change in trade 1945–2014 versus change in wealth Don’t mistake me for a free-market evangelist. Before I began my efforts to get less wrong about the world through data, I was an avowed Socialist who upheld the Nordic countries as paragons to emulate. However, my exploration of the numbers has led to the conclusion that free markets and the exchange they enable are the [drivers for escaping poverty](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/does-capitalism-cause-poverty/). I also still believe in the role of government: [tight government controls in areas like environmental protection](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution#dirty-then-clean-the-environmental-kuznets-curve-in-air-pollution) and worker rights are critical for making sure that increased wealth does not come at the cost of environmental devastation. The remarkable ability of commerce to lift people out of poverty can be seen in China, which over the past 40 years has undergone the most incredible wealth increase in history. As described in [How China Escaped the Poverty Trap](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1501700200/ref=as_li_tf_til?tag=foreaffamaga-20&camp=0&creative=0&linkCode=as1&creativeASIN=1501700200), China’s extraordinary escape from poverty occurred as the communist leaders gradually opened the nation to commerce, crucially, trade with other nations. In 1978, China allowed foreign trade, and [in the 40 years since, has once again](https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/chinas-reform-and-opening-40-years-and-counting/) become a world power. Along the way, the living standards of hundreds of millions of people has been raised. [CHART OMITTED] China’s incredible rise in GDP per capita (Not only does commerce lead to rising income, but it also leads to decreasing rates of violence within and between nations. As documented by Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature, when it is cheaper to buy something from someone than to steal it, economics wins out. Our neighbors become more valuable to us alive than dead which means less killing and more trading. This is known as the theory of gentle commerce.) Caveats While the long-term picture is overwhelmingly positive, it’s important to also focus on the realities that still need to be improved. At the moment, there are remain hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty around the world and every one of these people deserves to rise into the middle class. The unfortunate reality is that the vast proportion of the world’s poor are in Africa where groups like the [United Nations are working to end poverty](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/) through targeted spending programs and the institution of social safety nets. [CHART OMITTED] Where extreme poverty still exists ([source](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/decline-extreme-poverty-perspective/)) There are around 750 million people still in extreme poverty today. Nonetheless, considering 1.2 billion people moved out of extreme poverty from 1990–2015, there is every indication that extreme poverty can be ended. Furthermore, any time the issue of income is brought up, we have to mention income inequality. If countries are getting richer, but the wealth is going to fewer people, then is humanity really better off? Once again, it’s worth looking at the data, this time on inequality both within and between countries. We’ll turn to the Our World in Data articles “[Income Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality) and [“Global Economic Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/global-economic-inequality) for the facts. Fortunately, the numbers again provide an optimistic answer. While within-country inequality has increased in a few countries, overall, global inequality has decreased and is projected to continue to decrease. From the following plot, we can see that some countries have experienced an increase in inequality within their borders if we define inequality as the share of total income going to the top 1%. (This definition [may have some issues](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#within-country-inequality-in-rich-countries)). [CHART OMITTED] Share of income going to top 1% in selected nations. On the other hand, global economic inequality has declined:



Global income distribution showing decline in [Gini coefficient](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient). In summary, when looking at inequalities, the wealth distribution may be getting more skewed within some countries, but overall, because overall levels of wealth have increased most rapidly in the poorest nations, even those at the bottom of the income level are better off. I won’t go into the [debate about whether inequality](https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/news/what-should-we-do-about-inequality) is even negative, but, taking a long-term worldwide view of the situation, it does not appear to be worse now. Conclusions The news is not only misinforming you about the world but, by promoting a false picture, it’s stealing something valuable: the joy that comes with seeing the world is getting better. While it’s important to be realistic about the challenges we face in the short term, it’s also critical to take a look at the big picture and realize that all of our collective efforts are making a difference.

#### No consistent link between economic freedom and inequality---capitalism net alleviates poverty.

Lazear 20, \*Edward P. Lazear was the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Davies Family Professor of Economics at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business.;(May 26th, 2020, “Socialism, Capitalism, And Income”, https://www.hoover.org/research/socialism-capitalism-and-income-0)

First, there is no evidence that, as a general matter, high-income groups benefit more from a move toward capitalism than low-income groups. The effect of changing state ownership and economic freedom on income is not larger for the rich than for the poor. Second, income growth is positively correlated across deciles. The situation is closer to a rising tide lifting all boats than to the fat man becoming fat by making the thin man thin. Finally, there is no consistent evidence across the large number of countries and time periods examined of any strong and widespread link between income growth and inequality. There are examples, like China, where income growth was coupled with large increases in inequality, but others like Chile, where strong income growth came about without much change in inequality, and South Korea, where inequality declined slightly as economic freedom and income grew over time.

Transfers and redistribution present the most complex picture of state involvement.

Transfers from rich to poor through the tax system are a luxury that only rich countries seem to be able to afford and are not a product of socialism per se. There is a very high correlation (-.67 in 2010) between contemporaneous median income and the low transfer index across countries.

High transfer countries like those in Scandinavia and other rich parts of Europe have primarily private ownership and economic freedom more like what prevails in the United States than in socialist countries. The poor definitely—and unsurprisingly—seem to benefit from higher transfers at a point in time. But the high taxes that generally go along with transfers do result in low income growth for median and high-income groups within a given country over time.

A similar pattern exists with respect to rule of law. The contemporaneous relation of rule of law to income is strong, but this seems to reflect the fact that countries that are wealthy demand rule of law rather than the reverse. Low state ownership at a point in time is a more consistent predictor of income growth within a country over the following decade than is rule of law at that same point in time.

Finally, not all transitions are alike. The Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union saw large transitory declines in incomes for all groups during their transition to the market and the poor were more adversely affected than the rich. In China, and to a lesser extent India, market reforms brought about almost uninterrupted income growth. Venezuela provides an opposite example, moving from a more market-oriented economy to a socialist one.

Inequality fell slightly, but income growth was low for all groups and the poor have not regained the income levels that they had at the peak during the 1990s. The evidence suggests that it is economic shocks rather than transitions that disproportionately affect the poor. Transition from a command structure to the market is but one example of such a shock.

In sum, most income groups benefit from moves away from socialist command structures to free-market capitalism, but transfers can at least in the short run improve the well-being of those worst off.

#### 3---Stiegler’s K of value and individuation stems from capital---we are impact turning the move away [KU YELLOW)]

Stiegler 11 (Bernard, Head of the Institut de recherche et d'innovation and Founder of Ars Industrialis—*The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit (Volume 1)*, p. 85-99) NIJ, edited for language

With the advent of capitalism, issuing from a new stage of grammatization, which is also a new epoch of Western psycho-social individuation, we must however adapt to a system that no longer has any need for support from any religious force, and this adaptation substitutes for all other motivation the necessity of what is called the cult of accumulation, that is, of capitalization as generalized calculability. Now, such a cult is self-destructive: it is irrational in the sense that it destroys motives, for which it substitutes addictions. And this means that the calculation of trust leads to disbelief and miscreance, and ruins trust itself. The rational development of trust - rational understood here as accountable - leads to the destruction of rational belief, the destruction, by ratio as particularization of all singularities, of logos understood as motive, that is, also, and I will return to this in the final chapter, of theos, of that which according to Aristotle animates each soul, as absolute singularity. The rational development of trust is therefore irrational. This is the meaning and the final consequence of the absorption of the practices of hypomnemata - previously devoted to otium as cult of the absoluteness of the singularity of existence, that is, as cult of what I characterize as that which constitutes the consistence of existence - into negotium, as efficiency of calculation rationalizing all layers of existence, such that existence thereby becomes nothing more than the struggle for survival, reduced to the busyness of subsistence. This being so, elevation, as eris, that form of competition [emulation] which in Greek tragedy is turned towards the ariston, is what, degraded by the ideology of trust [confiance], becomes the theory of competition [concurrence], conceived no longer as elevation but as levelling, lowering, as the constitution of trust [in English]. And hence the game of calculated capitalist trust involves a new paradox, given that the game of competition is in principle guaranteed by anti-trust laws. Now, the reality is that the production of trust [in English] as calculated trust necessarily results in the trust [in English] as monopoly, that is, as entropy: calculation is that which eliminates all negentropy, all singularity, all opacity, as Jean-Francois Lyotard saw very well. And trust [in English], being substituted for belief [in English], leads inevitably to degradation, to decadence, to the encouragement of equally degraded and degrading behaviours—in the sense that, whereas eris designates competition [concurrence] as co-occurrence of occurrences, as the arena [concours] in which singularities compete in concert, that is, in the dialogue [concertation] that is this concerted action in which psycho-social individuation consists (in Simondon's sense), confidence [confiance] as calculation constitutes trusts which corrode all confidence and all belief and are at the same time self-destructive. We have seen that workers whose pay is increased tend to reduce rather than increase the time they spend labouring, in order that they might exist within their own free time, rather than merely survive and subsist. And we have further seen that this contradicts the 'spirit of capitalism', and thus that it was necessary to lower salaries in order to make workers work - and it was for this reason that proletarianization was analysed and understood essentially as pauperization, which does indeed accompany it in the nineteenth century. But with Fordism, as a new industrial as well as political model, the producer becomes, at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States, a consumer. Everyone, or nearly everyone, gaining a salary, this everyone essentially comes to constitute 'the market'. A new rationality thus appeared, the expansion of which will be all the more necessary within what affirms itself as industrial democracy, even though the Great Depression of the 1930s will appear to be the sudden expression of the 'contradictions of capitalism'. It is at this moment that marketing becomes king, and that the process of proletarianization of the consumer begins, while at the same time credit begins to be made available to consumers and not merely to investors. But this credit is going to irresistibly become 'lifetime value' [in English]:70 an investment in the consumer as constituting a lifetime, insofar as they can be sustainably inscribed within the vast circuit of desubjectivated subsistence, because they are entirely enslaved to the subjectivation of an industrial group. The lifetime of a consumer thus becomes, in turn, a calculable value. This induces, however, the standardization of savoir-vivre, that is, the loss of knowledge of how to live, in particular through the service economy that delegates the consumer's existence to bibles (bibles being understood here in the managerial sense according to which they explain precisely how to serve a customer, as, for example, in fast-food restaurants). This, then, constitutes the stage of generalized proletarianization, the impoverishment of existence as well as subsistence, an impoverishment imposed on every individuality, whether psychic or collective, and where all of these individualities are faced with a permanent pressure aiming to particularize and de-singularize them. Now, this situation culminates by engendering a collapse of reason, if one understands by 'reason' that which constitutes the motive to live of those souls that Aristotle called 'noetic', and that he also qualified as 'political' to the degree that they are turned towards and inclined towards philia. It is this motive that Aristotle named theos: Aristotle is par excellence the advent of the onto-theologico-political. Given that the proletarianizing rationalization of the producer is that which- passing by way of the transformation of logos into ratio, and as the concrete expression of the 'death of God' - substitutes for the question of belief that of trust, then it turns out that it is the dollar bill that expresses the entirety of the thinking of Benjamin Franklin, that dollar bill on which is inscribed 'In God we trust', belief having become, according to the sermons of Franklin, legitimately calculable. Such is the result of this new state of mind in which consists the development of capitalism as the permanent invention - literally fascinating - of new modes of production and consumption that must develop counter to tradition, and that presuppose the development of an essentially calculable trust. This calculable trust collides with belief until, finally, it collapses in shock: the artificial fabrication of trust has today become an obsession for the 'managers' and administrators of the production and consumption apparatus, even though it is perfectly clear that this fabrication of trust will encounter the kind of limit that characterizes every addictive situation, and this encounter is, indeed, sooner or later, inevitable. The more one confirms the necessity of maintaining trust, the more one multiplies the artifices, the less trust is in fact established - and one feels all the more the welling up of a frightening mistrust, while at the same there arise frightening planetary trusts [in English]. Today (but this begins in the first half of the twentieth century), the libido, desire in the Freudian sense, and not simply interest in the Weberian sense, has become the object of calculation with a view towards systematic exploitation, and this is what makes possible a third revolution of grammatization, after that which opened the age of the Reformation and of the 'innovators' studied by Weber. And at the beginning of the twenty-first century the liquidation of singularities and the resulting tendential destruction of the libidinal economy, of which everybody has a presentiment, even if they deny it, induces both a complete loss of trust by those who have been proletarianized, and the calculating and established disbelief and miscreance of the powerful, who become ever more hegemonic and arrogant. Total proletarianization has as its counterpart generalized discredit, and this threatens the capitalist system at its very heart: the rational development of trust leads to the rational destruction of all belief insofar as this is essential to any future, which can only ever be indeterminate, singular, exceptional and incalculable - and negentropic at this unique price, which is beyond measure, an inestimable price, a difference without possible comparison, without a yardstick, that primordial excess through which Bataille attempts to think 'general economy', the necessity of which Nietzsche affirms as the exception countering the herdish massification inducing the adaptation in which the reign of nihilism consists. This inestimable price is the condition of excess, that is, the condition of all economy not enslaved to immediate subsistence - or, in other words, of all civilization. If Valery can be found to say that all civilizations are mortal, then we are in the course of living a new mortality of civilization. But I have begun this book by posing that this mortality is a catastrophe, which means that it must open up a new stage of psychosocial individuation that it is the task of contemporary political economy to invent, in accordance with that becoming of hypomnemata in which consists contemporary industrial development. If nihilism, in fact, is this destruction of all belief, that is, also, of all exception, an event intrinsically tied to the development of the spirit of capitalism as an accountable consequence of the second revolution of grammatization, and then tied to the deployment of industrial mechanization, which is another age of grammatization, and which remains entirely to be thought, then, faced with this event, Nietzsche calls for another belief, as has been underlined by Marc Crepon: To what does one say 'yes' when one deliberately renounces all forms of appropriation? Nietzsche's response is without ambiguity: one says 'yes' to a new 'belief' .71 14. Subsistence, existence and consistence Nothing in our time is more necessary than a new interrogation of the theologico-political, since the new question of belief in politics is not a return to the religious but the return of that which was suppressed through the death of God, and which, perhaps, will only become stronger, with the force of a phantom, if it is true that when the father is killed he becomes stronger and returns as a phantom. This is the question of consistence, insofar as that which does not exist cannot become an object of calculation- the question of consistence insofar as it means that which distinguishes, but does not oppose, motive and ratio. This is the question of that which, as existence turned towards the consistent which does not exist, and which, as such, is always already projected beyond mere subsistence, composes (with) the incalculable: One must have had in the poem a number such that it prevents counting. 72 In other words, it is not only God who, though not existing, consists. It is also art, justice, ideas in general. Justice certainly does not exist on Earth, and will never exist. Who, however, would dare to suggest that this idea does not consist, and does not merit being maintained, and even cultivated in young souls, whom one raises on this basis, precisely because justice does not exist? Who would dare to maintain that because, in fact, justice does not exist, we should therefore renounce the desire for justice? Ideas in general, and not only the idea of justice, whatever these ideas may be do not exist: they are only made to consist. There are certainly diverse modalities of the inexistence of ideas: the idea of the triangle does not 'in exist', that is, does not consist, in the same way as the idea of the bee, which does not consist in the same way as God, who does not consist in the same way as the beautiful, or as the virtuous, which does not consist in the same way as the French language. If the French language does not exist any more than the bee, ways of speaking French do exist, just as bees exist in the plural; however, what distinguishes two ways of speaking French from two ways of being a bee is very different and even incomparable: the way of speaking French is constituted by its idiomatic difference in relation to other ways, which is not the case for the bee in relation to other bees, but rather in relation to other insects. As for God, he does not exist at all, which does not prevent him from consisting, at least in certain souls. And as for beauty, it is constituted in still another modality, which is what Kant calls reflective judgement - and I say, in my own language, that it only exists by default: its existence consists in the very fact that it causes faults or is deficient [fait defauts]. Of virtue, we must say that it is first defined as the elevation or the nobility of a singularity that is, precisely, incomparable and, as such, never ex-sists. The triangle, finally, can be said to constitute a mathematical ideality, which constitutes a world, that of mathemes, but this world, which does not exist, is nevertheless within a mode of inexistence completely other than the idea of God: it founds science. Such is the force of ideas or, as Freud said, their power. Such is the power of knowing, of sapidity, sapience - all of which has been profoundly redistributed since the death of God, and since, as a consequence, philosophers no longer seek to demonstrate the proof of his existence. God being dead, the devil is nevertheless still very much alive, and, as Beruf of the trust [in English] ingesting and eliminating all belief [in English], he risks ruining forever the ineluctable becoming-industrial of the world. To put this in another way, ideas are defective [font defaut]. It is nevertheless and first of all a matter of not demonizing this devil, which is also that force in the play of forces that gives ideas their force: we need to calculate trust as much as we need to presuppose belief, belief in the diachrony in which singularity consists, and that is also always turned towards the diabelein that supports all faith in its bosom, beginning with that faith in oneself that supports the singular being. But it is a matter of combating the hegemony of calculating trust, which is autophagous, and can only engender discredit. Because if the death of God, that is, the revelation of his inexistence, is not inevitably the nullification of the question of consistence, then we must nevertheless say that with the development of the spirit of capitalism, the becoming calculable of that which projected, as existences (as singularities), consistences (the ideas, knowledges and their powers), this becoming [devenir], without the future [avenir] with which it is not automatically synonymous, is that which tends to reduce these consistences to ashes: ashes of inexistent and inconsistent subsistences. To the insipid. In fact, the difference - which I have not ceased to maintain here, while nevertheless striving to avoid turning it into an opposition - between subsistence and existence, presupposes in its turn a difference between existence and consistence. This is, moreover, what Heidegger's ontological difference attempts to think, after the death of God. But Heidegger, like Plato, rejects hypomnesis, and fails to understand what difference the question of care makes to the practice of hypomnemata - he sees nothing of the process of grammatization; nor even that what he calls Dasein is also a process of psychic and collective individuation, all of which will lead him astray when it comes to the question of a people. He is led back to a metaphysical conception of this difference, making it into an opposition - the opposition between Besorgen, which one translates into French as 'preoccupation', that is, negotium, and Sorge, that is, otium: the opposition between calculated time and Eigentlichkeit. In brief, with the ontological difference Heidegger fails to think tertiary retention, through which consistence constitutes itself, as protention, that is, as the temporalization in which consists the individuation of that which remains always to come. Consistence is, in fact, an archi-protention: what I will call a collective secondary protention, that projects itself in and from collective secondary retentions, which will be analysed in the following chapter.73 Cultivating the difference between consistence and existence - this difference being the singular, that is, incomparable, and in this sense inexistent, reality (if by existing one understands calculable) of that difference, itself improbable (that is, which we do not know how to prove), between existence and subsistence - cultivating this difference is what the hyperindustrial control of tertiary retention and, through this process, the control of individual and collective secondary retention (I shall return to this), has made impossible. Because retentional practices alone permit protentional projections, that is, the satisfaction of desires, like the desire to elevate oneself in which desire always consists- including desires such as those for the 'experience of limits', the savagery and delights of the fall: the fall only procures such a delight as a kind of knowledge that is then preliminary to elevation. Marketing, on the other hand, substitutes mere usages [in English] for these practices, usages that aim to use products and with them consumers, to consume the time through which they consume themselves - this is what must be combated. Like the hegemony of the restricted economy, this consumption must be combated, and requires a general economy/4 that is, a political economy that renews the question of the belief in politics. Now, this presupposes before anything else the critique of 'postmodern' mythology that, as ideology, has made the consideration of the question of the relation between otium and negotium impossible. I would therefore now like to turn to the myth of the 'leisure society', also called 'post-industrial society', a myth that presumes to declare the disappearance of the proletariat and the advent of the middle classes, whereas the truth is, on the contrary, that the control of libidinal energy is devoted to generalized proletarianization and the herdish accomplishment of nihilism in hyperindustrial society. 1. Postmodern renunciation and the quantum leap Decadence is a de-composition of the forces of individuation and of all the individualities that must compose it, including collective economic individualities (a corporation, which is a collective economic individual, is thus a case of social individuation). In this proliferous decomposition, ressentiment prevents thinking of the composition of forces, and prevents the affirmation of their lack of unity [defaut d,unite] (and the lack of identity, of calculability, and of the determination of the individuation that results from it) as a chance: as a chance within that game that consists in the pursuit of individuation in metastability. The decomposition of tendencies is the decomposition of metastability as that which joins the synchronic and the diachronic. This decomposition causes the loss of individuation as much as it is its result, so that what is involved here is a vicious circle: the loss of individuation results from the hyper-synchronization that follows from the becoming-hegemonic of the tendency towards synchronization, that is, from the elimination of that diachrony that is singularity, and, as the destruction of primordial narcissism, this feeds resentment, which in its turn intensifies decomposition. The explosion of conflict is everywhere threatening: social conflicts, geopolitical conflicts, religious conflicts, inter-ethnic conflicts, and so on. It remains the case that if a thought and practice of the composition of forces are more urgent than ever, then it is nevertheless also the case that to think and act by composition does not mean renouncing opposing oneself to decomposition. Now, there is, today, another temptation: at the end of the twentieth century, reigning 'postmodernism', acting from out of a collapse in the belief in progress - that is, also, a collapse in the belief in politics -eventually turned this state of affairs into an historic truth, and thus got itself mired in a renunciation, with the consequence that to want to think about the course things were taking came to appear derisory. The whole world today knows very well, however, that abandoning things to their course is, within our current situation, ~~suicidal~~ [guarantees destruction]: the fact that this epoch is decadent means that it has run its course [revalue], and to not act is to renounce life. This decadence, however, also means that the epoch is exhausted- that it stagnates, that it is unable to engender its own transformation. In other words, this means that it requires a jumpstart [sursaut] - let's say, to remain with the language of Simondon, a quantum leap [un sursaut quantique]. This leap could only be an opposition to decomposition. Who, however, still believes in the possibility of such a leap, who would deny that it is already too late, and that it is futile to attempt to interrupt the course of things and act out their revolution, that is, to publicly establish the fact that, given that this course has run its course, it must be a matter of inaugurating not only a new stage of the process of individuation but in fact another epoch of individuation, a story that follows on from this catastrophe by installing a new order of things, or, in brief, the fact that it is a matter of making this revolution? If it is quite clear that no one is able to believe in this possibility, it is also quite clear that only a new belief in this possibility could make it possible, while the temptation to claim that things must follow their course up until their final catastrophe, that is, until there is no tomorrow, induces an unbearable lethargy of thought. It is impossible to accept such resignation, which is itself a consequence of this decomposition. The necessary leap opposing it is the question of will and of belief. Contrary to a widespread delusion, belief only exists where there is a will to believe. Belief is that which is maintained and produced: it is not a given of individual spontaneity. And the will to believe, which belief presupposes, does not secrete a psychic subject but a process of psycho-social individuation, characterized by practices and behavioural controls, a social control that can also become, as an epoch of the process of adoption that is always a process of individuation, and through the intermediary of technologies of grammatization, a control society, no longer containing anything other than usages. But at this point, and this is my central thesis, there is no longer any belief in nor possibility of a pursuit of individuation. Will has always been conceived as the faculty of a subject, that is, as an avatar of the metaphysics of representation that has reigned since the birth of modern philosophy. It has, in other words, been conceived as an avatar of onto-theologico-political thought, which is, precisely, a thought incapable of thinking becoming, since it does not see in becoming anything other than an accident of being, that is, an illusion. This is the reason that will has become, in the course of the last few decades, an outmoded theme, seeming to constitute nothing more than a lure. The Nietzschean question of nihilism, however, is more profoundly that of will, and of thinking will after the liquidation of the onto-theologico-political—of a will to power of which the operational concept is here, for us, individuation as process. Because, according to my proposed reading of the Nietzschean question of nihilism, this question of will, which is not at all outmoded, is that which the de-composition of tendencies, that is, the ruin of individuation, tends to liquidate, at the precise point where it is a matter of engaging in combat, of opposing this hegemony, and of affirming the will to will --' this is what I have named the quantum leap. In spite of this, this discourse of the will to will, inspired by Nietzsche and revisited by Simondon, does not merely seem like an outmoded lure: it appears eminently dangerous. It sounds at the same time like the discourse on the will and the discourse on power that was addressed to the German people in 1933. It is for this reason that we tend to conclude that when philosophy, as extreme critique of metaphysics, transforms itself into political thought, whether we are speaking of class struggle, of the will to power, or of resolution, we can only expect the worst. We are aware these days that to search for the best leads to the worst and we therefore fear to act. We know, and have learned, through books, films, newspapers, and through our own existence, the Terror of 1793, Stalinism and Nazism. We have seen the greatest thinkers, and in particular Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger, either inspire totalitarian organizations, or allow themselves to be deluded by such mirages, leading to abominable catastrophes. Each time, these regimes echo concepts of struggle, of will or of Entschlossenheit. We have even come to think that 'metaphysics' - in what one calls metaphysics in the Kantian sense, then in the Heideggerian sense, and that affects philosophy in its totality, Kant and Heidegger included - amounts to the loss by philosophy of its object and even of its way of seeking it, as the Platonic discourse opposing the sensible and the intelligible, that is, the body and soul, that is, mortal and immortal, then as the Cartesian discourse of the will to mastery and possession of nature, then as Hegelian discourse on the end of history and fulfilment of spirit in the dialectic of will and mastery, but also as philosophy wishing to establish phenomenology as rigorous science,. or as the propriety of the proper or authenticity, that is, as Eigentlichkeit. We have come to think that everything that is diversely yet constantly metaphysical as the play of oppositions is an historical element essential to the advent of nihilism, and of what I describe here as de-composition. We have therefore lost our trust in thought for action - because we think, with reason, that an action always passes through a moment of opposition. We would like to be able to think without having to act, and to be able to act without having to think. We would like to think that discourse could justify the world while having nothing to fear in this world, and that the world can continue to follow its course while having nothing to expect of thought or of its discourse that could interrupt or divert this course. Unfortunately, the world does not follow its course: it becomes squalid, un-world [im-monde]. And discourse can no longer justify this accumulation of physical and symbolic hideousness [immondices] and of human waste that our planet is in the process of becoming. Because, today, we also know that the worst more and more frequently accompanies liberalism, the reach of which has become irreversibly planetary, and that the worst of liberalism has direct effects, even in the heart of industrial democracies, as well as indirect effects, but which are in fact far more unjust, in those countries that it pillages, against which it makes war, or that it kills with all kinds of poison and pollution. This new reign of the worst is, in its final consequences, the reign of disbelief or miscreance in all its forms, including and especially all forms of fundamentalism (which is its inverse), whether religious fundamentalism (which denounces, precisely, the 'unbelievers' [mecreants], and finds its credit in doing so), or secular fundamentalism (which denounces this denunciation, but in doing so renounces the question of where credit could any longer be found). 2. Passage to the act, will and power Today, there is nothing worse than to fail to think about action. That is, also, and in all its forms, best and worst, transgression, the passage to the act; and power [puissance], including, and first of all, that which the phrase 'will to power' tries to think; and the difference between act and potential [puissance]. Power, in the analyses I have proposed of the time of existence and of individuation, is what I have called epiphylogenesis, that is, tekhne as that which supports and transmits pre-individual milieus inherited by the I and the we, which produce, in other words, individuations, and of which the act is precisely individuation insofar as it is always at once psychic and collective: insofar as it is always the composition of the synchronic and the diachronic as tendencies. Action is always in some way such a passage to the act of a potential - such a passage: from potential to act - which means that action is always in some way technical, that is, also, practical. To think about action is equally, as has long been thought, to think the relation of theory and practice. But what I must state here, with Heidegger, as well as with Marx, is that this must mean thinking theory as practice, and practice as theorein: as contemplation. In brief, it is a matter of thinking practice as that which the Romans called otium. But it must then be asked: how does technics fit into this picture? The answer is very clear: technics is that which, through theory, proceeds from a redoubling of the grammatization of preindividual funds, which thus become political, hence a redoubling of that grammatization that itself constitutes an epochal technological redoubling. 3 In brief, theorein is a practice of which the question and the necessity appear with the hypomnesis that writing constitutes. And this is why, as we have seen with Foucault, the culture of the self, that is, precisely, otium, is first of all a practice of hypomnemata, that is, a technique of the self. Otium is that which is not negotium: it is that which distinguishes itself- it is a distinction. That is, it is the discernment of a difference - of a difference that only exists to the extent that one believes in it, and that one only believes to the extent that one makes it, all of this signifying, more exactly, that the difference is not and does not become that which is and such as one makes it except to the extent that one cultivates it, that is, to the extent that one wants it: one does not contemplate, as theorein, unless one practises it, unless one makes it be, that is, become, and grow, and raise itself, rather than 'letting it be'.

#### 4---Butler’s whole argument is a critique of techno-capitalism.

#### 5---Featherstone calls for an institutional shift away from neoliberal capitalism [KU YELLOW]

Featherstone 13 (Mark, Senior Lecturer in Sociology @ Keele University, UK, Einstein's Nightmare: On Bernard Stiegler's Techno-Dystopia, Theory Beyond the Codes, December 4) arnav \*edited for ableist language

Stiegler thinks that this kind of institutional shift is necessary because there is no parental authority in neoliberal capitalism -- the instrumental rationality of the technological system has wiped out cultural memory and destroyed intergenerational connections premised on the authority of the paternal superego and transferred this relation to TV and the culture industries, [66] what Marcuse called the "automatic superego." [67] Of course, this is not simply a problem contained within education, but rather an issue concerned with the future of civilization itself. In Stiegler's account, events such as Columbine and Sandy Hook, where young men rampage through schools, are premised on the pervasive nature of the spirit of nihilistic rage, where the only way to leave one's mark is through negative sublimation. [68] Here, destruction and violence become cultural acts, ways to assert one's existence in a world that cannot recognise any form of significance beyond base calculations around more or less. This is Stiegler's suicidal society, his technological dystopia, which we must resist through the creation of durable objects able to hold historical significance and thus the possibility of progress through the present into the future on the basis of the knowledge and experience of the past. This vision of history, which he inherits from Husserl's theory of memory, retention, and protention, is how Stiegler escapes from the suicidal society with no future. This is his utopia beyond the petty calculations of the computational machine, the technological dystopia of neoliberal capitalism. In the second volume of Disbelief and Discredit, the relation between the dystopia of nihilism and utopia of history is couched in terms of struggle. [69] Stiegler tells us that we must fight for the right to the future. Like Prometheus, the original rebel with a cause, we must struggle to save the possibility of hope. We must struggle to save our openness to change, which is, of course, based in our humanity, which is, in turn, rooted in our fundamental lack -- our default.


Stiegler argues that we must find time and space in life for otium, or studious leisure, which is today absolutely subordinate to negotium, or calculation and necessity. [70] Fundamentally, he explains that this is not about supporting the importance of the pleasure principle, but rather a defence of art, craft, and the value of cultural discipline, because this is how we insert ourselves into a world and co-individuate ourselves through communication with others. In this sense, he is critical of Foucault, who he argues advances a one-dimensional view of the idea of discipline, a view that ignores the importance of discipline in suturing people into social symbolic systems that allows them to become human and elevate themselves beyond mere bestial necessity. This is why he thinks we need valuable objects that can enable us to create historical fictions -- realisable fictions based in the past that can act as guides to the present and help us to think about moving forward into the future. These good fictions, or fictions of the good, are essentially utopias, narratives necessary to escape the horror of our contemporary un-world and which we can only create on the basis of the care, attention, and discipline we learn through immersion in culture. This is why Stiegler writes in Taking Care of Youth and Generations about the culture industries and what he calls the "battle for intelligence," because it is here, in the psychopolitical struggle for available brain time, that the possibility of care, attention, and discipline is destroyed in the emergence of hyper-attention and drive-based culture characterised by a complete lack of focus. [71] Stiegler is scathing of consumer culture because there is no know-how or craft in the channel or web surfer who says I want this, that, and the other, and I want it now. In explaining the emergence of what he calls "global attention deficit disorder," he refers to the short-termism of real time financial speculation, which has brought the global capitalist technological system to the brink of destruction. He calls this the dynamism of the very worst and suggests we need to make time to think and contemplate the good object that has some kind of meaning beyond its own profane objectivity. But how is this possible in a society of hyper-attention, where we cannot concentrate on one thing for very long, and cognitive overflow, which ensures that we are unable to handle the floods of information that flow through our minds?

Stiegler's answer is that the global technological system is essentially pharmakonic. [72] Indeed, he describes his own critique of neoliberal capitalism as pharmacological in order to argue that the light speed of attention and excess of information produced by late capitalism effectively cancel themselves out, thus opening up space for a new politics of attention, information, and knowledge -- a noopolitics to oppose what he calls the globalised market of ~~fools~~ or conspiracy of ~~imbeciles~~. In What Makes Life Worth Living, he argues that this noopolitics must be a politics of care, attention, and the good object, where the object could be Winnicott's transitional object, a child's teddy or blanket, or a great work of art contemplated by everybody who stands before it. Ironically, the object itself does not matter -- what matters is its aura, that which transgresses the object's profane objectivity in the creation of transitional or potential space where the new, the future, and hope can be born. This is Stiegler's utopia, the truly human environment made in meaningful objects, rather than the technological environment that debases humans and things in the creation of a wasteland, a techno-dystopia where nothing really matters. This nightmare scenario, which is effectively Einstein's Nightmare, or what Stiegler refers to as a "Godless apocalypse," [73] is what he is concerned with opposing through his think tank, Ars Industrialis. Ars Industrialis is set on the re-enchantment of the world through noetic struggle. This is not Luddism, or a somehow anti-technological politics, but rather an attempt to invent a non-instrumental or humanistic relation to technology based in an appreciation of the infinite dimension of value. In many respects, this move requires a psychological shift -- we must escape the vertigo of the technological system that encourages us to overcompensate for our humanity understood in terms of a basic lack that is also an excess which enables us to imagine a future mediated through the creation of more machines that dominate us in the way we want to dominate ourselves. Centrally, we must come to terms with our own lack, because this lack, or what Stiegler calls "default," is also the root of our imagination, creativity, and ability to make a future beyond Einstein's Nightmare.


#### Global poverty and inequality are declining, leading to better wellbeing and health outcomes---prefer raw data, their evidence is narrative pessimism.

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How is it possible for people in a supposedly literate society like the US to be so wrong about reality? I don’t like to place blame, but in this case, it’s likely justified: the media has succeeded in a campaign to misinform us about the world. Instead of reporting facts, they have chosen to activate our natural inclination towards xenophobia (fear of outsiders) by convincing us there is a “developed world” with well-off people, and then there is everyone else, a mass of poor hordes that will never be able to rise from poverty. Fortunately, armed with the right data, we can correct our wrong beliefs about poverty. On doing so, we discoverable a remarkable fact: over the past few decades, people all over the world have undergone a remarkable increase in prosperity, resulting in measurably better living standards for billions of people. This is episode one of [the Reality Project,](https://medium.com/@williamkoehrsen/announcing-the-reality-project-e16cc71abb64) a weekly series dedicated to becoming less wrong about the world with data. The Facts about Global Poverty and Income First, we need to look at the statistics. The single best resource on this topic is the [Our World in Data “Global Extreme Poverty” page.](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) You can view all the numbers there, but one chart suffices to show the drastic decline in poverty:




Global share of the world population in extreme poverty. We can see that the definition of poverty varies by institution, but no matter which definition we use, the rates have drastically increased. Sure, the rate is decreasing, but because there are more people, doesn’t that mean more people are still poor? Nice try nightly news, but the number of people living in poverty has also declined precipitously, by over 1.2 billion since 1990.



Number of people living in extreme poverty. Where do these people go as they rise from extreme poverty? Simple: into the global middle class. As of this writing, [about 85% of people in the world (6 billion out of 7 billion)](https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Factfulness?WT.mc_id=04_03_2018_10_Factfulness_BG-media_&WT.tsrc=BGmedia) are at or above the middle part of the global income scale. Making a distinction between “developed” and “developing” is the wrong way of looking at the world: there are not two income levels, but rather a smooth scale which people everywhere are rapidly climbing. We can observe the drastic increase in worldwide wealth in the numbers. As global poverty declines, incomes increase as shown in GDP per capita over time ([from the Our World in Data “Economic Growth” page](https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth)): Gross Domestic Product Per Capita around the world. [CHART OMITTED] So, the facts are unequivocal that poverty is declining and incomes are increasing at an extremely rapid pace, but does this actually matter? It is possible that people are making more money but not having better lives? Why Wealth Matters: Rich Countries are Better Places to Live All of this may look nice, but you may be wondering if the rise in wealth actually means that people are better off. Well, based on the following chart showing life dissatisfaction vs GDP per capita, the answer is a resounding yes. Dissatisfaction in Living vs GDP [(Source)](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) [CHART OMITTED] As wealth increases, people become more satisfied with life. Money is not a magical cure for all ills, and the [effects only persist up to a certain income level](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/relationship-money-happiness/) but wealth is positive because of the side effects it brings with it: lower infant mortality, more educational opportunities, and fewer working hours. It can be easy to lose sight of the humans in all the numbers so it’s critical to remember that behind every one of these data points is a person. Billions of people rising out of poverty means mothers who don’t have to bury their children because [care improves with wealth](https://ourworldindata.org/health-meta), girls who are able to attend high school, and families that are living healthier, happier lives. I’m not very good at talking about individual humans, but Hans Rosling provides stories (in addition to facts) in his excellent book Factfulness. As for me, I’ll end this section with another chart from Our World in Data which demonstrates why less poverty is positive: [CHART OMITTED] Average Number of Years of Schooling vs Poverty Levels The data could not be more clear:

Marked

around the world, humans are rising out of poverty and into the middle class. As a consequence, they are living longer, going to school more, working less, and leading more enjoyable lives. Cause of the global decline in poverty There are likely many factors at play behind this decline (as with any human phenomenon) but I’ll focus on the most compelling argument: commerce. (For a full treatment of this subject, see Matt Ridley’s The Rational Optimist). For hundreds of thousands of years, humans engaged in zero-sum interactions: one person stole or killed another person, so someone’s gain was offset by someone else’s loss. In this system, the overall state of humanity could improve only glacially if at all ([new tools](https://www2.palomar.edu/anthro/homo/homo_4.htm) that raised living standards spread very slowly when communication was limited to walking speed). However, [beginning around 1000 AD in Europe](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/commercial-revolution-of-the-middle-ages-9501350/27C2AF7F2C913BADCDC29631B71EA7BF), a new form of interaction emerged: economic exchanges in which both parties came out better off. This invention, [known as commerce,](https://www.amazon.com/Great-Transformation-Political-Economic-Origins/dp/080705643X) completely changed the game: people were now able to enter into positive-sum exchanges where both parties gained. This is a fundamental building block of civilization: in commerce, both the person selling a good and the person buying a good come out ahead. For most of history, humanity had a constant amount of material wealth which could change hands but did not increase overall. With the invention of commerce, the size of the economic pie itself increases as people trade goods and specialize. Both within and between country exchanges lead to a [division of labor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_labour) wherein people or countries specialize in fulfilling one role, leading to [massive increases in efficiency](https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization). It took humans a long time to figure out, but once we created exchanges and market economies, we started on the incredible upward journey in wealth that continues to this day. We can see the beneficial effects of trade in recent years on the following chart. As countries trade more, they grow wealthier: [CHART OMITTED] Change in trade 1945–2014 versus change in wealth Don’t mistake me for a free-market evangelist. Before I began my efforts to get less wrong about the world through data, I was an avowed Socialist who upheld the Nordic countries as paragons to emulate. However, my exploration of the numbers has led to the conclusion that free markets and the exchange they enable are the [drivers for escaping poverty](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/does-capitalism-cause-poverty/). I also still believe in the role of government: [tight government controls in areas like environmental protection](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution#dirty-then-clean-the-environmental-kuznets-curve-in-air-pollution) and worker rights are critical for making sure that increased wealth does not come at the cost of environmental devastation. The remarkable ability of commerce to lift people out of poverty can be seen in China, which over the past 40 years has undergone the most incredible wealth increase in history. As described in [How China Escaped the Poverty Trap](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1501700200/ref=as_li_tf_til?tag=foreaffamaga-20&camp=0&creative=0&linkCode=as1&creativeASIN=1501700200), China’s extraordinary escape from poverty occurred as the communist leaders gradually opened the nation to commerce, crucially, trade with other nations. In 1978, China allowed foreign trade, and [in the 40 years since, has once again](https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/chinas-reform-and-opening-40-years-and-counting/) become a world power. Along the way, the living standards of hundreds of millions of people has been raised. [CHART OMITTED] China’s incredible rise in GDP per capita (Not only does commerce lead to rising income, but it also leads to decreasing rates of violence within and between nations. As documented by Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature, when it is cheaper to buy something from someone than to steal it, economics wins out. Our neighbors become more valuable to us alive than dead which means less killing and more trading. This is known as the theory of gentle commerce.) Caveats While the long-term picture is overwhelmingly positive, it’s important to also focus on the realities that still need to be improved. At the moment, there are remain hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty around the world and every one of these people deserves to rise into the middle class. The unfortunate reality is that the vast proportion of the world’s poor are in Africa where groups like the [United Nations are working to end poverty](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/) through targeted spending programs and the institution of social safety nets. [CHART OMITTED] Where extreme poverty still exists ([source](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/decline-extreme-poverty-perspective/)) There are around 750 million people still in extreme poverty today. Nonetheless, considering 1.2 billion people moved out of extreme poverty from 1990–2015, there is every indication that extreme poverty can be ended. Furthermore, any time the issue of income is brought up, we have to mention income inequality. If countries are getting richer, but the wealth is going to fewer people, then is humanity really better off? Once again, it’s worth looking at the data, this time on inequality both within and between countries. We’ll turn to the Our World in Data articles “[Income Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality) and [“Global Economic Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/global-economic-inequality) for the facts. Fortunately, the numbers again provide an optimistic answer. While within-country inequality has increased in a few countries, overall, global inequality has decreased and is projected to continue to decrease. From the following plot, we can see that some countries have experienced an increase in inequality within their borders if we define inequality as the share of total income going to the top 1%. (This definition [may have some issues](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#within-country-inequality-in-rich-countries)). [CHART OMITTED] Share of income going to top 1% in selected nations. On the other hand, global economic inequality has declined:



Global income distribution showing decline in [Gini coefficient](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient). In summary, when looking at inequalities, the wealth distribution may be getting more skewed within some countries, but overall, because overall levels of wealth have increased most rapidly in the poorest nations, even those at the bottom of the income level are better off. I won’t go into the [debate about whether inequality](https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/news/what-should-we-do-about-inequality) is even negative, but, taking a long-term worldwide view of the situation, it does not appear to be worse now. Conclusions The news is not only misinforming you about the world but, by promoting a false picture, it’s stealing something valuable: the joy that comes with seeing the world is getting better. While it’s important to be realistic about the challenges we face in the short term, it’s also critical to take a look at the big picture and realize that all of our collective efforts are making a difference.

#### COVID-19 proves capitalism is financially sustainable---no structural collapse.

Carlsson-Szlezak 20, \*[Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak](https://hbr.org/search?term=philipp%20carlsson-szlezak&search_type=search-all) is a partner and managing director in BCG’s New York office and global chief economist of BCG; \*[Martin Reeves](https://hbr.org/search?term=martin%20reeves&search_type=search-all) is the chairman of Boston Consulting Group’s BCG Henderson Institute in San Francisco and a coauthor of [The Imagination Machine](https://www.amazon.com/Imagination-Machine-Create-Companys-Future/dp/1647820863/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=Martin+Reeves%2C+The+Imagination+Machine&qid=1596553141&s=books&sr=1-1) (Harvard Business Review Press, 2021); \*[Paul Swartz](https://hbr.org/search?term=paul%20swartz&search_type=search-all) is a director and senior economist in the BCG Henderson Institute, based in BCG’s New York office; (“The U.S. Is Not Headed Toward a New Great Depression”, https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-u-s-is-not-headed-toward-a-new-great-depression)

Why the U.S. Is Unlikely to be Headed Towards a Structural Regime Break

Though the path from the crisis we’re in now to either depression or debt crisis is not impossible, it’s not easy or natural, if we examine each of the four paths in regards to the current situation:

Policy Error — The policy challenge of coronavirus is enormous, but what is on display is the opposite of the inaction of the Great Depression. On the monetary side, the first signs of stress in the banking system — in the repo and commercial paper markets — were met with timely and sizable monetary policy action. On the fiscal side, it didn’t take long — certainly by Washington standards — to pass the $2 trillion CARES Act to provide funds to counteract the wave of liquidity and capital problems for the real economy (households and firms). Beyond any specific policy action, we are seeing a mindset in which policy makers will keep throwing policy innovations at the problem until something sticks — quite the opposite of the 1930s.

Political Willingness — It certainly is possible that political calculus gets in the way of averting a structural breakdown, but not very plausible because the political costs are high. To be sure there are two risks involved: 1) The unwillingness to craft a piece of legislation, perhaps because of differences in analysis, beliefs, or dogma; and 2) the failure to pass legislation because one side sees greater political gain in obstruction. While the TARP fiasco reminds us that both risks are real and shouldn’t be dismissed, crises tend to lubricate deal making, and the costs of political obstruction are particularly high, even in a hyper-partisan election year.

Policy Dependence — This path is not applicable in the U.S. because of monetary sovereignty. The Federal Reserve will always facilitate fiscal policy in a time of low and stable inflation and a healthy currency.

Policy Rejection — A debt crisis seems improbable for the U.S.: Inflation expectations are very well anchored (and, if anything, too low). The rate-risk correlation is very solid, where in risk-off periods (moment when investors are less tolerant of risk and prices of risk assets like stocks fall) bond prices rally (yields fall). The USD reserve currency status is deeply entrenched as the rest of the world needs to hold U.S. safe assets (and don’t wish to see their currencies appreciate). And nominal interest rates are generally lower than nominal growth (r – g < 0). All of these factors make for favorable financing conditions. Can coronavirus damage all that and deliver a crisis where markets refuse to purchase U.S. debt? It’s possible, but very implausible, and it would be a long and painful process. A break in the inflation regime plays out over several years.

#### Resource abundance is growing---we have 500% better access to resources than in 1980

Bailey 19, is a science correspondent for Reason magazine, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, writer of multiple books, formerly wrote for Forbes, and testified in front of Congress. (Ronald, 05-31-2019, “Earth Is Nearly 520 Percent More Abundant Now Than in 1980”, <https://reason.com/2019/05/31/earth-is-nearly-520-percent-more-abundant-now-than-in-1980/>)

Good news: The Earth was 518.98 percent more abundant last year than it was in 1980. So says the latest edition of the Simon Abundance Index, which tracks the relative availability of 50 fundamental commodities over time. The index, which was first unveiled last year by Marian Tupy of the Cato Institute and Gale Pooley of Brigham Young University–Hawaii, was inspired by economist Julian Simon's famous win over population bomber Paul Ehrlich in a bet on whether the prices of a basket of non-renewable resources would rise or fall between 1980 and 1990. They fell by more than 50 percent, and in 1990 Ehrlich mailed Simon a check for $576.07. In constructing the index, Tupy and Pooley first measure the "time price" of that basket of 50 commodities—that is, the amount of time that a person has to work in order to earn enough money to buy something. They calculate this by multiplying the World Bank's average global GDP per person with the Conference Board's estimate of annual hours worked. Tupy and Pooley find that from 1980 and 2018, the average time price of the basket of 50 basic commodities fell by 72.3 percent. In other words, the time it took to earn enough money to buy one unit in that basket of commodities in 1980 bought 3.62 units in 2018. Tupy and Pooley then use the time price of the commodities and the change in global population to estimate overall resource abundance. In their words: The Index represents the ratio of the change in population over the change in the time price, times 100. It has a base year of 1980 and a base value of 100. In 2018, the Index reached a level of 618.98. That is to say that the Earth was 518.98 percent more abundant in 2018 than it was in 1980. The compounded growth rate of abundance came to 3.44 percent per annum, which means that the affordability of our basket of commodities doubled every 20.49 years. Back in 1981, Simon argued compellingly that human minds are the ultimate resource. "There is no physical or economic reason," he wrote, "why human resourcefulness and enterprise cannot forever continue to respond to impending shortages and existing problems with new expedients that, after an adjustment period, leave us better off than before the problem arose." Tupy and Pooley confirm Simon's insight by noting that between 1980 and 2018, the world's population increased by 71.2 percent. The time price of commodities fell by 72.3 percent. Consequently, the time price of commodities declined by 1.016 percent for every 1 percent increase in the world's population. In other words, over the last 38 years, every additional human being born on our planet appears to have made resources proportionately more plentiful for the rest of us.